News article here, via Pechanga.
Materials:
Baffles me why this is unpublished….
Here is the opinion in Nason v. 1991 Buick.
The tribal interest in self-governance rests with the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians-both the incident leading to the forfeiture proceeding and the seizure of respondent’s vehicle took place on the Mille Lacs Reservation. Because respondent is enrolled in the Fond du Lac Band, the Mille Lacs Band’s interest in self-governance is not as strong over respondent. We reject respondent’s argument that we should consider the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe as a whole when assessing the strength of the interest in self-governance; that argument was considered and rejected by the supreme court in Davis, and we find nothing to distinguish respondent’s case from Davis.
Based on the state’s strong interest of promoting safety on state roads and the weaker tribal interest in self-governance present in this case, we conclude that a forfeiture proceeding against respondent in state court is not preempted by federal or tribal interests. We therefore conclude that the state has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the forfeiture action involving respondent’s vehicle.
Here are the materials from the District court in Montana:
Here is the magistrate R&R in this matter, a companion case to Miranda v. Nielson (D. Ariz.), though a different federal judge will review this report, so we’ll see.
Bustamante Report and Recommendation
Briefs are here.
Here:
State Court Administrative Office – Court Improvement Program: Indian Child Welfare Act Forum Remarks, October 6, 2008
by Justice Michael F. Cavanagh
Indian Children and Termination of Parental Rights: Michigan Supreme Court Takes a Step in the Right Direction in In Re Lee
by Angel Sorrells, Cami Fraser, Thomas Myers, and Aaron Allen
Proceed with Prudence: Advising Clients Doing Business in Indian Country
by R. Lance Boldrey and Jason Hanselman
Indian Gaming and Tribal Self-Determination: Reconsidering the 1993 Tribal-State Gaming Compacts
by Zeke Fletcher
Indian Country Law Enforcement and Cooperative Public Safety Agreements
by Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Kathryn E. Fort, and Wenona T. Singel
And I completely missed this article in the same issue (many apologies to the authors!):
In the Law: Keeping Current with American Indian Legal Resources
by Jan Bissett and Margi Heinen
Aviva Orenstein has published “Propensity or Stereotype? A Misguided Evidence Experiment in Indian Country,” in the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy.
Here is the abstract:
In a significant break with traditional evidence rules and policies, the Federal Rules of Evidence concerning rape and child abuse, Rules 413 and 414, permit the government to admit the accused’s prior sexual misconduct as evidence of character and propensity. Although these rules have been roundly criticized, insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that in allowing propensity evidence for federal sex offenses (as opposed to offenses under state law), these rules disproportionately affect one distinct civilian population: Indians.
Here are a series of minute orders dismissing claims against Grand River Enterprises’ Native Wholesale Supply brought by the State of California. Many states have been attempting to prosecute this entity for selling tobacco in Indian Country in violation of the Master Settlement Agreement reached by 46 state AG’s and major tobacco companies.
They have a claim pending against the United States under NAFTA (documents here).
Here is the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum opinion in United States v. Lyons.
An excerpt:
Lyons contends that the mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) unconstitutionally violates his right to equal protection. This contention fails because § 2241(c) does not discriminate against Native Americans, either on its face or as applied. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). Any disproportionate impact § 2241 has on Native Americans simply reflects the different treatment of criminals under the Major Crimes Act who commit crimes in a federal enclave. See United States v. Lemay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645, 648-49 (1977) (holding that federal legislation, although relating to Indian tribes, is not based upon impermissible racial classifications; and that it is of no consequence that the federal scheme differs from a state criminal code.)
You be the judge (here’s the federal government’s motion in U.S. v. Diaz, via Indianz).
An excerpt:
On at least one occasion, defense counsel has referenced his former employment as an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of New Mexico during oral argument before this Court. The United States asserts that defense counsel should not be permitted to make a similar argument before the jury. If he is so permitted, a jury may erroneously conclude that defense counsel is a voice of authority with respect to the appropriateness of the decisions, rules and procedures, or protocol involved in the charging decisions made by the Department of Justice.
…with leave to amend their complaint. The case is Dupris v. McDonald (D. Ariz.). The events occurred on the White Mountain Apache reservation. And the plaintiffs are accused of sexual assault.
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