Here is today’s order list.
The petitions are here.
Here is today’s order list.
The petitions are here.
Here are the updated materials in Nambé Pueblo Housing Authority v. Department of Housing and Urban Development (D. Colo.):
56 Plaintiff Statement of Relief Requested
Here is an excerpt from the order:
the defendants shall restore to Plaintiff Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity all Indian Housing Block Grant funds that it has recaptured for twenty-three units located in housing projects known as NM99B040011 (Project 11) and Project NM99B040013 (Project 13)and one unit located in the housing project known as NM99B040017 (Project 17); the Defendants shall refrain from threatening recapture of funding associated with those units and shall not act upon any threatened recapture; that on or before April 15, 2014, Plaintiff Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity shall submit a proposed form of judgment, specifying the amounts to be paid to it and the asserted sources of the payment; that if Plaintiff Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity claims entitlement to payment for underfunding because HUD excluded those units from its FCAS in a particular year, the proposed form of judgment should include a separate itemization for those amounts, which may be submitted by May 15, 2014. An Appendix may be provided to explain the calculation of the amount owed and the record support for the claim. The Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs will be addressed after entry of judgment, by Judge Richard P. Matsch on 3/7/2014.
Prior post in this case is here.
Here:
opening brief of plaintiffs-appellants
addendum to brief of plaintiffs-appellants
The MSU ILPC filed an amicus brief in this matter as well:
Lower court order here:
108 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss
Here are the opening lines of the appellants’ brief:
Appellees engineered and executed a scheme to swindle hundreds of millions of dollars in oil-and-gas lease revenue from Appellants Ramona Two Shields and Mary Louise Defender Wilson and the class of Native Americans they propose to represent. Yet the District Court concluded that Appellants could not, as a matter of law, pursue their North Dakota common-law claims against Appellees simply because Appellees involved the United States in their swindle. Based on that fact alone, the District Court found that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 required dismissal of Appellants’ entire case.
There is a parallel suit against the United States in the CFC.
James D. Leach has published “Bad Men Among the Whites” Claims After Richard v. United States” in the New Mexico Law Review.
An excerpt:
This article contends that Richard provides Indians with exactly what they bargained for and received when their tribes negotiated and signed treaties with the United States. The government is unlikely to return the parties to their pre-agreement status by returning to Indians the lands they gave up in treaties. The right of Indians to receive what the government promised them in exchange for large amounts of tribal land would seem to be beyond moral or legal dispute. But as we will see, even these seemingly self-evident principles are now disputed.
Our post on the Richard case is here.
Here are the new materials in Smith v. Parker (D. Neb.):
136 Village of Pender Response
Cross-motions for summary judgment and briefs are here. Prior posts here, here, and here.
Here are the new materials in Fletcher v. United States (N.D. Okla.):
1196 DCT Order Certifying Class
This case is on remand from the Tenth Circuit; post here.
Here:
Wolfchild questions presented:
1. Whether the court of appeals interpretations of statutes specific to the Mdewakanton Band — 1863 Acts, 1888-1890 Acts and 1980 Act: (a) contradict Tohono O’Odham Nation because the court of appeals failed to appreciate that the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC) is to provide a judicial forum for most non-tort requests for significant monetary relief against the United States; (b) contradict Nevada v. Hicks, because the court of appeals opinions, including the Eighth Circuit opinion in Smith v. Babbitt, essentially refer the Mdewakanton Band’s federal claims to tribal courts which lack jurisdiction; (c) contradict Mitchell I, Mitchell II, White Mountain Apache, and Navajo Nation because the court of appeals misinterpreted statutory trust and other legal obligations and failed to properly apply the money-mandating duty requirement; (d) conflict with the First Circuit opinion in Passamaquoddy Tribe because the court of appeals failed to apply the “plain and unambiguous” requirement to the 1980 Act for the purported termination of the Mdewakanton Band and its statutory property rights; and (e) contradict Carcieri because the court of appeals treated the three non-tribal communities as sovereign historical tribes when they are not.
2. Whether the court of appeals’ interpretation of statutes general to American Indians: (a) contradict Oneida I and Oneida II and their progeny because the court of appeals failed to properly interpret the Indian Nonintercourse Act to require Congressional authorization prior to the purported termination of the Mdewakanton Band’s tribal statutory property rights; (b) contradict Carcieri and the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) because the court of appeals deemed the purchased IRA lands to be held exclusively in trust for the three post-1934 non-tribal communities; and (c) misinterpreted the six-year statute of limitations and the Indian Trust Accounting Statute (ITAS) to bar the Mdewakanton Band’s monetary claims.
3. Whether summary judgment should have been granted to petitioners on the pre-1980 and post-1980 statutory fund claims and the statutory land claim.
Zephier questions presented:
I. Whether the Federal Circuit’s 2013 holding that a February 16, 1863 Act of Congress, providing that “the Secretary of Interior is hereby authorized to set apart of the public lands . . . eighty acres in severalty” to loyal Mdewakanton Indian individuals, is “too discretionary to support a viable claim,” thereby conflicts with this Court’s and other precedents holding that power given to public officers in permissive form statutory language, but involving individual property rights calling for its exercise, the language used is “in fact peremptory” and money-mandating?
II. Whether the Panel failed to recognize the trust nature of the February 1863 Act in rejecting Petitioners’ “two basic claims” and thus issued a determination that conflicts with a previous authoritative decision in Wolfchild v. United States, 559 F.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2009), which found that the language of the Act of February 16, 1863, Section 9, ch. 37, 12 Stat. 652, “created an inheritable beneficial interest in the recipients of any land conveyed under the statute . . . [and] explicitly created a trust relationship” with the Federal Government?
III. Whether the Secretary of Interior’s 1865 actions “invoking the land-allocating authority of the two 1863 Acts” created an equitable estoppel against the Government, conflicting with the 2013 Panel’s conclusion that “those 1865 actions . . . cannot support a timely claim for relief?”
IV. Whether the Panel erred in failing to find an actionable violation of the 1851 and 1858 treaties between the Government and the loyal Mdewakanton by the Government’s failure to fully implement Section 9 of the Act of February 16, 1863?
Lower court materials here.
Here.
Here.
An excerpt:
At issue are contract support costs that are spelled out in the agreements, under which the government pays tribes to run education, public safety and health programs on reservations. The support costs — which include items like travel expenses, legal and accounting fees, insurance costs and worker’s compensation fees — typically account for 20 percent of the value of the contract, according to Lloyd Miller, a lawyer who represented the tribes at the Supreme Court.
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