Here are the materials in Barrick v. Kasbaum (E.D. Okla.):
165 Kasbaum and Lee Motion for Summary J
167 Hannah Motion for Summary J
167-2 Exhibit 2 – CNO District Map
226 Objection to Magistrate Report

Here are the materials in Barrick v. Kasbaum (E.D. Okla.):
165 Kasbaum and Lee Motion for Summary J
167 Hannah Motion for Summary J
167-2 Exhibit 2 – CNO District Map
226 Objection to Magistrate Report

Here is the opinion in In re J.O.
Excerpt:
¶14 Rather than answer that question, COCA took a detour. Relying primarily on a United States Supreme Court case, COCA determined that, if Parker never had a relationship with Child, the requirements of ICWA Sections 1912(d) and (f) would not apply. As the trial court never made a specific finding regarding the nature of Parker’s relationship with Child, COCA ordered the trial court on remand to make that finding. COCA then concluded if there was no relationship the State would not have to make the necessary showings under ICWA. Parker petitioned for certiorari, arguing that COCA misapplied federal and Oklahoma law regarding ICWA. We agree.
¶15 The ICWA Section 1912 requirements are intended to respect and preserve the tribes’ interest in the custody and care of its children, and the detrimental impact to a child of placement outside its culture, in addition to and independent of any parental custodial interest. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49-50. Oklahoma adopted the Oklahoma ICWA (OICWA) to clarify state policies and procedures used to implement the federal statutory scheme. After Holyfield, the Legislature amended the OICWA policy statement to recognize that “Indian tribes and nations have a valid governmental interest in Indian children regardless of whether or not said children are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are initiated.” 10 O.S. § 40.1. And the OICWA applies “to all state voluntary and involuntary child custody court proceedings involving Indian children, regardless of whether or not the children involved are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are initiated.” 10 O.S. § 40.3(B). We presume that the Legislature was aware of the previous statutory language and intended these amendments to change the statutes accordingly. In the Matter of Baby Boy L., 2004 OK 93, ¶ 18, 103 P.3d 1099, 1105-06. Thus, under OICWA, whether a parent has a relationship with the child is not determinative of the tribe’s independent interest.
¶16 This Court reinforced this policy in Baby Boy L. There, the non-Indian mother refused father’s attempts to be active in the baby’s life and sought a non-Indian adoption outside the reservation. Indian father objected to the adoption, and the tribe intervened, moving to dismiss the adoption and seeking ICWA compliance. The trial court applied a doctrine called the “existing Indian family exception.” This doctrine, applied in a minority of states, requires that for ICWA to apply a child must be living in an Indian home, or already have a primarily Indian cultural heritage, or are otherwise somehow culturally “Indian”, rather than applying the federal ICWA definitions of Indian children. This Court, interpreting the OICWA amended language, concluded that through the amendments the Legislature had explicitly repudiated the “existing Indian family” exception to ICWA, and that exception could not be applied under Oklahoma law. Baby Boy L., 2004 OK 93, ¶ 18, 103 P.3d at 1105-06.


A tuition free event hosted in-person at the Choctaw Casinos & Resorts, Durant, OK
Visit the training website to register and view agenda information as it arises
Here are updated materials in Cherokee Nation v. Stitt, now captioned Wichita & Affiliated Tribes v. Stitt (W.D. Okla.):
Prior post here.
Here are the materials in Cherokee Nation v. Dept, of the Interior (D.D.C.):
Prior post here.

From the facts in this opinion, it’s clear this is a pretty contested post termination of parental rights/foster care adoption case from the southern district of Missouri (Poplar Bluff, Springfield). What is not in the opinion but is available on the Westlaw decision page are the attorneys involved in the case. I’m sure it’s some local southern Missouri attorneys:
Attorneys for Relator – Heidi Doerhoff Vollet of Jefferson City, MO; James R. Layton of St. Louis, MOAttorney for Respondent Judge – Scott S. Sifferman Acting Pro SeAttorneys for Minor – William Petrus of Mt. Vernon, MO (GAL); Matthew D. McGill, David W. Casazza, Robert Batista, Todd Shaw of Washington, D.C.Attorneys for Respondents Foster Parents – Toni M. Fields of Cassville, MO; Paul Clement, Erin Murphy of Washington, D.C.; Kevin Neylan of New York, NY
Huh.
Even so! In this case, the Court of Appeals found the Choctaw Nation had standing to to bring the writ of prohibition against the judge and the Court of Appeals entered the writ (Respondent is the trial judge)(also, this is why formal legal intervention is so important for tribes whenever possible)(also why it’s good to find local family law attorneys who can talk about things like “writs of prohibition” with expertise):
In his brief, Respondent argues that the Choctaw Nation does not have standing to seek this writ of prohibition. On two occasions, Respondent granted the Choctaw Nation the right to intervene in this protective custody proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c), and also granted the Choctaw Nation the right to intervene in Foster Parents’ adoption proceeding. We see no error in these rulings. The Choctaw Nation has standing to seek
this writ of prohibition.
***
Respondent did not have the express or implied authority to interfere in the Children’s Division’s administrative review of a nonfinal administrative recommendation for adoption, and then substitute Respondent’s judgment for that of the Children’s Division and compel the Children’s Division to reach or adhere to a particular recommendation.
Here.
You must be logged in to post a comment.