Grant Christensen on the Extradition Clause and Indian Country

Grand Christensen has posted “The Extradition Clause and Indian Country,” forthcoming in the North Dakota Law Review, on SSRN.

The abstract:

This article looks at the enforceability of the Extradition Clause in the federal courts of the United States. In 1861 the Supreme Court held in Dennison that the federal courts could not be used to enforce a request made by one state governor to another state governor for the extradition of a suspected criminal under Article IV Section 1. In 1987 the Supreme Court reversed the Dennison decision and for the first time since the Civil War held that the federal judicial power includes the power to enforce the Extradition Clause. This article takes the position that federal judicial power is limited to cases where the state governor has both territorial and personal jurisdiction over the accused. When an individual is on an Indian reservation, even Article IV does not authorize the governor of a state to enter the reservation and return the accused subject to an extradition request. Article IV’s Extradition Clause provides a constitutional duty for the executive of one state to remit to the power of a sister state someone located within its borders and subject to its jurisdiction. Critical to the exercise of this power is the dual understanding that the individual sought must be both within the state territory and subject to the state’s jurisdiction. Indian country lies outside the general jurisdictional power of the states. States may not enter Indian country and remove persons found there absent cooperation with or permission from the Tribe. Doing so infringes upon the Tribe’s right to make its own laws and be governed by them.

Grant Christensen on Using Consent to Expand Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction

Grand Christensen has posted “Using Consent to Expand Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction,” forthcoming in the California Law Review, on SSRN.

Navajo police officer photographed by Edward Curtis

Here is the abstract:

In June of 2022 the Supreme Court reversed two-hundred years of precedent and held in a 5-4 opinion that states have concurrent criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. In conducting the preemption analysis Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion reasoned that while states have a strong interest in prosecuting crimes in Indian country in order to keep the community safe, tribes had functionally no interest because they generally lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The court then reasoned that the lack of a tribal interest could not preempt the state interest. This article suggests, despite the general prohibition on tribes asserting criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians that was discovered by the Supreme Court in 1978’s Oliphant opinion, tribes can assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who consent to the jurisdiction in tribal court. The argument extends to both affirmative and implied consent and draws its authority from both pre-Oliphant scholarship and precedent as well as from recent development by the Court, Congress, and dicta from the Ninth Circuit. If tribes are able to regularly assert some criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, then when lower courts apply Castro-Huerta in the future there will be a strong tribal interest to preempt state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country.

Highly recommended.

Ninth Circuit Rejects Effort to Challenge Tribal-State Cross-Dep Agreement [Fort Peck]

Here is the opinion in United States v. Fowler.

Briefs:

Oregon COA Reverses State Criminal Conviction of Nez Percé Treaty Fishers

Here are the materials in State v. McCormack (Or. Ct. App.):

University of Washington digital collection

Muscogee (Creek) Nation SCT Orders Remand in Speedy Trial Appeal after Defendant Held for 248 Days

Here is the opinion in Vandecar v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation:

New Mexico Federal Court Dismisses Most of Federal Criminal Charges against Navajo Citizen for Selling Hawk and Eagle Feathers

Here are the materials in United States v. Skeet (D.N.M.):

Not a bird

Washington COA Rejects Cowlitz Members’ Aboriginal Fishing Rights Claim

Here are the materials in Simmons v. State of Washington:

Muscogee SCT Issues Opinion in Criminal Law Matter [speedy trial; duress defense]

Here is the opinion in Casey v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation:

Northern Cheyenne Tribe Sues Interior over Reservation Policing

Here is the complaint in Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. United States (D. Mont.):

Wisconsin COA Rejects Challenge to Constitutionality of PL280

Here is the unpublished opinion in State of Wisconsin v. House:

Briefs here.

Public Law 280 is the classic example of what SCOTUS would strike down as violating the anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment. It is a mandate to states (six of them, including Wisconsin) to assume criminal jurisdiction over Indian country and it’s basically unfounded (more or less like most other aspects of Indian country criminal jurisdiction). I guess since the mandatory PL280 states consent to this federal commandeering of their legislative process, it’s okay? Or since the states retain prosecutorial discretion in individual cases? Like a lot of crap the Supreme Court has been shoving down our collective throats for the last few decades, anti-commandeering law is just stupid with two Os (thank you Knives Out for that one).