Here.
Here.
Here are the materials in Alturas Indian Rancheria v. Salazar (E.D. Cal.):
129 Alturas Motion for Contempt
An excerpt:
This is a proceeding brought by plaintiff Indian tribe to determine whether the government is in contempt of the court’s January 13, 2012 order in this case (ECF No 126). Plaintiff asserts that the following portion of the court’s order required the government to pay “contract support costs” associated with the “self-determination” contracts it entered into with plaintiff:
The BIA has approved the Tribe’s selfdetermination contract requests for the fiscal years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and shall transfer the amounts provided in those requests to the Tribe’s bank account … in accordance with the terms contained in the contract award documents.Order of January 13, 2012, ECF No. 126 ¶ 2 (“Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Order”).
For the reasons that follow, plaintiff’s request to enforce the judgment or for a contempt order will be denied.
Our prior post on this case includes materials on the court’s original denial of the government’s motion to dismiss.
Here:
Hopi Letter to Secretary of the Interior
An excerpt:
On September 4, 2013, the Hopi Tribe (“Tribe”) wrote to you expressing its serious concerns regarding the Department oflnterior’s (“DOl”) decision to join with the Salt River Project (“SRP”) and others to develop and endorse a proposed Altemative (“SRP- Altemative”) to the pending EPA rulemaking that would set stricter air quality standards and require the Best Available Retrofit Technology (“BART”) for the Navajo Generating Station (“NOS”), a coalfired power plant located on the Navajo Reservation in northeastern Arizona. In our letter, we also informed you that the Tribe would be hosting DOl attomey, Letty Belin, for a meeting (on September 5, 2013) that she had requested in order to discuss the proposed SRP-Altemative to the EPA rule, including the Tribe’s exclusion from the process. As a result of the Tribe’s meeting with Ms. Belin, the Tribe now has greater concerns regarding DOl’s explanations for its decision to exclude the Hopi Tribe from the process and its support of the proposed SRPAlternative. Rather than satisfying the concerns expressed by the Tribe, Ms. Belin’s explanation of the basis for DOl’s decisions merely senred to underscore DOI’s disregard of the Tribe’s interests as a major stakeholder in this matter and its violation of the trust responsibility it owes to the Hopi Tribe.
Here are the briefs in Flute v. United States (D. Colo.):
Flute Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
The complaint is here.
News coverage here.
Here are the materials in Southcentral Foundation v. Roubideaux (D. Alaska):
An excerpt:
Before the Court at Docket 3 is a motion filed by Plaintiff Southcentral Foundation (SCF). Although entitled a motion for a preliminary injunction, SCF is seeking mandamus relief in the form of an order that requires the immediate payment to it from a federal official of additional funding for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 for the Methamphetamine and Suicide Prevention Initiative (MSPI) and the Domestic Violence Prevention Initiative (DVPI). The Defendant is Yvette Roubideaux, the Director of the Indian Health Service (“IHS” or “Defendant”). After this litigation was filed, IHS agreed to pay SCF approximately $1.08 million of the disputed funds. Still disputed is approximately $449,000 in funding. On September 27, 2013, the Court heard oral argument on the motion. Having considered the documents filed with the Court, the law, and the arguments of counsel, the Court will deny the motion for the reasons set forth herein.
Here is the opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss in Flute v. United States (D. Colo.):
Gregory C. Sisk has posted “Twilight for the Strict Construction of Waivers of Federal Sovereign Immunity,” forthcoming in the North Carolina Law Review, on SSRN. An important read for tribal advocates.
Here is the abstract:
The Government of the United States has long benefited from two canons of statutory construction that tip the scales of justice heavily in its direction in civil litigation by those seeking redress of harm by that government: First, the federal government’s consent to suit must be expressed through unequivocal statutory text. Second, even when a statute explicitly waives federal sovereign immunity for a subject matter, the traditional rule has been that the terms of that statute “must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign.” The restrictive effect of these rules has made a distinct difference in cases that truly matter to the lives and well-being of ordinary people.
Since the dawn of the new century, however, the Supreme Court’s increasingly common encounters with waivers of federal sovereign immunity are also becoming more conventional in interpretive attitude. During the first eleven years of the twenty-first century, the Court turned a deaf ear to the government’s plea for special solicitude in the substantial majority of instances and frequently declared that the canon of strict construction was unhelpful or ill-suited. In four sovereign immunity cases decided in the 2012 Term, the Court continued to evidence a commitment to text, context, and legislative history, unblemished by any presumption of narrow construction. Notably during oral arguments in this most recent term, multiple members of the Court openly challenged the government’s reach for broader immunity.
In these recent decisions, the Court increasingly accepts a dichotomy between the threshold question of whether sovereign immunity has been waived (requiring a “clear statement” by Congress) and the inquiry into how the statutory waiver should be interpreted in application (with the canon of strict construction fading away as a viable tool for statutory interpretation).
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