Here are the materials in United States v. LeBeau:
Criminal
Minnesota COA Decides PL 280 Case Involving DUI on White Earth Reservation
Here is the opinion in State v. St. Clair:
An excerpt:
In December 2011, a state trooper observed a vehicle traveling at 65 miles per hour in an area on the White Earth Indian Reservation where the speed limit was 55 miles per hour. The trooper initiated a traffic stop and identified the driver of the vehicle as appellant Linda Jane St. Clair. The trooper noticed that appellant’s driver’s license had an ignition-interlock restriction and asked her if an ignition-interlock device was installed in the vehicle she was driving. Appellant explained that the vehicle belonged to her husband and did not have an ignition-interlock device. The trooper cited appellant for violating her restricted license by driving a vehicle without an ignition-interlock device. See Minn.Stat. § 171.09, subd. 1(g). Appellant has six prior driving-while-impaired (DWI) convictions.
Appellant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because she is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe and the offense occurred on her reservation. The district court denied the motion, determining that the state has subject-matter jurisdiction because a violation of Minn.Stat. § 171.09, subd. 1(g), is criminal/prohibitory.
The parties signed a stipulation in which appellant waived her trial rights and agreed that the district court could consider the law enforcement reports and her White Earth Reservation enrollment card. Based on the stipulated evidence, the district court determined that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of violating Minn.Stat. § 171.09, subd. 1(g). This appeal follows.
DOJ Grants Federal Law Enforcement Commission to Tigua Tribal Police
Here is the article.
An excerpt:
The U.S. solicitor general granted the Tigua Police Department a special law enforcement commission to apprehend potential felons, where before they would have to rely on Soccorro or El Paso PD to investigate a crime, and and could only hope justice would be served. Tribal Police Chief Raul Candelaria, Celina’s uncle, says not being able to protect the Pueblo made him feel like 2nd class citizens.
“El Paso has encroached on the land of the res, and now a lot of the indians living on the pueblo are married to non-indians,” said Chief Candelaria. “We also have visitors coming into the reservation that are non-indian and unfortunately we cannot enforce any penalty or law on them.”
The new law enforcement recognition though, changes that for the ten officers that make up the tribal police department.“Now we have the ability to enforce our own laws, tribal laws and US laws,” Chief Candelaria said, and for Officers like Celina Candelaria, the power to protect their people.
“Now any crime that’s under the felony list, we can actually go ahead and convict them of that,” Candelaria said.
Chief Candelaria tells ABC-7 domestic violence, rape, drug abuse and theft are the most common non-native crimes on the reservation, and the ones tribal police will be pursuing.
Eighth Circuit Affirms Sentence in Major Crimes Act Conviction at Red Lake
Here is the opinion in United States v. Cook:
Louise Erdrich and TLOA in Poets & Writers Magazine
Unfortunately the article isn’t available online, but it includes snippets of an interview with Louise Erdrich, a discussion of The Round House, and some comments by both Erdrich and Professor Bruce Duthu on the problems with the current criminal jurisdiction framework on reservations. Here’s further information about where to find it.
Federal Court Denies Motion to Remand Serial DV Case to Tribal Court
Here are the materials in United States v. Pego (E.D. Mich.):
Second Circuit Decides Fourth Amendment Dispute over Search by Tribal Police
Here is today’s opinion in United States v. Wilson:
An excerpt:
The United States of America appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (David N. Hurd, Judge), suppressing evidence found following the stop and subsequent search of a vehicle driven by defendant Eric C. Wilson. See United States v. Wilson, 754 F. Supp. 2d 450 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). The vehicle stop was executed by two tribal police officers, one of whom was cross-designated as a U.S. customs officer. The district court concluded that the vehicle stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers acted without valid law enforcement authority, having stopped the vehicle in breach of jurisdictional boundaries set by state law and without having obtained prior authorization to exercise customs authority as required by federal policy governing designated customs officers. On appeal, the government does not dispute that the officers stopped Wilson in violation of state law and federal policy but argues that neither breach violates the Fourth Amendment. We hold that the violation of the federal policy governing designated customs officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and that the stop and subsequent search comported with the Fourth Amendment because they were justified by probable cause. We do not reach the question whether the stop was also a constitutional exercise of the officers’ New York police authority. Reversed and remanded.
Briefs here.
Ho-Chunk Tribal Member Sentenced to Three Years for Bribery
Michigan COA Applies Victimless Crimes Exception to Exclusion of State Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
In other words, the Michigan COA held that the state may prosecute non-Indians for engaging in drug-related criminal activity inside the Hannahville casino. Here is the opinion in People v. Collins:
Our previous post on this case is here.
Ninth Circuit Vacates Condition of Indian Country Sex Offender’s Supervised Release
Here is the opinion in United States v. Wolf Child.
An excerpt:
Timothy Eric Wolf Child, a Native American, appeals a special condition of supervised release imposed by the district court after he pleaded guilty to attempted sexual abuse. The special condition, condition 9, prohibited Wolf Child from residing with or being in the company of any child under the age of 18, including his own daughters, and from socializing with or dating anybody with children under the age of 18, including his fiancée, in both cases unless he had prior written approval from his probation officer. The district court imposed the special condition without first making any specific findings regarding the necessity of restricting Wolf Child’s ability to have contact with his children and his fiancée. It did so on the basis of a record devoid of evidence supporting the need for such a restriction with respect to his intimate family members. We hold that the fundamental right to familial association, implicated by the parts of the special condition prohibiting Wolf Child from residing with or being in the company of his own daughters and socializing with his fiancée, is a “particularly significant liberty interest.” The district court was therefore required to follow an enhanced procedural requirement to make special findings on the record supported by evidence in the record, that the condition is necessary for deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation, and that it involves no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. Because the district court made no such findings regarding the imposition of the special condition, and it conducted no individualized examination of Wolf Child’s relationship with the affected family members, it committed procedural error with regard to these specific individuals. Moreover, because of the absence of any evidence in the record that would support the limitations on the fundamental liberty interests at issue, we hold that special condition 9, as applied to restrict Wolf Child’s ability to reside or socialize with his own children and with his fiancée is substantively unreasonable.
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