Rule 19

Supreme Court Cert Petition in Two Shields v. Wilkinson

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

Two Shields Cert Petition

ILTF Amicus Brief in Support of Petition

Law Profs Amicus Brief in Support of Petition

Questions presented:

In Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5 (1990) (per curiam), this Court unanimously held that joint tortfeasors are not required parties under Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because “[i]t has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit.” Id. at 7. Six circuits have recognized the rule that joint wrongdoers are not required parties under Rule 19(a). Three circuits now have followed the opposite rule in holding that, in some circumstances, a joint tortfeasor is a required party, while case law in the Seventh Circuit is conflicted. The Eighth Circuit below followed the minority line of the circuit split to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the action under Rule 19 for failure to join the United States.

The question presented is: Does Rule 19 incorporate the common law rule that joint tortfeasors are not required parties?

Lower court materials here.

Supreme Court Petition Involving NAGPRA, Rule 19, and Tribal Immunity

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the petition in White v. Regents of the University of California:

White Cert Petition

Questions presented:

The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), which governs repatriation of human remains to Native American tribes, contains an enforcement provision that states, “The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over any action brought by any person alleging a violation of this chapter and shall have the authority to issue such orders as may be necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter.” 25 U.S.C. § 3013. Over a strong dissent, a divided Ninth Circuit panel held that a party can prevent judicial review of controversial repatriation decisions by claiming a tribe is a “required party” under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if the tribe invokes tribal immunity. The questions presented are:
1. Whether Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a district court dismiss any case in which a Native American tribe with immunity is deemed to be a “required party.”
2. Whether tribal immunity extends to cases where Rule 19 is the only basis for adding a tribe, no relief against the tribe is sought, and no other forum can issue a binding order on the dispute; and if so, whether Congress abrogated tribal immunity as a defense to claims arising under NAGPRA.
Lower court materials here.
UPDATE (1/4/16): Anthropologists Amicus Brief

Update in Western Sky-Related Proceedings

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are materials in Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank NA (M.D. N.C.):

162 Dillion Motion to Compel re Generations

164 Dillon Motion to Compel

165 Bay Cities Bank Opposition

166 Generations Community FCU Opposition

170 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Using the Heldt analysis, however, Plaintiffs’ logic can be used to assert a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction, because some of Defendants’ actions involved alleged tribal entities and/or tribal members.”). Operating against that backdrop, these courts mandated tribal exhaustion where the record did not establish (i) the nature of the payday lenders’ relationship to each other and/or the tribe; (ii) the unavailability of the specified tribal arbitral forum; and (iii) for purposes of the Western Sky agreement, (A) who constitutes an “authorized representative of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation” and (B) whether any such authorized representative “is a JAMS or AAA arbitrator,” Heldt, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 1193 (internal quotation marks omitted).See id. at 1184-87, 1190-93; see also Brown, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 480-81 (following Heldt).

As discussed below, Dillon bases his Requests and Motions to Compel in significant part on a need to develop a factual record sufficient to overcome the concerns in the Heldt line of cases. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 162 at 1-2; Docket Entry 162-2 at 4-6.).

We posted on this Rule 19 portion of this case here.

 

Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians Seeks to Quash Third-Party Subpoena in Class Action re: Sovereign Lending

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the motion in Dillon v. BMO Harris (W.D. Okla.):

1 Motion to Quash

Here are materials in the North Carolina portion of this suit.

Oklahoma v. Hobia Cert Stage Briefing Complete

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Hobia Cert Opp

Oklahoma Reply

Lower court materials here.

Hobia Cert Opposition Brief

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

Hobia Cert Opp

Cert petition here.

Ninth Circuit Briefs in Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Dept. of Interior

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

Opening Brief

Interior Answer Brief

Tribal Council Answering Brief

Agency decision here. Materials here.

Federal Court Dismisses Challenge to Santa Ynez Chumash Casino

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Save the Valley LLC v. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians (C.D. Cal.):

22-1 Santa Ynez Motion to Dismiss

26 Opposition

29 Reply

31 DCT Minute Order

We posted the complaint here.

Eighth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Two Shields v. Wilkinson

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here is the opinion:

Two Shields Opinion

An excerpt:

Appellants Ramona Two Shields and Mary Louise Defender Wilson are Indians with interests in land allotted to them by the United States under the Dawes Act of 1887. Such land is held in trust by the government, but may be leased by allottees. Two Shields and Defender Wilson leased oil and gas mining rights on their allotments to appellee companies and affiliated individuals who won a sealed bid auction conducted by the Board of Indian Affairs (BIA) in 2007. Subsequent to the auction, appellants agreed to terms with the winning bidders, the BIA approved the leases, and appellees sold them for a large profit. Appellants later filed this putative class action in the District of North Dakota, claiming that the United States had breached its fiduciary duty by approving the leases for the oil and gas mining rights, and that the defendant bidders aided, abetted, and induced the United States to breach that duty. The district court concluded that the United States was a required party which could not be joined, but without which the action could not proceed in equity and good conscience, and dismissed the case. Appellants challenge that dismissal. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

Briefs here.

Federal Court Imposes $200K Appeal Bond on Wolfchild Appeal

Matthew L.M. Fletcher3 Comments

Here are the relevant materials in Wolfchild v. Redwood County (D. Minn.):

208 Lower Sioux Community Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions

291 DCT Order

Materials on the court’s dismissal of the claim are here.