Here is the order in Griffith v. Caney Valley Public Schools (N.D. Okla.):
22. Order and Opinion (5-20-15)
Prior materials here.
Here is the order in Griffith v. Caney Valley Public Schools (N.D. Okla.):
22. Order and Opinion (5-20-15)
Prior materials here.
In which the student is denied the right to wear an eagle feather on her graduation cap. Her graduation from Caney Valley Public Schools, which is just north of Tulsa, is tomorrow.
The School demonstrated that the graduation ceremony is a formal ceremony and that the unity of the graduating class as a whole is fostered by the uniformity of the caps which are the most prominently visible part of the graduation regalia viewed by the audience to the graduation. Prohibiting decoration of any graduation cap by any student for any purpose serves these legitimate interests. Based on the application of these established principles the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on her First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion claim.
Here:
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (as filed)
Question presented:
Does Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014), require the dismissal of a State’s suit to prevent tribal officers from conducting gaming that would be unlawful under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and a state-tribal compact when
• the suit for declaratory and injunctive relief has been brought against tribal officials – not the tribe;• the gaming will occur in Indian country, on the land of another tribe; and
• the state-tribal compact’s arbitration provision does not require arbitration before filing suit?
Lower court materials here.
Here. Like its earlier decision, today’s amended opinion concludes that the district court erroneously granted the State’s request for a preliminary injunction and held that the State’s complaint, which alleged class III gaming activities on non-Indian lands, failed to state a claim under IGRA.
The Tenth Circuit also reiterated that arbitration provisions in the state’s gaming compact effectively barred Oklahoma from suing tribal officials in federal court for purported violations of the compact. The court remanded the matter to the Northern District of Oklahoma with instructions to vacate the preliminary injunction and to dismiss Oklahoma’s complaint with prejudice.
Also, the court denied the petition for en banc review.
Panel materials are here.
Here is the complaint in United States v. Osage Wind LLC (N.D. Okla.):
An excerpt:
In this civil action, the United States seeks a preliminary and a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment that the ongoing excavation activities of Osage Wind, LLC, Enel Kansas, LLC, and Enel Green Power North America, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”) in Osage County, Oklahoma, are unlawful and must be suspended until Defendants have obtained all requisite federal regulatory approvals and have entered into appropriate leases approved by the Secretary of the Interior (“the Secretary”).
Here are selected materials so far in Donelson v. United States (N.D. Okla.):
162 Donelson Response to B&G Motion to Dismiss
163 Donelson Response to Devon Motion to Dismiss
166 Donelson Response to US Motion to Dismiss
Update (2/28/17):
Here is the complaint in Cherokee Nation West v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (N.D. Okla.):
An excerpt:
Plaintiff seeks equal access to Fort Gibson Lake to hold a religious ceremony on November 7, 2014, March 2015 and on future dates. Although Fort Gibson Lake is open to the general public for indiscriminate use, the Defendants denied Plaintiff equal access to the public area of Fort Gibson Lake because Plaintiff wanted to hold a religious ceremony, and such ceremony was considered “sacrilegious” by the government Defendants.
Here are the materials in Estate of Gonzales ex rel. Gonzales v. Brown (N.D. Okla.):
Here is the opinion in Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham. An excerpt:
The Thlopthlocco Tribal Town is a federally recognized Indian tribe in Oklahoma. An election dispute arose about which individuals were properly elected or appointed to govern the Thlopthlocco people. Seeking to resolve that dispute, the Tribal Town filed suit in the tribal court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and, accordingly, voluntarily submitted to that court’s jurisdiction.
The Tribal Town subsequently concluded it did not want to maintain its suit in tribal court and dismissed its claims. But the defendant in that suit had, by that time, filed cross-claims. Arguing that the Tribal Town’s sovereign immunity waiver did not cover proceedings on the cross-claims, the Tribal Town attempted to escape Muscogee court jurisdiction, but, in various decisions, several judges and justices of the Muscogee courts held that they may exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Town without its consent.
The Tribal Town then filed a federal action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against those Muscogee judicial officers, seeking to enjoin the Muscogee courts’ exercise of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, the Tribal Town had failed to join indispensable parties, and the Tribal Town had failed to exhaust its remedies in tribal court. We conclude, however, that the Tribal Town has presented a federal question and that the other claims do not require dismissal. But we agree the Tribal Town should exhaust its remedies in tribal court while its federal court action is abated.
Here are the briefs:
Lower court materials here.
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