The materials in the Teck Camino v. Pakootas case are at the Supreme Court Project website, here. Today, the United States responded to the Court’s call for the views of the Solicitor General by arguing in favor of a denial of the petition. In some respects, this is a victory for the tribal member plaintiffs, because it upholds the Ninth Circuit’s decision that CERCLA applies to the Canadian company’s discharges. But in another respect, it is a loss, because the EPA attempted to render the case moot by refusing to enforce its own finding that Teck Camino was liable. The SG argued that the case was moot because of this action.
cert petition
“Factbound and Splitless” Talk
Here’s the abstract for my talk tomorrow at U-M Law School, “Factbound and Splitless: The Impact of the Certiorari Process on Federal Indian Law.”
The process by which the Supreme Court reviews petitions for writs of certiorari is intended to parse through the thousands of petitions to pick out the most important cases for the Court to decide. These include cases in which there is a split of authority, cases in which a lower court has committed a gross error, or cases in which there is a critical constitutional issue at stake. Cases in which there is no split, cases that will affect only a few people, cases involving simple error correction, or cases involving an unimportant issue are unlikely to be heard by the Court.
Since the 1980s, more and more Justices have resorted to a pool of law clerks for a write-up of each cert petition that includes a recommendation of whether or not the Court should grant cert using these factors. With the release of Justice Blackmun’s papers, the cert pool petitions from the docket years 1986 to 1993 are available for study. The views of Supreme Court clerks in the cert pool memos are often the only written documentation of the Court’s views of the vast majority of petitions that are denied.
The certiorari process creates a structural barrier to the fair adjudication of federal Indian law cases. Because over 80 percent of Indian law cases arise in three circuits, few circuit splits arise, rendering most petitions “splitless.” Moreover, since Indian law cases are often sui generis, they are labeled “factbound.” Most importantly, Supreme Court clerks do not find Indian law cases to be important in regards to the legal issues in dispute, except when the petitioner is a state or local government opposing a tribal interest such as a tribe or a tribal member.
What this means is that the clerks almost never recommend a grant when the petitioner is an Indian tribe or an Indian because the petition is “splitless,” “factbound,” or just unimportant. Conversely, when a state or local government petitions, the Court grants the petition around 75 percent of the time, regardless of whether any split exists. Perhaps this is part of the explanation for why tribal interests have lost 75 percent of their cases before the Court since 1987.
The classic case is a treaty rights case brought by a tribe. If the tribe loses below, the clerks will never find a split in authority because the treaty is unique, making the case sui generis. And Supreme Court clerks almost never find the petitions of Indians and Indian tribes to be important enough to be certworthy. But if the tribe wins below, the opponents usually are state governments, whose cert petitions are viewed favorably by the clerks.
This paper argues, as have occasional Supreme Court clerks, that the Court should recognize the special relationship that exists between the United States and Indian tribes in the certiorari process. The Court should also recognize the structural inequity of the certiorari process in the context of federal Indian law. Both of these changes could be accomplished through an amendment to Supreme Court Rule 10, which articulates the Court’s factors in considering certiorari petitions. Either the Court should grant more petitions filed by tribal interests or deny more petitions filed by tribal opponents.
Hope you can make it. The talk begins at 12:20 in Room 150 in the law school. Lunch is available. The talk is sponsored by the U-M NALSA and the Michigan Journal of Race & Law.
Tales from the Cert Pool: Montana Taxes at Crow
The Supreme Court denied cert in a case captioned Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. 1039 (1988) (No. 87-343). The case involved the State’s attempt to impose severance and gross proceeds on a non-Indian mining company.
The cert pool memo (from a Rehnquist clerk no less) ripped the State’s argument:
[Montana]’s contention that its taxes should not be preempted because they fall on Westmoreland, rather than on the Crow Tribe itself, is ludicrous. The state severance and gross proceeds taxes have restricted the amount of taxation [Crow] can levy on its lessees. The CA9 found that the marketability of [Crow]’s coal was significantly diminished by [Montana]’s taxes, resulting in a corresponding decrease in the amount of money accruing to[Crow]’s coffers.
Cert Pool Memo at 7.
How times have changed. After Cotton Petroleum and Wagnon, states can strategically tax for the specific purpose of limiting on-reservation activities and all but eliminate tribal tax base.
Supreme Court Preview @ MSU Law College, Tuesday at 3:30 PM
I’ll be giving a talk tomorrow at the law college at the behest of the MSU chapter of the ACS: a preview of the 2007 Term of the Supreme Court.
Here’s a preview of the preview — namely, a list of the cases I plan on discussing tomorrow, with links to briefs and other materials as available:
Boumediene v. Bush (No. 06-1195)
Al-Odah v. Bush (No. 06-1196)
Baze v. Rees (No. 07-5439)
Crawford v. Marion Election Board (No. 07-21)
Democratic Party v. Rokita (No. 07-25)
District of Columbia v. Heller (No. 07-290)
FCC v. Fox Television Stations (No. 07-582)
United States v. Williams (No. 06-694)
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (No. 07-219)
Medellin v. Texas (No. 06-984)
Danforth v. Minnesota (No. 06-8273)
Carcieri v. Kempthorne (No. 07-526)
Matthew L.M. Fletcher
Tales from the Cert Pool: Cherokee Nation v. US (Arkansas River Navigation System claim)
The Cherokee Nation brought suit against the United States over the Arkansas River Navigation System, arguing that the government’s actions violated the “fair and honorable dealings” language of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. 70a. The Court denied the petition.
The cert pool memo in the case includes some of the most exasperated language from a clerk in any of the Indian law related cert pool memos in the Blackmun Digital Archive:
In providing for ‘claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity,’ [25 U.S.C. § 70a] Congress invited litigation on a potentially limitless class of so-called ‘moral’ claims against the govt. … But how’s a ct to tell when the govt has done something that, while permissible under law and equity, is nonetheless ‘unfair,’ ‘dishonorable,’ or ‘immoral?’ Over the years, the cts have tried to give shape to the inquiry by requiring a tribe asserting a moral claim to demonstrate a relevant ‘special relationship’ with the fed govt. Yes, as this case shows, that inquiry can be as amorphous as the one it’s supposed to clarify. Arguably, in the words of one judge, having a ‘special relationship’ w/ the govt means simply ‘that though there is no contract or treaty obligation, or formal trusteeship, honor may oblige the United States to take steps to protect Indians…. What honor requires depends on circumstances and will vary from case to case according to the conscience of the court.’ [United States v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 576 F.2d 870, 883 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (Nichols, J.).] Given the strangeness of the entire inquiry, one cannot easily evaluate either the merits or the certworthiness of petr’s claim.
Cert Pool Memo at 8-9, Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 504 U.S 910 (1992) (No. 91-1354).
What’s even more interesting is the annotation added to the memo by Justice Blackmun’s clerk, who is identified as “NB”:
I would not want to see the Ct take this case. Because it is not one the Ct would handle well, it would likely declare the provision to be unenforceable. (Imagine the opn of Scalia, J.) I think in the long run your friends are best served by denying cert.
Id. at 11.
Tales from the Cert Pool: Justice Blackmun’s Papers on Cotton Petroleum
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico is one of the harshest outcomes in the modern era of Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court. In this case, the Court held that states may tax non-Indian-owned businesses doing business in Indian Country, even where the tribe has imposed its own tax. In short, the states may double-tax non-Indians, effectively preempting tribal taxes on the tribe’s own land.
The recent uploading of Justice Blackmun’s papers on the internet offers a glimpse into the background of the case.
In Cotton Petroleum, two documents are available: The cert pool memo and Justice Blackmun’s docket sheet recording the votes of the Justices.
The Court decided to grant certiorari in this case over the recommendation of the cert pool memo to deny cert. Justices White, Stevens, O’Connor, and Blackmun voted to grant cert (in accordance with the Rule of Four, only four votes are required to grant cert), while Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, Scalia, and Kennedy voted to deny.
One interesting (and awful) tidbit from the cert pool memo is that the memowriter noted that the tribal interests weren’t represented in the litigation and that, importantly, Cotton Petroleum hadn’t introduced evidence about the impact of New Mexico’s tax on tribal sovereignty:
“As [New Mexico] and [state] amici explain, this Court’s precedents require a showing of actual impact on tribal interests in self-government before pre-emption will be found, and [Cotton Petroleum] failed to introduce evidence of such impact in this case.” Cert Pool Memo at 7.
As noted above, the impact of New Mexico’s tax on tribal sovereignty was devastating, but since Cotton Petroleum was never in a position to make the argument, it was never developed.
Moreover, in a case denied cert that same Term, Rodney, Dickason v. Revenue Division of New Mexico, the cert pool memowriter (Deborah Malamud of NYU) argued that “the Indian preemption framework serves a substitute for the now-repudiated doctrine that state law has no effect on Indian reservations…. As that doctrine was geographical in nature, perhaps it makes sense that those same limits should apply to its modern substitute.” Cert Pool Memo in Rodney, Dickason at 8-9. But, alas, the Court decided not to adopt such a workable bright-line rule.
More tales from the cert pool memos will follow over the next several weeks.
Chief Justice Roberts & Federal Indian Law
Long before John G. Roberts, C.J. became life-tenured, he practiced. And he worked on at least three Indian law-related cases: Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, Rice v. Cayetano, and (briefly) Roberts v. United States. Also, as part of President Reagan’s Office of Legal Counsel, he vetted several Acts of Congress related to Indian tribes.
Roberts won Venetie, representing the State of Alaska. He lost Rice, representing the State of Hawaii. And the Court denied his petition for cert on behalf of Hollis Roberts (no relation, one presumes) in Roberts v. U.S.
The now semi-notorious brief Roberts filed in Alaska v. Venetie is here: Venetie Petr Brief. It is notorious for the reversal of the “deadliest enemies” language in United States v. Kagama. The Kagama Court wrote that states and state citizens were the deadliest enemies of Indians and Indian tribes, but the Venetie brief (for no real good reason) altered the quote to mean that Indians and Indian tribes were the deadliest enemies of states and state citizens. Here’s my own paper on the archaic notion that states and tribes are “deadliest enemies.”
Hawaii’s brief in Rice v. Cayetano is here: Rice Resp Brief
Roberts’ cert petition in Roberts v. US is here: Roberts v. United States Cert Petn. This one is especially important since Roberts (and Roberts) brought a challenge to Section 465, the fee to trust statute. There is ongoing litigation involving Section 465 that may soon be appealed to the Supreme Court. To some extent, the legal challenge to Section 465 has morphed since the 1999 cert petition, but it is significant that Roberts, C.J. is aware of this kind of case.
Finally, we include the documents Roberts wrote as a member of the OLC. These came out during his Senate confirmation process.
Tribal Tax Status Act OLC Memo
I guess what these memos demonstrate is that young Roberts was a serious conservative and a funny guy (unless you were the subject of the humor).
Cert Petition in Carcieri v. Kempthorne
From Indianz.com:
Rhode Island appeals land-into-trust ruling
Friday, October 19, 2007The state of Rhode Island is asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear a land-into-trust case that is being watched by tribes nationwide.
In July, the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Bureau of Indian Affairs can place 31 acres in trust for the Narragansett Tribe. The tribe is like any other tribe and can follow the Indian Reorganization Act, which authorized the land-into-trust process, the court said.
As I will argue in my forthcoming article, “Factbound and Splitless: An Empirical Study of the Impact of the Certiorari Process on Federal Indian Law,” the Supreme Court is unlikely to grant cert. in this case for two important reasons. First, there is no circuit split (“splitless”). What that means is that the federal courts of appeal that have addressed the question of the constitutionality of the fee to trust process (25 U.S.C. § 465) — the 8th Circuit in South Dakota v. Kempthorne, the 10th Circuit in Utah v. Shivwits, and the 11th Circuit in Roberts v. U.S., are examples — have held (just as the 1st Circuit did here) that the statute is constitutional.
Second, this case involves the muddying aspects of the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act and how it affects the application of § 465, rendering this case a bit messy as a factual matter (“factbound”). If this was a straight-up interpretation of § 465 without the Settlement Act’s application, the Court would be more likely to grant cert (although, without a split, not so much). In short, this case implicates a relatively small number of tribes (those Rhode Island tribes).
Land-into-Trust Decision:
Carcieri v. Kempthorne (July 20, 2007)
Earlier 1st Circuit Decision:
Carcieri v. Norton (February 9, 2005)
Relevant Documents:
Carcieri v. Norton Briefs, Opinions (NARF-NCAI Tribal Supreme Court Project
Relevant Laws:
Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act (US Code)
Relevant Links:
Narragansett Tribe – http://www.narragansett-tribe.org
Tribal Supreme Court Project – http://www.narf.org/sct/index.html
Turtle Talk 