Author: Matthew L.M. Fletcher – Page 582

The government argues that Counts One, Two, and Three of the pending case must be dismissed under § 1500 because those Counts raise claims that are the same as the claims pending in the Nevada litigation. Plaintiffs contend that the claims in both lawsuits are not the same and therefore Counts One, Two, and Three need not be dismissed. In addition, the government argues that Counts Three and Four must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because they seek equitable relief and a declaratory judgment that are outside the jurisdiction of this court. Plaintiffs did not respond to the government’s arguments regarding this court’s lack of jurisdiction over Counts Three and Four.³ For the reasons discussed below, the court agrees with the government that § 1500 bars the court from considering Counts One, Two, and Three of plaintiffs’ complaint and that Counts Three and Four also must be dismissed as seeking relief outside the jurisdiction of the court. The government’s motion to dismiss the complaint is therefore GRANTED.

New Scholarship by Gerald Torres on American Indian Blood

July 10, 2014July 9, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Gerald Torres has published “American Blood: Who is Counting and For What?” in the St. Louis University Law Journal‘s most recent symposium issue.

An excerpt:

For Indians, the problem of “who counts” is complex. That it could be asked at all reveals that asking “who counts?” is an artifact of power. The question could be whether Indians have “American blood”? Could they be part of the political community that was being created by Europeans in North America? Or could it mean who counts as an Indian for other reasons? These are not as radically divergent questions as they might first appear because they both pivot around the deeper inquiry: who is counting and for what? And because of the nature of the political culture of the new United States, “who counts” also necessarily implicates the question of race. Thus for Indians, the question is not merely whether they are a “race.” The question for Indians and other indigenous people is whether they will have access to the power that attaches to their being a nation and not just another “race” or ethnicity.

Update in City of Duluth v. NIGC

July 10, 2014July 9, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here is Duluth’s motion for summary judgment:

25 Duluth Motion for Summary J

Prior materials here.

ICT on NICS’ New Online Tribal Court Opinions Database

July 10, 2014July 9, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is ” Northwest Tribal Courts Providing Free Access to Justice.”

We posted on this here.

Hoopa Tribal Leaders Letter re: S. 2379

July 9, 2014July 9, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher6 Comments

The Hoopa Valley Tribe is seeking letters from Michigan tribes to Sen. Stabenow and to the Chairs of SCIA and SENR regarding a bill that would abrogate tribal water rights.

The letters should go to the Senators of the state of the tribe sending the letter. The reference to Sen. Stabenow is for Michganders.

Here are the materials:

Reply-S2379-062314

Tribal leaders letter re Klamath Legislation061714

Tribal leaders template3

VirgilMastenStatementw_Attachments_061614

New Mexico Court of Appeals Affirms Conviction of Non-Indian Arrested by Tribal Police

July 9, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in State v. Sanchez (N.M. App.).

An excerpt:

Defendant Ronald Sanchez was arrested by a Tesuque Pueblo police officer on property of the Tesuque Pueblo and charged in Santa Fe County Magistrate Court with aggravated driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (DWI), first offense, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66–8–102 (2010). The officer was cross-commissioned as a Santa Fe County special deputy sheriff. His salary was paid by the Tesuque Pueblo Police Department, and it included incremental pay financed from a grant to assist the department in targeting the motoring public. On appeal to the district court, Defendant was again convicted. He appeals his conviction to this Court, contending that the district court (1) erred in denying his motion to suppress by holding that the tribal officer who conducted the arrest was properly cross-commissioned and had authority to arrest Defendant under the Motor Vehicle Code; and (2) erred in denying Defendant’s defense, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 66–8–137(B) (1978), and holding that the tribal officer did not have financial incentive motivating his arrest of Defendant. We hold that (1) the tribal officer was properly cross-commissioned and could properly arrest Defendant while wearing the uniform of and receiving his salary from the Tesuque Pueblo Police Department, and (2) the tribal officer’s receipt of pay from a grant and his obligation under the grant to make monthly statistical reports did not give rise to a defense under Section 66–8–137(B). We affirm Defendant’s conviction.