Here:
Lower court materials here.
trust relationship
Opening Eighth Circuit Brief in Two Shields v. Wilkinson
Here:
opening brief of plaintiffs-appellants
addendum to brief of plaintiffs-appellants
The MSU ILPC filed an amicus brief in this matter as well:
Lower court order here:
108 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss
Here are the opening lines of the appellants’ brief:
Appellees engineered and executed a scheme to swindle hundreds of millions of dollars in oil-and-gas lease revenue from Appellants Ramona Two Shields and Mary Louise Defender Wilson and the class of Native Americans they propose to represent. Yet the District Court concluded that Appellants could not, as a matter of law, pursue their North Dakota common-law claims against Appellees simply because Appellees involved the United States in their swindle. Based on that fact alone, the District Court found that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 required dismissal of Appellants’ entire case.
There is a parallel suit against the United States in the CFC.
New Scholarship on the “Bad Men” Clause in the Sherman Treaties
James D. Leach has published “Bad Men Among the Whites” Claims After Richard v. United States” in the New Mexico Law Review.
An excerpt:
This article contends that Richard provides Indians with exactly what they bargained for and received when their tribes negotiated and signed treaties with the United States. The government is unlikely to return the parties to their pre-agreement status by returning to Indians the lands they gave up in treaties. The right of Indians to receive what the government promised them in exchange for large amounts of tribal land would seem to be beyond moral or legal dispute. But as we will see, even these seemingly self-evident principles are now disputed.
Our post on the Richard case is here.
Federal Court Holds Omaha Reservation Not Diminished in Tribal Liquor Jurisdiction Matter
Here are the new materials in Smith v. Parker (D. Neb.):
136 Village of Pender Response
Cross-motions for summary judgment and briefs are here. Prior posts here, here, and here.
Federal Court Certifies Class in Osage Headrights Accounting Suit
Here are the new materials in Fletcher v. United States (N.D. Okla.):
1196 DCT Order Certifying Class
This case is on remand from the Tenth Circuit; post here.
Zephier v. United States & Wolfchild v. United States Cert Petitions
Here:
Wolfchild questions presented:
1. Whether the court of appeals interpretations of statutes specific to the Mdewakanton Band — 1863 Acts, 1888-1890 Acts and 1980 Act: (a) contradict Tohono O’Odham Nation because the court of appeals failed to appreciate that the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC) is to provide a judicial forum for most non-tort requests for significant monetary relief against the United States; (b) contradict Nevada v. Hicks, because the court of appeals opinions, including the Eighth Circuit opinion in Smith v. Babbitt, essentially refer the Mdewakanton Band’s federal claims to tribal courts which lack jurisdiction; (c) contradict Mitchell I, Mitchell II, White Mountain Apache, and Navajo Nation because the court of appeals misinterpreted statutory trust and other legal obligations and failed to properly apply the money-mandating duty requirement; (d) conflict with the First Circuit opinion in Passamaquoddy Tribe because the court of appeals failed to apply the “plain and unambiguous” requirement to the 1980 Act for the purported termination of the Mdewakanton Band and its statutory property rights; and (e) contradict Carcieri because the court of appeals treated the three non-tribal communities as sovereign historical tribes when they are not.
2. Whether the court of appeals’ interpretation of statutes general to American Indians: (a) contradict Oneida I and Oneida II and their progeny because the court of appeals failed to properly interpret the Indian Nonintercourse Act to require Congressional authorization prior to the purported termination of the Mdewakanton Band’s tribal statutory property rights; (b) contradict Carcieri and the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) because the court of appeals deemed the purchased IRA lands to be held exclusively in trust for the three post-1934 non-tribal communities; and (c) misinterpreted the six-year statute of limitations and the Indian Trust Accounting Statute (ITAS) to bar the Mdewakanton Band’s monetary claims.
3. Whether summary judgment should have been granted to petitioners on the pre-1980 and post-1980 statutory fund claims and the statutory land claim.
Zephier questions presented:
I. Whether the Federal Circuit’s 2013 holding that a February 16, 1863 Act of Congress, providing that “the Secretary of Interior is hereby authorized to set apart of the public lands . . . eighty acres in severalty” to loyal Mdewakanton Indian individuals, is “too discretionary to support a viable claim,” thereby conflicts with this Court’s and other precedents holding that power given to public officers in permissive form statutory language, but involving individual property rights calling for its exercise, the language used is “in fact peremptory” and money-mandating?
II. Whether the Panel failed to recognize the trust nature of the February 1863 Act in rejecting Petitioners’ “two basic claims” and thus issued a determination that conflicts with a previous authoritative decision in Wolfchild v. United States, 559 F.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2009), which found that the language of the Act of February 16, 1863, Section 9, ch. 37, 12 Stat. 652, “created an inheritable beneficial interest in the recipients of any land conveyed under the statute . . . [and] explicitly created a trust relationship” with the Federal Government?
III. Whether the Secretary of Interior’s 1865 actions “invoking the land-allocating authority of the two 1863 Acts” created an equitable estoppel against the Government, conflicting with the 2013 Panel’s conclusion that “those 1865 actions . . . cannot support a timely claim for relief?”
IV. Whether the Panel erred in failing to find an actionable violation of the 1851 and 1858 treaties between the Government and the loyal Mdewakanton by the Government’s failure to fully implement Section 9 of the Act of February 16, 1863?
Lower court materials here.
NYTs: Feds Looking for Thousands of Cobell Settlement Beneficiaries
Here.
WaPo: BIA/IHS Fail to Pay Contract Support Costs
Here.
An excerpt:
At issue are contract support costs that are spelled out in the agreements, under which the government pays tribes to run education, public safety and health programs on reservations. The support costs — which include items like travel expenses, legal and accounting fees, insurance costs and worker’s compensation fees — typically account for 20 percent of the value of the contract, according to Lloyd Miller, a lawyer who represented the tribes at the Supreme Court.
New Scholarship on Fracking Near Indian Country
Heather Williams and Hillary M. Hoffman have posted “Fracking Near Indian Country: The Federal Trust Relationship, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Right to Clean Water,” forthcoming in the Wyoming Law Review, on SSRN.
Here is the abstract:
The tortured history of the federal and state governments’ relationships with Native American tribes has created a legal structure in which Native American people are, quite frequently, the recipients of non-native waste generated off of native lands. Traditionally, this has taken the form of solid waste, but in recent years, it has grown to include nuclear waste and wastewater generated by hydraulic fracturing, otherwise known as “flowback fluids”, or “produced water.”
Over the last two years, produced water from four different hydraulic fracturing operations was found being discharged onto dry land and into “streambeds covered in white crystals,” on the Wind River Reservation in central Wyoming. In addition to the open dumping of these fluids, there was also visible oil and foam sheen. Pollution events like these are the result of a regulatory exemption under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), commonly referred to as the “livestock loophole.” The livestock loophole, created in 1979, allows oil and gas operations to discharge hazardous waste fluids generated from fracking operations onto reservation land if they are consumed by livestock and wildlife, or used for agricultural purposes. The EPA, which regulates RCRA and has a fiduciary responsibility toward Indian Tribes, has not set maximum levels for many compounds used in the drilling process, and uses antiquated data to regulate toxics that have been capped. Further, industrial “trade secrets” prohibit the disclosure of additional toxics in drilling fluids under intellectual property laws, making it impossible to regulate pollution limits for surface waters under the Clean Water Act’s National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).
The policy behind the livestock loophole is complex. Reports of gushing streams of toxic fracking fluids on reservation land reek of environmental injustice, yet tribes, as sovereign governments, are willing, able, and informed participants in the solicitation, installation, and placement of non-native waste on their own tribal lands.
Several questions arise out of the issues faced by the Wind River tribes: Is the federal policy to dump fracking fluids in Indian country consistent with its federal trust obligation, and its requirement under RCRA to protect human health and safety from toxic compounds? Is the livestock loophole’s policy to feed fracking fluids to livestock, wildlife, and agriculture a legitimate beneficial use under the Prior Appropriation doctrine? Should the EPA be forced to conduct up-to-date studies on the compounds in produced water, and their effects on living organisms, including humans? This Article will answer those questions and explore the bounds of tribal sovereignty and the federal trust responsibility in the context of produced water from fracking operations.
WaPo Article on Wyoming’s Fight against the EPA and Tribal Sovereignty
Here.
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