Here are the briefs in support of the petition:
Alec L v McCarthy Cert Petition
Here are the briefs in support of the petition:
Alec L v McCarthy Cert Petition
Here:
11-7-14 Stockbridge-Munsee Cert Petition_(filed)
Questions presented:
In Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), this Court held that courts may not override Congress’ judgment and apply laches to summarily dispose of claims at law filed within a statute of limitations established by Congress, thereby foreclosing the possibility of any form of relief. Equitable remedies may be foreclosed at the litigation’s outset due to a delay in commencing suit only in “extraordinary circumstances,” such as the need to prevent unjust hardship on innocent third parties. Id. at 1978.
The question presented is: Where Petitioner’s claims were filed within the statutory-limitations period established by Congress, did the court of appeals contravene this Court’s
decision in Petrella by invoking delay-based equitable principles to summarily dismiss all of Petitioner’s federal treaty, statutory and common-law claims, including one for money damages as upheld by this Court in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 246 (1985)?
Lower court materials here. En banc petition materials here.
Here:
Menominee Indian Tribe Cert Petition
Question presented:
Whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied this Court’s Holland decision when it ruled – in direct conflict with a holding of the Federal Circuit on materially similar facts – that the Tribe did not face an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing of Indian Self-Determination Act claims under the Contract Disputes Act?
Lower court materials here.
Here:
Buena Vista Rancheria Opposition
The United States has waived its right to respond.
The cert petition is here.
Here:
Question presented:
This Court has an established jurisprudence recognizing Indian sovereign immunity, and defining its scope. The Court also has an established jurisprudence on what actions will work a waiver of immunity.
This Court, however, has never decided the issue of what needs to be shown to establish authority for waiver of Indian sovereign immunity, nor whether apparent authority can be sufficient to do so. Lower courts have done so, and are split on the question of the availability of apparent authority. E.g. Rush Creek Solutions, Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402 (Colo. App. 2004) (apparent authority appropriately invoked); Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Industries, Inc., 585 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2009) (prohibiting use of apparent authority).
The question presented is whether the authority of a tribal official who signs a waiver of sovereign immunity may be established under the doctrine of apparent authority.
Lower court materials here.
Here is today’s order list.
The Court denied cert in Dupris v. Procter and Hicks v. Hudson Insurance.
Here:
Here is the question presented:
This Court established in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that a plaintiff may sue state officials for prospective injunctive relief against the enforcement of an unconstitutional state law. In the intervening years, this Court and most courts of appeals have repeatedly held that Ex parte Young allows federal courts to enjoin the future enforcement of state tax schemes that violate federal law or the Constitution. This Court has also observed that an injunction requiring a state’s future compliance with federal law does not violate state sovereign immunity, even if it has a “substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986).
In this case, however, the Eleventh Circuit concluded otherwise. It departed from this Court’s precedent, and “create[d] a circuit split,” Pet. App. 24a (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), when it held that Ex parte Young does not permit the Seminole Tribe of Florida to seek injunctive or declaratory relief against the future unconstitutional enforcement of Florida’s fuel tax scheme. The court’s holding turned on the fact that Florida precollects this tax from a third party, which means that an order barring future enforcement against the tribes might require the state to issue tribal consumers refunds “from state coffers,” supposedly in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. Pet. App. 12a.
The question presented is whether sovereign immunity bars an American Indian tribe from seeking Ex parte Young relief from the unconstitutional enforcement of a state tax scheme merely because that relief might require refunds for taxes unlawfully collected in the future.
Lower court materials and my commentary here.
Here are the materials in Gustafson v. Poitra (D. N.D.):
An excerpt:
The Court notes the equities clearly favor the Gustafsons, and the Court is sympathetic to the jurisdictional dilemma they find themselves in. The juvenile behavior and attitude of the Poitras that triggered the need for the issuance of the TRO in October 2012 is difficult for any reasonable person to understand. However, the plaintiffs cannot use the Declaratory Judgment Act as a vehicle to resolve a multitude of long-standing disputes which neither raise a federal question nor bear any relationship to a lawsuit over which the Court would have jurisdiction.
We have posted on the multiple suits in this long-running dispute here, here, and here.
Here:
Question presented:
Whether, in an action by a third party against the Secretary of the Interior under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., a putative Indian tribe may invoke its sovereign immunity to prevent a court from reviewing the lawfulness of the Secretary’s decision to recognize it as a tribe.
Lower court materials here.
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