Seventh Circuit Holds Oneida Owes No Stormwater Fees to Village of Hobart

Here are the materials in Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. Village of Hobart:

CA7 Opinion

Village of Hobart Brief

Oneida Brief

United States Brief

Village of Hobart Reply

An excerpt from Judge Posner’s opinion:

Nevertheless we can imagine an argument, built on our earlier example of the Village’s authority to deploy its firefighters on Indian parcels, for an exception of necessity—a common law graft onto the Clean Water Act—to the Oneida tribe’s exclusive authority over Indian land. But the Village doesn’t argue for such an exception; it doesn’t deny the feasibility of cooperative arrangements between it and the tribe, which has signed cooperative service agreements with other government bodies in the area.

So Hobart loses its case against the tribe. And there is another reason it must lose. Because federal law forbids states and local authorities to tax Indian lands, the tribe can’t be forced to pay the assessment decreed by the challenged ordinance if the assessment is a tax.

Lower court materials here.

Riverside-San Bernardino County Indian Health, Inc. v. Sebelius Complaint

Riverside-San Bernardino County Indian Health, Inc.v. Sebelius complaint (D. D.C.):

Complaint

D.C. Circuit Briefing in Menominee Tribe v. United States (IHS)

Here:

Menominee Opening Brief 2013

IHS Brief

Menominee Reply Brief

Lower court materials here.

Prior D.C. Circuit case materials here.

Quantum Entertainment Ltd. v. Dept. of Interior Cert Petition — “Old” Section 81 Appeal

Here:

Quantum Entertainment Cert Petition

Question presented:

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), implicitly overruled McNair v. Knott, 302 U.S. 369 (1937), and Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143 (1883), by requiring the conclusion that a statute eliminating legal impediments to the enforcement of contracts has an impermissible “retroactive effect” when applied to a contract that was entered into before the statute’s enactment but performed without complaint until afterwards.

Lower court materials here.

D.C. Circuit Briefs in Jicarilla Royalty Dispute with Interior and Merit Energy

Here are the briefs in Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Dept. of Interior:

Jicarilla Brief

Federal Brief

Merit Energy Brief

Jicarilla Reply

Lower court materials here.

Two More Tribal Complaints against IHS over Contract Support Costs

Here:

Cherokee Nation Complaint

Shoalwater Bay Complaint

Federal Court Dismisses Hopi Suit for US Trust Breach over Arsenic Levels in Water

Here are the materials in Hopi Tribe v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

1 Complaint

10 US Motion to Dismiss

13 Hopi Response

13-1 Puhuyesva Affidavit

13-2 Marley Affidavit

15 US Reply

18 DCT Order Dismissing Complaint

An excerpt:

Plaintiff, an Indian tribe, brought this suit to recover damages for breach of trust. The alleged breach consists of defendant’s supposed failure to ensure that the water supply on plaintiff’s reservation contains safe levels of arsenic. Before the court is defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, in which defendant asserts that plaintiff has failed to identify an applicable fiduciary duty. The central legal question in this case, therefore, concerns the precise scope of the federal government’s duties as trustee with respect to Indian trusts. See generally United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535 (1980). The answer to this inquiry has a long and sometimes acerbic pedigree. But there are some constants.

To be sure, the very notion of a tribal trust relationship is intertwined with the sovereignty of the United States: “Throughout the history of the Indian trust relationship, we have recognized that the organization and management of the trust is a sovereign function subject to the plenary authority of Congress.” United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2323 (2011) (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 169, n.18 (1982); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978); Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391 (1921); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902); United States v. Cadelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 439 (1926); and Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911)). As will become clear, in this case, plaintiff has failed to show that Congress has defined the federal government’s trust duties in such a way as to authorize plaintiff’s suit for damages in this court. Accordingly, the court must grant defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Federal Court Dismisses Challenge to Indian Preference in Employment at Office of Special Trustee

Here are the materials in Hester v. Salazar (D. Utah):

3 Hester Complaint

7 MJ R&R

8 Hester Objection

9 DCT Order Adopting R&R

An excerpt from the R&R:

Because the Supreme Court has ruled in Mancari that Indian preference “does not constitute ‘racial discrimination,’ “ Mancari, 471 U.S. at 553, Mr. Hester’s claims that he was subjected to racial discrimination and that his civil rights have been violated are not valid. Therefore, because Mr. Hester has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, and it would be futile to amend his complaint, his complaint should be dismissed under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Based on that conclusion, Mr. Hester’s motion to appoint counsel and motion for service of process should be deemed moot.

Choctaw Nation v. Sebelius Amended Complaint

Here:

13 1476 Docket 4 2013 09 30 Choctaw First Amended Complaint

Federal Circuit Decides Wolfchild v. United States Appeal

Here are the materials:

33 United States Appellant Brief

82 Wolfchild Answer Brief

90 Coursolle Descendants Answer Brief

92 US Answer Brief

99 Coursolle Reply

105 Wolfchild Reply

122 Lower Sioux Community, Prairie Island, and Shakopee Amicus Brief

CAFed Opinion

An excerpt:

The United States currently holds certain tracts of land in Minnesota in trust for three Indian communities. It originally acquired some of that land in the late 1800s, using funds appropriated by Congress to help support a statutorily identified group of Indians, and held it for the benefit of those Indians and their descendants for decades. As time passed, that beneficiary group and the three present-day communities that grew on these lands overlapped but diverged: many of the beneficiary group were part of the communities, but many were not; and the communities included many outside the beneficiary group. In 1980, Congress addressed the resulting land use problems by putting the lands into trust  for the three communities that had long occupied them. Ever since, proceeds earned from the lands—including profits from gaming—have gone to the same three communities.

The discrepancy between the makeup of the three communities and the collection of descendants of the Indians designated in the original appropriations acts underlies the present dispute, which was before this court once before. Claimants allege that they belong to the latter group and that they, rather than the communities, hold rights to the land at issue and any money generated from it. Four years ago, based on an extensive analysis of the relevant laws and history, we rejected what was then the only live claim, which got to the heart of their assertion: that the appropriations acts created a trust for the benefit of the statutorily designated Indians and their descendants. Wolfchild v. United States, 559  F.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2009). On remand, claimants advanced several new claims, some of which seek proceeds generated from the lands, others of which seek more. Again unable to
find that claimants have stated a claim that meets the standards of governing law, we now reject these new claims, including the one that the Court of Federal Claims held valid in the judgment we review.

Lower court materials here.