sovereign immunity – Page 127

Eastern Shawnee Complaint and Motion for Summary J in Gaming Compact Arbitration Case

June 28, 2010Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Similar to the Chickasaw and Choctaw case we noted last week.

Here are the materials in Eastern Shawnee Tribe v. Oklahoma:

2010172 – ESTOO v. OK – Complaint – FILE-STAMPED 5.4.10 – 1 –

2014075 – ESTOO v. OK – Plaintiff ESTOOs Motion for Summary J

Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations Win Injunction against Oklahoma Courts for Accepting Jurisdiction over Claims under their Gaming Compact

June 25, 2010June 26, 2010Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the order in Choctaw Nation and Chickasaw Nation v. State of Oklahoma (W.D. Okla.): choctawchickasaworder.

If you’ll recall, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in a series of cases held that state courts were “courts of competent jurisdiction” to take jurisdiction over tort claims brought under a Class III gaming compact approved by Oklahoma voters and, later, several Oklahoma tribes.

Oklahoma tribes (with the State consenting) then invoked the arbitration provision of the compacts, arguing the Supreme Court had violated the terms of the compact. They were successful.

This federal suit followed. Very interesting case.

Federal Court Slip and Fall Action against Eastern Band Cherokee Dismissed

June 24, 2010Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Madewell v. Harrah’s (W.D. N.C.): DCT Order Dismissing Slip and Fall Claim

Ninth Circuit Allows EEOC Claim against Peabody Coal to Proceed; EEOC and Navajo May Seek Injunctive Relief

June 23, 2010June 23, 2010Matthew L.M. Fletcher4 Comments

Ah, Rule 19!

Here is Judge William Fletcher’s opinion in EEOC v. Peabody Coal. Here are the briefs.

And supplemental authority filed by the Navajo Nation: Austin v Andrus Brief.

Cert Petition on Hoffman v. Sandia Resort and Casino

June 23, 2010December 15, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Available ~~here, on Mr. Hoffman’s website.~~ here:

Hoffman petition

UPDATE: Incidentally, Hoffman’s attorney apparently is the same Paul Livingston who challenged the Santa Fe Indian Market all those years ago in Livingston v. Ewing, known to (according to an anonymous source) “rant[] in local right wingnut rags about abolishing Indian law.”

Lower court materials here. Local TV coverage here, via Pechanga.

Questions presented:

1. Whether the doctrine of tribal immunity properly bars claims that an Indian Casino cheated a non-Indian gambler by refusing to pay a slot machine jackpot?

2. Whether the “property damage” under the waiver of immunity in Section 8 of the Tribal Gaming Compact applies only to physical damage to property?

As you might suspect, I give this petition very little chance. I would doubt any response is necessary. There’s no split in authority and the case isn’t important on a national level. As for question 1, I am always suspicious of claims that Indian casinos have cheated gamblers because casinos LOVE IT when there’s a jackpot — it means that everyone and their brother is going to show up at that casino to replicate the magic. And question 2 is just patently frivolous.

California Trial Court Dismisses Claims on Timbisha Bank Accounts, Citing Tribal Immunity

June 11, 2010Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion: Canyon National Bank v Timbisha Shoshone Tribe

An excerpt:

Thus, the Court concludes that sovereign immunity bars it from exercising jurisdiction over the Tribe. Nevertheless, the Beaman Faction would have the Court find that it could exercise jurisdiction over the Kennedy Faction to resolve this case. The Kennedy Faction contends that its members are protected by sovereign immunity. The Court need not resolve this issue. Because it cannot exercise jurisdiction over the Tribe, it cannot hear the interpleader action: to hear such an action all potential stakeholders must be parties. California Code of Civil Procedure section 386(b) provides “Any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity against whom double or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more person which are such that they may give rise to double or multiple liability, may bring an action against the claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims.” The statute does not permit an action against only some of the claimants for an obvious reason: the purpose of the statute is to permit the stakeholder to require all of the competing claimants to litigate their claims. Without all of the competing claimants being joined in the litigation, a court could not determine which was entitled to the funds. Obviously, a court cannot adjudicate the rights of parties who are not before it. Holloway v. Thiele (1953) 116 Cal. App. 2d 68, 74. Here, without the Tribe being a litigant, the Court does not have all of the potential claimants before it-indeed, it is lacking the most important litigant, the one in whose name the other parties claim to have the authority to act-and thus cannot adjudicate the competing claims.