Here is the reply brief from Harrah’s, and so the certiorari briefing is concluded (the petition is here, and the opposition is here).

I was a little surprised that SCOTUSblog lists this case as a petition to watch. I don’t see any of the indicators that this would be the kind of case to make the discuss list (including either party employing a member of the Supreme Court “bar” suggested by Prof. Lazarus), except for the very superficial circuit split alleged by the petitioners. Maybe they know something I don’t. [I suppose that SCOTUSblog might think this case is similar to Carcieri and MichGO, but I doubt it.]

I say the circuit split is superficial, but in reality it is illusory. The claimed split is between the Ninth and Second Circuits over the definition of “Indian lands.” The CA2 looked at “Indian lands” as used in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2711), and the CA9 looked at “Indian lands” as used in Section 81 of Title 25. The CA2 said that IGRA’s “Indian lands” definition includes both lands already held in trust and lands that will go into trust. The CA9 says that Section 81’s “Indian lands” definition includes only lands already held in trust. Both courts seem to have spent some time reading the dictionary on these cases — 1 U.S.C. 1 et seq. Looks like a split, right?

NO.

Hopefully, the SCT and their clerks will realize that no split exists at all. There are two reasons. First, the purposes of each statute distinguish them, even though they use the same words. Second, the operation and implementation of the different statutes prevent them from conflicting. I really don’t think the Dictionary Act would trump either of these two arguments, or else someone better go back and reargue D.C. v. Heller.

OK, the first point. Section 2711 is about management contracts that tribes might sign to manage a gaming facility. Tribes will and do sign these contracts long before any land is taken into trust, and even before a tribe owns a single acre. So it is the National Indian Gaming Commission’s responsibility to review these contracts could kick in before any land is taken into trust, making the CA2’s outcome reasonable. Section 81, on the other hand, is about tribes collateralizing lands held in trust for the tribes by the Secretary of Interior. There’s no reason to review a contract that potentially encumbers tribal trust land unless that land is already in trust, making the CA9’s decision reasonable.

Which leads to the second point, closely related — the Secretary cannot take land into trust without first determining that there are no encumbrances on the land (25 U.S.C. 465). So under Section 81, the Secretary doesn’t need to review a contract that might encumber trust land. In other words, the Secretary will never review a contract that might encumber “Indian lands” under Section 81 unless the land is already in trust. So, the CA9’s decision is the only decision possible. Conversely, IGRA expressly allows for the NIGC to review a contract regarding lands that will go into trust, often because the contract itself will provide the tribe funds to buy lands and ask the Secretary to take the land into trust.

And so, no circuit split.

I hope the Court isn’t confused by this one.