Ninth Circuit

Equal Protection Challenge to Major Crimes Act Fails

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum opinion in United States v. Lyons.

An excerpt:

Lyons contends that the mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) unconstitutionally violates his right to equal protection. This contention fails because § 2241(c) does not discriminate against Native Americans, either on its face or as applied. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). Any disproportionate impact § 2241 has on Native Americans simply reflects the different treatment of criminals under the Major Crimes Act who commit crimes in a federal enclave. See United States v. Lemay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645, 648-49 (1977) (holding that federal legislation, although relating to Indian tribes, is not based upon impermissible racial classifications; and that it is of no consequence that the federal scheme differs from a state criminal code.)

Ninth Circuit Panel Issues New Opinion in Upper Skagit v. Washington

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the new opinion, granting rehearing and denying the en  banc motion as moot.

The earlier opinion and materials are here.

Ninth Circuit Declines Jurisdiction over Pechanga Disenrollments

Matthew L.M. Fletcher3 Comments

Here is the opinion in Jeffredo v. Macarro. There was a dissent (by a district court judge sitting by designation), however, which seemed to focus on the apparent “greed” of the Pechanga people in disenrolling tribal members.

Here are the briefs:

Jeffredo Opening Brief

Macarro Answering Brief

Jeffredo Reply Brief

An excerpt from the majority: Continue reading →

Ninth Circuit Sitting En Banc Denies Samish Tribe’s Motion to Reopen U.S. v. Washington

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion, per Judge Canby — En Banc Opinion

Here are the materials.

Thanks to A.S.

Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Counterclaims against Kalispel Tribe

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Kalispel Tribe v. Spokane Raceway Park (unpublished opinion).

An excerpt:

We need not decide whether the Tribe waived its immunity to Orville Moe’s counterclaim for contract damages as a third-party beneficiary, because Moe failed to present a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Neither the Joint Venture Agreement nor any other document specified the amount of compensation board members were to receive or how that amount was to be determined. Given the lack of details in the agreement, Moe had to produce evidence of what compensation was due and that the Tribe was responsible for that compensation. He failed to do so.

We need not decide whether the Tribe waived its immunity to Orville Moe’scounterclaim for contract damages as a third-party beneficiary, because Moe failedto present a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324(1986). Neither the Joint Venture Agreement nor any other document specified theamount of compensation board members were to receive or how that amount wasto be determined. Given the lack of details in the agreement, Moe had to produceevidence of what compensation was due and that the Tribe was responsible for thatcompensation. He failed to do so.

Ninth Circuit Decides QTA Case; Holds FTCA May Apply

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

The Ninth Circuit recently decided Robinson v. United States (Robinson v US CA9 Opinion), where the court held that the Quiet Title Act does not foreclose litigation over an easement running across Indian trust lands.

Here are the materials:

Robinson Opening Brief

US Answering Brief

Robinson Reply Brief

Ninth Circuit Decides Federal Common Law Indian Lands Case

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in U.S. v. Milner, which involves non-Indian shore defense structures interfering with the treaty rights of the Lummi Tribe. The U.S. charged the landowners with trespass.

Milner Opening Brief

US Appellee Brief

Milner Reply Brief

Who is an Indian under the Major Crimes Act?

Matthew L.M. Fletcher6 Comments

The Eighth Circuit’s decision that Matthew Stymiest is an “Indian” under 18 U.S.C. 1153(a) raises possible constitutional questions about due process and vagueness of a criminal statute, and it may be ripe for review by the Supreme Court as a circuit split.

Federal courts have adopted common law “tests” to determine whether a person charged under the statute is an Indian — they have to be in order to be convicted. The Eighth Circuit’s test lists a series of factors for a jury to consider in determining whether the defendant is an Indian.

Stymiest is a descendant of Leech Lake Band members, but he does not have the blood quantum to be eligible for membership himself. He often held himself out to be an Indian when it was to his advantage, such as when he was seeking Indian health clinic services, or in earlier criminal debacles where he probably thought it was to his advantage. But the local IHS people often asked him to produce some ID, which of course he never could. So is he an Indian? Hmmm.

And the wild thing about all of this is that under the statute, a jury of non-Indians (likely) will decide on these facts whether or not defendants like Stymiest are Indians beyond a reasonable doubt. As a matter of law, it is improbable that a jury can make a finding of “Indianness” under such a standard.

The Stymiest case likely conflicts in large part with the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Cruz. There, the court held that Christopher Cruz was not an Indian, despite being nearly quarter blood, although ineligible for tribal membership with the Blackfeet Nation. He worked for the BIA, spent several years of his childhood on the reservation, is eligible for some IHS and treaty hunting and fishing benefits, and was even once prosecuted in tribal court for a minor violation. In other words, Cruz is spectacularly similar to Stymiest.

Cruz isn’t an Indian under the Major Crimes Act, but Stymiest is. There’s a problem here.

Continue reading →

Ninth Circuit Affirms Injunction against Waste Disposal Facility on Indian Allotment

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Not sure what tribe is involved, but this case (United States v. Tarlow Realty, Inc.)  involves the government’s efforts to shut down a waste disposal unit on an Indian trust allotment. It succeeded. Of note, the unpublished opinion offers this commentary about the potential conflict of interest demonstrated by the government:

Finally, we note that the Government instigated this suit at the behest of two different federal agencies — the EPA and the BIA — and that it thus represents both the general public and the allottees, whose interests may diverge in some respects. Congress permits the Government to serve dual advocacy roles as environmental steward and allotment trustee, see Nevada, 463 U.S. at 128, 135 n.14, but the Government’s focus in this case on the former, with little evident regard for the latter, raises some concern. The statutory scheme governing third-party commercial use of allotted land places the Government, in its capacity as landowner and trustee, in the paternalistic position of sanctioning only those land uses which strike an appropriate balance between economic development for the allottees and the impact of that development on the environmental health and safety of the allotment property and surrounding community. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 348, 415(a); Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987); Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Watt, 707 F.2d 1072, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1976). In litigating this case, the Government has vigorously pursued its role as advocate for the environment and the general public, and admirably so, but it may have given shorter shrift to its role as representative of the economic interests of the allottees. In fact, nowhere in the record or the Government’s brief is there a discussion of how and whether this litigation serves the allottees’ welfare. We suspect that enjoining further operation of the waste disposal facility and redeveloping the property probably does serve their long-term economic interests, but the Government’s failure to so much as mention its obligation in this regard leaves the impression, right or wrong, that it may have eschewed this duty altogether. Nevertheless, while in different circumstances that might have affected the outcome, in this case we are satisfied that the Government did not act in excess of its authority.

Ninth Circuit Requires Alaska Courts to Provide Full Faith and Credit to Native Villages’ ICWA Judgments

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in Kaltag Tribal Council v. Jackson, unpublished. This is one the cases highlighted by NARF lawyers in their opposition to Sarah Palin (here). An excerpt:

Plaintiffs-Appellees Kaltag Tribal Council (“Kaltag”), Selina Sam and Hudson Sam (collectively, “Kaltag plaintiffs”) filed this case in district court against Karleen Jackson, Bill Hogan, and Phillip Mitchell, employees of the State of Alaska, Department of Health and Human Services. The Kaltag plaintiffs alleged that an adoption judgment issued by the Kaltag court is entitled to full faith and credit under § 1911(d) of the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), and that the Alaska employees were required to grant the request for a new birth certificate. The district court granted the Kaltag plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied the Alaska employees’ summary judgment motion. The Alaska employees appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.