Supreme Court

Opening Merits Brief in Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

Menominee Tribe Brief

 

Ho-Chunk Nation Cert Opposition Brief

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the brief in opposition in Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation:

Ho-Chunk Nation Cert Opposition Brief

Cert petition here.

Dollar General Opening Brief

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

Dollar General Brief

No. 13-1496 Joint Appendix 8-31-15

NYTs: “Supreme Court’s ‘Long Conference’: Where Appeals ‘Go to Die’”

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here.

I’m unaware of any Indian law grants from the so-called “long conference” since we started the blog in 2007.

From NARF’s page, here are the petitions currently pending:

Jensen was initially set for the long conference, but the Court asked the respondents to file a response brief (a CFR) and that moved back the date.

Hobia, Jim Thorpe, and Torres are currently set for the long conference. Parker and Ho-Chunk likely will as well.

Turtle Talk Poll — The Enduring Legacy/Aftermath of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez is patently one of the two or three most important and perhaps controversial Supreme Court decisions affecting Indian nations and Indian people. In light of Steve Russell’s four part ICT series, we wonder what Turtle Talk readers think about Martinez.

As we think of them, we may add a question or two.

Update – here’s one!

 

United States Cert Opposition Brief in Nebraska v. Parker

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

US Cert Opp Brief

Cert petition and link to lower court materials here.

Oklahoma v. Hobia Cert Stage Briefing Complete

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Hobia Cert Opp

Oklahoma Reply

Lower court materials here.

Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation Cert Petition re: e-Poker

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here:

Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation Cert Petition

Question presented:

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) defines authorized Indian gaming as Class I, Class II, or Class III. 25 U.S.C. § 2703. Unlike Class III gaming, Class II is not subject to tribal-state gaming compacts. 25 U.S.C. § 2710. Class II gaming includes card games that “are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State.” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(II). Wisconsin’s Constitution prohibits the state legislature from authorizing any form of gambling, including poker. See Wis. Const., art. IV, § 24(1).
Prior to Congress enacting IGRA, the Court held that a state cannot enforce its gambling laws on Indian land when its policy toward gambling is civil and regulatory, rather than criminal and prohibitory. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,480 U.S. 202, 210 (1987). Here, the Seventh Circuit applied Cabazon to interpret IGRA. It concluded that the electronic poker offered by the Ho-Chunk Nation is Class II, not Class III, when Wisconsin’s policy toward gambling and poker is regulatory, rather than prohibitory. Under this approach, the Nation can offer e-poker in Madison, Wisconsin despite the parties’ compact, which does not authorize Class III gaming in Madison.
The question presented is:
Whether Cabazon’s “regulatory/prohibitory” test that pre-dates IGRA applies to determine whether a game is Class II or Class III gaming under IGRA?

Lower court materials here.

Jensen v. EXC Cert Petition

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here:

Jensen Cert Petition

Questions presented:

1. Whether federal courts are free to ignore congressionally confirmed Indian treaty rights that impliedly reserve tribal jurisdiction over nonmember conduct within an Indian reservation, thereby effecting an impermissible judicial abrogation of those treaty rights.
2. Whether federal courts may disregard the Supreme Court’s multifactor analysis for determining the status of a roadway existing on tribal trust land when deciding if an Indian tribe has inherent sovereign jurisdiction to adjudicate a collision occurring on that roadway between a tribally regulated tour bus and a passenger vehicle carrying tribal members.
3. Whether federal courts may decline to apply the consensual relationship exception of Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), because nonmember conduct occurred on land deemed to be the equivalent of non-Indian fee land, where (a) the Supreme Court has indicated that Montana’s consensual relationship exception can justify tribal jurisdiction over nonmember conduct occurring on non-Indian fee land or its equivalent, and (b) there exists a consensual relationship of the qualifying kind between the tribe and the nonmembers.
4. Whether federal courts may deny that an Indian tribe has inherent civil jurisdiction, pursuant to the second Montana exception, over nonmembers’ commercial touring of tribal lands that results in a fatal tour bus/auto collision where (a) the nonmembers’ conduct implicates the tribe’s interests in governing itself, controlling internal relations, and superintending land use, and (b) the impact of the commercial touring activity, unconstrained by tribal regulatory authority, is demonstrably serious and imperils the tribe’s sovereign interests.

Lower court materials here.