Here are the materials so far in Sichenzia Ross Ference LLP v. Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians of Utah (S.D. N.Y.):

Here are the materials so far in Sichenzia Ross Ference LLP v. Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians of Utah (S.D. N.Y.):

It is true that Indian reservations are “physically within the territory of the United States.” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (emphasis added). The PKPA’s definition of “State,” however, includes “a territory . . . of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(8) (emphasis added), which is most naturally understood to mean a political entity that is not a state but is still “[a] part of the United States . . . with a separate legislature (such as Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands).” Territory, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (“The Virgin Islands . . . are declared an unincorporated territory of the United States of America.”). And the Supreme Court has made clear that within our constitutional order, such “territories” are distinct from Indian tribes.
***
Our conclusion that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes is further supported by the fact that when Congress intends for tribes to be subject to statutory full-faith-and-credit requirements, it expressly says so.
***
For the reasons explained above, we conclude that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. As a result, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court is not obligated under that statute to enforce the North Dakota court orders awarding custody of C.S.N. to Nygaard. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court.
Here are the materials in United States v. Kills Warrior (D.S.D.):
Here is the order in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Vanir Construction Management Inc. (D. Idaho):

Briefs here.
Here are the materials in Turpen v. Muckleshoot Tribal Court (W.D. Wash.):

It’s an older case, from back in April, but here are the materials in Gilliland v. Barteaux (N.D. Okla.):

Sarah Deer has published “Feminist Jurisprudence in Tribal Courts: An Untapped Opportunity” in the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism.
An excerpt:
What if every gendered legal issue was not burdened by over 200 years of patriarchal and racist precedent? How would feminists craft legal practices and structures in a way that would be grounded by a clear understanding of the harms of oppression and subjugation? These questions are not just rhetorical; this essay argues that a fresh perspective is possible in the context of an Indigenous feminist jurisprudence. Indigenous feminist legal theory (IFLT) is in its nascent stages as a contemporary academic discipline and praxis. It has largely been elucidated by legal scholars in Canada, including Emily Snyder, Val Napoleon, and John Borrows. Snyder explains that IFLT lies at the intersection of feminist legal theory, Indigenous feminist theory, and Indigenous legal theory.

Here are the materials in Dakota Metal Fabrication v. Parisien (D.N.D.):

You must be logged in to post a comment.