Kate Fort on The New Laches and the Iroquois Land Claims

Kathryn Fort has posted a draft of her paper, Disruption and Impossibility: New Laches and the Unfortunate Resolution of the Iroquois Land Claims in Federal Court, forthcoming in the Wyoming Law Review as part of an Indian law symposium, on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

That the law changes over time is no secret. That the law changes based on the parties involved is less obvious, but still no secret. In the case of the Haudenosaunee land claims cases, however, the law shifted dramatically and quickly based entirely on the identity of the parties. In less than five years, the federal appellate courts changed the law so drastically to all but end more than thirty years of modern litigation, reversing years of relative fairness at the district court level. These actions required a fundamental shift in the law of equity: the creation of a new equitable defense for governments against Indian land claims. How the courts accomplished so much in such a short amount of time requires a close reading of the cases and a few logical leaps.

The first part of this article will give a brief history of the New York land claims, focusing on the Oneida Indian Nation and the Cayuga Indian Nation of New York. While the tribes have been fighting the status of this land since the original agreements were signed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, this article looks to the modern era of land claims in the federal courts. The second part of this article will review how a decision in the Oneida claims case directly informed City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation. The third part will focus on the Cayuga Nation line of cases and how Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki changed the fundamental understanding of the equitable defense of laches into a new defense used to defeat tribal land claims. Finally, the fourth part of this article will look closely at the most recent loss, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, where the court admits the creation of a new equitable defense. This defense, identified as “new laches” or “Indian law laches” is a defense that can prevent even the bringing of a land claim in the courts. The defense is no longer traditional laches, but rather an equitable defense that follows none of the rules of equity, and exists only in federal Indian law.

Upstate Citizens Claims re: Oneida Fee to Trust Fail (Mostly)

Here are the materials in Upstate Citizens for Equality v. Salazar (N.D. N.Y.), a companion to Central New York Fair Business Assn. v. Salazar (N.D. N.Y.):

DCT Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment

US Motion for Partial Dismissal

Plaintiff Response to Motion for Partial Dismissal

US Reply re Partial Dismissal

US Motion to Dismiss Supplemental Claim

Plaintiff Response to Motion to Dismiss Supp Claim

US Reply re Supp Claim

Federal Court Dismisses Private Parties’ Challenge to Oneida Trust Land Aquisition

Here are the materials in Central New York Fair Business Assn. v. Salazar (N.D. N.Y.):

US Motion for Partial Dismissal of Complaint

CNYFBA Response to First Motion to Dismiss

US Motion for Partial Dismissal of Amended Complaint

CNYFBA Response to Second Motion to Dismiss

US Reply in Support of Partial Dismissal of Amended Complaint

DCT Order Dismissing Claims

Presumably, other claims on the merits remain (here is the complaint — CNYFBA Complaint, and the amended complaint — CNYFBA Amended Complaint).

Second Circuit Summarily Dismisses Joe Frazier Suit against Oneida’s Turning Stone Casino

Here is the opinion in Frazier v. Brophy — Frazier v Brophy CA2 Order

An excerpt:

An Indian Tribe is not a citizen of any state for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1997); Frazier, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 304. (“[T]he Court cannot assert diversity jurisdiction over this action as long as the Oneida Indian Nation (“Oneida Nation”) and the Casino are Defendants.”). Because an Indian Tribe is not a citizen of any state, the Oneida Nation’s presence as a party bars a federal court from hearing the matter under its diversity jurisdiction. Romanella, 114 F.3d at 16 (“[T]he diversity statute’s provisions for suits between citizens of different states, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), strictly construed, cannot be said to embrace suits involving Indian tribes.”); see also Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 829 (1989) (holding that one stateless party destroys diversity jurisdiction). This accords with the treatment of other domestic sovereigns, such as states, which cannot sue or be sued in diversity. Romanella, 114 F.3d at 16. Given the continued presence of the Oneida Nation in this suit, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. We therefore remand with instructions to dismiss the matter.

And, importantly:

The dismissal of this suit from federal court does not foreclose all relief against the tribe, its casino, and its agents. The Oneida Nation has a trial and appellate court system staffed by former New York Court of Appeals Judges Stewart Hancock and Richard Simons. FACT SHEET: The Oneida Nation Court, http://www.oneidaindiannation.com/pressroom/factsheets/26965674.html (last visited October 2, 2009). To the extent Frazier has live claims against the tribe, its casino, or the casino’s employees, he could attempt to bring them there.

Federal Court Rejects Constitutional Challenges to Fee to Trust Statute in Oneida Trust Acquisition Case

Here is the opinion — Oneida County v Salazar

Materials later….

Stockbridge Munsee Community v. US — Case Transferred to N.D.N.Y.

This is a fee to trust case, originally filed in D.C., now transferred to New York to be litigated along with several Haudenosaunee cases. Here are the materials:

stockbridge-munsee-v-us-dct-order

interior-motion-to-transfer

stockbridge-munsee-brief-in-opposition

interior-reply-brief

Hunt Construction Group v. Oneida Indian Nation

In this short order, the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court reads the tribal waiver of sovereign immunity closely, holding that while the portion of the contract that reads

defendant “hereby expressly, unequivocally, and irrevocably waives its sovereign immunity from suit solely for the limited purpose of enforcement of the terms of this Agreement”

does indeed waive the Nation’s sovereign immunity in this matter, the portion that reads

[defendant] hereby consents to submit to personal jurisdiction of those courts of the State of New York and of the United States with competent subject matter jurisdiction located in the City of Syracuse, New York and the parties agree that all actions related to this Agreement shall be brought or defended in such courts ” (emphasis added).

means that the suit can only be brought in the City of Syracuse, not in Oneida County. This order overturns the lower court ruling which denied dismissal.

Hunt Construction Group v. Oneida Indian Nation

Oneida Fee to Trust Lawsuits Commentary

Indianz reports that a plethora of lawsuits will be filed against Interior’s decision to take land into trust for the Oneida Indian Nation of New York.

Bear in mind that (in my limited understanding) much of the land in question here is the same land in question in the City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation case from 2005. Unfortunately (we now know), the Nation sought to avoid state and local taxation and regulation on that land when it was held in fee simple under federal Indian law principles. Those principles supported the OIN, but only as far as the Supreme Court, which reversed.

Now the OIN is pursuing the path they (perhaps, in hindsight) should have pursued all along — asking the Secretary to take the land into trust. So far, they have been successful, which was no easy feat given the mountain of documentation required to convince the Secretary, but several years have passed since this started, and there might be a new legal climate on the constitutionality of the fee to trust statute, 25 U.S.C. 465.

Perhaps as early as next fall, the Supreme Court might rule in Carcieri v. Kempthorne that the Secretary has no authority to take land into trust for tribes not recognized in 1934. After that, the Oneida case is the kind of case that the Supreme Court might be willing to use to decide whether or not the fee to trust statute is unconstitutional on its face. I would be surprised, because a successful challenge to the fee to trust statute likely would require the Court to go in depth into its nondelegation doctrine and/or Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, areas in which the Roberts Court has not expressed much interest.

We’ll see.

Research Note on Barriers to Indian Land Claims

I’ve posted a short paper called “‘Now What the Hell You Gonna Do in Those Days?’ A Research Note on Practical Barriers to Indian Land Claims” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

There are extra-legal barriers that American Indian people faced when confronted with the illegal theft of their lands, or with any dispossession of their lands. Indian tribes and Indian people faced numerous practical barriers to bringing land and treaty claims prior to the modern era, including without limitation: (1) lack of financial resources; (2) lack of knowledge and sophistication about the American legal system; (3) demoralization; (4) lack of a clear and authorized tribal governmental plaintiff; and (5) government interference and control over tribal affairs.

For Indian tribes pursuing a remedy for these claims, there is a significant defense raised – why didn’t the tribes or the Indians bring these claims before? Since the Supreme Court decided Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Tribe, the equitable defense of laches has been raised by states, local units of government, and property owners against the tribal claims with frightening success rates. The defense is superficially compelling in large part because the practical reasons for failing to bring suit decades sooner might not be considered excusable.

In a pending case, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, the National Congress of American Indians attempted to flesh out the practical barriers to tribal land claims in an amicus brief. This short Essay attempts to add to that research. But the ultimate purpose of this Essay is to call for serious empirical research on this difficult question – why didn’t Indians and tribes file suit to vindicate their rights to land?