Martorello v. Williams Cert Petition [tribal sovereign lending]

Here:

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Indian Commerce Clause preempts state regulation of loans made on an Indian reservation, by an arm of a tribe, when the borrower contracts via the internet.

2. Whether a violation of the unlawful debt prohibition of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, requires scienter for civil liability.

Lower court materials here.

Someone’s either been playing Galaga or reading Gorsuch, or both.

Tenth Circuit Affirms Life Sentence for Murphy

Here is the opinion in United States v. Murphy.

The defendant was the subject of Sharp v. Murphy, the predecessor case to McGirt v. Oklahoma.

How many agree? “Supreme Court Bad.”

Spokane County Bar Association Indian Law Section 17th Annual Indian Law Conference (Mar. 6, 2026) + Bar Scholarship Info.

Elizabeth Reese on Phasing Out Federal Paternalism in the Self-Determination Era

Elizabeth Hildago Reese has published “The Three Phases of the Tribal Self-Determination Era and the Phase-Out of Federal Paternalism” in the Columbia Law Review Forum.

Here is the abstract:

We commonly call the last fifty years of federal Indian law and policy the “tribal self-determination era.” This Piece argues that this era is actually three conceptually distinct though temporally overlapping phases of federal Indian law and policy development. Each of these three distinct phases is a step further dismantling the structures of federal paternalism and replacing them with laws and policies that support tribal nations’ strength, capacity, and autonomy. Paternalism has become, therefore, somewhat of an anti–North Star for the transformative federal Indian policies of the last fifty years and can continue to serve as that anti-guiding light for further federal Indian law and policy development. What makes this era challenging and noteworthy is that it is characterized by an instance of something unusual and difficult for a government: a commitment to giving up power. 

Now this commitment is at a crossroads. The Biden Administration championed a third phase of policies with traditionally conservative, small government–minded commitments to start shrinking federal government bloat and promoting deference to or cooperation with local tribal decisionmaking. The Trump Administration must decide between conservative impulses to continue this work of shrinking unnecessary federal bureaucracy or more authoritarian impulses to increase the control that funding gives the executive branch over entities like tribal nations that rely on that funding.

Highly, highly recommended! Any forward-looking scholarship in this field is golden and this paper is simply brilliant.

En Banc Petition Materials in Tix v. Tix + Commentary

Here:

The panel decision in Tix v. Tix is (1) almost certainly wrong, (2) almost certainly will not be reheard en banc, (3) almost certainly will not be reviewed by SCOTUS (assuming a cert petition is filed), and (4) almost certainly inconsistent with the realities on the ground at Prairie Island.

First, the panel decision denying tribal jurisdiction over a divorce case involving tribal member and nonmember spouses where the children are tribal citizens, the large majority of the community property derives from the tribal government, and the nonmember spouse benefitted from the tribal member spouse’s eligibility for tribal governmental services (the tribe’s amicus brief makes this clear) for many years makes little common sense. There are no meaningful cases to the contrary on this issue, certainly no on-point Supreme Court precedents, so for the panel to claim to be bound by precedent is not persuasive. Moreover, the “precedents” cited are truly federal common law precedents, derivatives of the so-called Montana test that had no basis then or now in Constitutional text, Congressional Acts, or treaty law. Montana and its progeny are perhaps best understood as a bulwark against a tribe using its sovereignty to assume control over nonmember property or liberty without guaranteeing meaningful procedural protections (if Montana makes much sense at all). A textualist judge should be very concerned that Montana, at bottom, a judge-made rule rooted in factual assumptions (not facts) and policy preferences (in line with Justice Scalia’s admission that the Court just makes up Indian law based in its own policy preferences/political commitments), is a guiding principle for much of anything. And any judge should appreciate that Montana and its progeny are all absolutely distinguishable — none of those cases involved Prairie Band and improperly essentialize tribal nations.

Fundamentally, this is a tribal property rights case, where the typical roles in older tribal jurisdiction cases like Brendale (partly) and Plains Commerce are reversed. Prairie Band is a truly remarkable tribal nation, on the vanguard of outstanding modern tribal governance. There’s no hint of unfairness in the tribe’s laws and policies, no hint of tribal court procedural error, and a long history of hospitality toward the nonmember spouse in this matter. Maybe the nonmember has community property entitlements under state law, but the property at issue is inescapably tribal.

Second, the Eighth Circuit has become an outlier with the rest of the courts that have decided tribal civil jurisdiction cases over the last two decades, most of which were decided by the CA9. Most of the recent wave of cases finding tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers involve tribal or Indian property. The Ninth Circuit’s insurance cases involved tribal property. The Ninth Circuit’s nonmember trespass cases involved tribal property. The Ninth Circuit’s nonmember regulation cases involve individual or tribal Indian property. A recent South Dakota Supreme Court decision also involved a tribe’s property interest in a contract. The Court’s decision in US v Cooley even stepped over into tribal jurisdiction over nonmember liberty, although certainly in a narrow manner. The Court has had several opportunities to review most these cases and has declined all of them.

Third, more generally the Eighth Circuit has shown an extraordinary willingness to more or less summarily eradicate impact litigation victories by tribal interests in the lower courts. The circuit’s brief and simplistic dismissal of the Oglala and Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s civil rights suit against Rapid City judges, involving years of fact-finding and careful decisions of the district court finding outrageous human rights violations by local judges against Lakota families, was outright shocking, at least in part because a federal statute established federal policy favoring such suits. The circuit’s unnecessary vacature of a hard-fought and reasoned district court opinion in the Mille Lacs reservation boundary case was another shock. Same with the vacature of HCI’s injunction against Nebraska taxes. Most impactful given the lengthy and well-established history of racial bias by both Dakotas in seeking to limit Indian voting, the circuit has similarly shot down Indian country voting rights cases.

In fairness, the circuit has been faithful to the Court’s tribal exhaustion doctrine (though that is a far cry from affirming actual tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers). The circuit’s recent rejection of civil rights suits against a BIA cop who killed an innocent tribal member and Standing Rock protesters’ claims of police abuse is not inconsistent with other courts’ deference to the police (not that such deference to police violence is a good thing). One wonders if the circuit was stung by the reversal of its decision in Plains Commerce, but that was nearly 20 years ago. Time to move on.

Oklahoma Federal Court Denies Local Prosecutors’ Efforts to Dismiss Federal/Tribal Challenge to Indian Country Criminal Jurisdiction

Here are the materials in United States v. Ballard (N.D. Okla.):

And here are the materials in United States v. Iski (N.D. Okla.):

Prior posts with complaints here and here.

Nazune Menka on Alaska Tribal Sovereignty

Nazune Menka has published “The Corpus Juris of (Alaska Native) Inherent Tribal Sovereignty” in the Alaska Law Review.

Highly recommended!

Here is the abstract:

The inherent Tribal sovereignty of Native nations predates the formation of the United States and is reflected in the constitutional vision of tripartite sovereignty. Yet their sovereignty is oft diminished explicitly by federal law or implicitly by federal courts. This implicit divestiture is often the result of the federal judiciary’s inconsistent interpretations of Indigenous Peoples law. This Article argues that a more principled and coherent approach for federal judges would be to consistently make use of the corpus juris, or whole body of law, including the in pari materia or affiliated statutes canon. The Article posits that the corpus juris of inherent Tribal sovereignty requires understanding whether any federal laws have explicitly abrogated or diminished a specific Native nation’s rights to traditional self-governance and understanding traditional Tribal law. The corpus juris inherent Tribal sovereignty approach illustrates how, where the Supreme Court has utilized the in pari materia canon, the consistency and coherence of Indigenous Peoples law increases. Through an analysis of select cases, involving Native nation traditional land and ways of life, I illustrate how Alaska Native nations have been particularly impacted by the explicit and implicit diminishment of traditional ways of life. However, through traditionally informed governance systems, Alaska Native nations continue to assert their inherent Tribal sovereignty, especially when faced with Alaska’s “sole state sovereignty” arguments in federal courts. The Article utilizes the corpus juris of inherent Tribal sovereignty argument and the constitutional vision of tripartite sovereignty to illustrate how the State of Alaska’s “sole state sovereignty” arguments must fail when utilizing this more coherent approach.

Past Blast — Tim Coulter on the Lack of Redress for Indian Claims, Civil Rights Digest, 1978

Squaxin Island Tribal Court Holds Disenrollment Action Was Arbitrary and Capricious

Here is the opinion in In re the Disenrollment Appeal of Selvidge-Brownfield: