Hopi Job Vacancies

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are current vacancies for the Hopi Tribe. These positions are vacant until filled. Position descriptions are attached. The employment application may be obtained on their website.

GEN COU General Counsel02996

HTC Chief Judge 012014 E80

OGC Deputy General Counsel 122006

You can also find their Job Vacancy Listing on-line at the following address:   http://www.hopi-nsn.gov/tribal-services/human-resources/job-listings/

Applications can be submitted:

a: To the Office of Human Resources

b: Mailed to:  The Hopi Tribe, Human Resources, PO Box 123, Kykotsmovi Arizona 86039

c: Faxed to (928) 734-6611 (Please call to verify that HR received your fax)

d: Or e-mail to HumanResources@hopi.nsn.us

Questions may be directed to 928-734-3212.

Jamul Tribal Gaming Commission Request for Legal Services

Sarah M Donnelly

Download RFQ here.

If you are interested in representing the JTGC, please submit a response as outlined above. Please direct any inquiries concerning the Request for Qualifications (RFQ) to:

Chad Delgado, Executive Director
Jamul Tribal Gaming Commission
P.O. Box 2267
Spring Valley, CA 91979
Direct Phone: 619-303-9339
Email: cdelgado@jamulindianvillage.com

All Responses must be submitted to Jamul Tribal Gaming Commission, Attention: Chad Delgado, Executive Director on or before May 2, 2016, 4:00 P.M. PDT.

Director of Public Affairs Opening at NIGC

Sarah M Donnelly

National Indian Gaming Commission

Job Title: Director of Public Affairs
Salary Range: $128,082.00 to $160,300.00 / Per Year
Location:  Washington, D.C.
Open Period: Monday, April 4, 2016 to Monday, April 18, 2016
http://www.nigc.gov/utility/nigc-employment-opportunity-director-of-public-affairs

About the Agency
The Commission’s primary mission is to work within the framework created by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) for the regulation of gaming activities conducted by tribes on Indian lands to fully realize IGRA’s goals: (1) promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency and strong tribal governments; (2) maintaining the integrity of the Indian gaming industry; and (3) ensuring that tribes are the primary beneficiaries of their gaming activities.

The Director of Public Affairs is responsible for overseeing and coordinating all governmental and public interactions for the Commission’s communication programs and activities relating to public, governmental and media relations. The Director of Public Affairs is also responsible for the coordination of daily activities and functions relating to the Division of Public Affairs, including supervision of the Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs Coordinator, Communication Specialists and collaborations with other staff and Divisions within NIGC.

Duties

  • Serves as point of contact, both internally and externally, for all public and governmental communications and interactions; ensures that all such contacts are consistent with overall Agency mission, policy and protocol. Directs and oversees incoming written communications while working with the proper Agency department or division for adequate response.
  • Coordinates, on an agency-wide basis, the implementation of policies, criteria, and procedures governing Congressional relations, and other governmental affairs, and media relations.
  • On a daily basis keeps the Chief of Staff and other key NIGC officials informed on matters regarding tribal, Congressional, legislative and other governmental and media issues that may impact the Agency or reaction toward NIGC programs and activities.
  • Develops, integrates, and monitors plans and programs and tracks associated budget.
  • Organizes the formulation, development and presentation of the public message of the NIGC, including preparation and release to the media of press releases, speeches, reports and policy statements.
  • Has extensive experience in the development of and understanding of social media and should be able to utilize multiple social media platforms to share and exchange Commission information.

How to Apply
A cover letter, resume and writing sample must be received by 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time (ET) on the closing date of this announcement, April 18, 2016. To apply submit your Cover letter and Resume to: Renee_Fox@NIGC.gov. Questions can be directed to Renee Fox at Renee_Fox@NIGC.gov  or 202-632-7003.

Federal Court Dismisses Individual Tribal Member’s Attempt to Invoke Treaty Rights

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the materials in Turunen v. Creagh (W.D. Mich.):

56 DCT Order to Show Cause re Rule 19

57 Plaintiff’s Brief

58 DNR Brief

61 KBIC Letter

62 Fond du Lac Band Letter

63 Red Cliff Band

64 LCO Brief

66 Plaintiff’s Response to Tribes

67 DCT Order Dismissing Complaint

An excerpt:

Plaintiff, Brenda Turunen, is a member of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community (KBIC), a federally recognized Indian tribe in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula that is the successor-in-interest to the L’Anse and Ontonagon bands of the Lake Superior Chippewa Indians. In 1842, the Lake Superior Chippewa  Indians signed a treaty with the United States of America, 7 Stat. 591 (the 1842 Treaty), in which the Indian signatories ceded large portions of the western Upper Peninsula of Michigan, but reserved “the right of hunting on the ceded territory, with the other usual privileges of occupancy.” 7 Stat. 591.

Plaintiff owns property that is within the “ceded territory” at issue in the 1842 Treaty. Plaintiff asserts that the “the usual privileges of occupancy” reserved by the KBIC on the ceded territory included commercial farming and animal husbandry. Based on that interpretation of the 1842 Treaty, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that she may—as a member of the KBIC—raise animals free from state regulation on her property within the ceded territory.

Plaintiff’s claim rests on the twin propositions that the KBIC retained certain rights in the 1842 Treaty, and that she may exercise such rights based on her membership in the KBIC. Although the Court must determine the scope of the rights retained by the KBIC to resolve Plaintiff’s claim, the KBIC is not a party to this action. Thus, the Court previously sought briefing from the parties regarding whether the KBIC should be joined pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and whether the case  should be dismissed if the KBIC could not be joined. After the parties responded, the Court—at Plaintiff’s urging—ordered Plaintiff to notify the KBIC of the pending action and the opportunity to intervene. The KBIC followed up to that notification with a letter to the Court stating that it would not intervene in the action, and further urging that the action be dismissed under Rule 19. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the matter should be dismissed.

We have posted on this matter here, here, here, here, and here.

Midwest Peacemaking Conference is June 8-10 in Manistee

Sarah M Donnelly

Download agenda and presenter bios here.

Link to registration here.

Seeking Part-time Staff Director, Center for Indian Law & Policy

Sarah M Donnelly

Link to job announcement here.

Latest Legal Developments in California ICWA Case

Kate Fort

From the docket:

The writ of supersedeas was denied. Here.

The application to transfer the case out of the court of appeals and directly to the California Supreme Court was also denied. Here.

The underlying appeal against the placement order remains open in the California court of appeals. Here.

What is a writ of supersedeas? It’s what California still calls a stay of proceedings. A writ of supersedeas is defined in California’s Rules of Court here. Under rule 8.824, a writ of supersedeas is a stay of a judgment or order pending appeal. The petition for the writ must bear the same title (or name) as the appeal (hence a lot of confusion). In this case, the petition for the writ was filed to in an attempt to stop the transfer placement to Utah while the California court of appeals hears the foster parents’ appeal of the March 8th placement order. The court of appeals denied the petition for the writ of supersedeas on March 18. The first time this case went up on appeal, the appeal process took nine months from filing to opinion.

In addition, the California Rules of Court allow for a transfer of a case pending in the court of appeals to the California Supreme Court. Rule 8.552 allows a party to petition for the transfer, but the case must present “an issue of great public importance that the Supreme Court must promptly resolve.” in order for the transfer to be granted.

Tl;dr? The case is ongoing, it will stay in the California court of appeals for now, but the child will not be moved back to California during the pendency of the appeal.

 

Update in TON Suit against Arizona Officials re: Glendale Casino

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the new materials in Tohono O’Odham Nation v. Ducey (D. Ariz.):

82 DCT Order Denying TON Motion for PI

108 TON Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims

111 Bergin Response

115 TON Reply

127 DCT Order

Previous materials are here.

Navajo Loses 2014 Self-Determination Contract Funding Challenge

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here are the materials in Navajo Nation v. Dept. of Interior (D.D.C.):

15-3 Navajo Motion for Summary J

18 US Response

21 Navajo Reply

23 US Reply

30 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Plaintiff Navajo Nation (the “Nation”) alleges that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), an agency within the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”), violated the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. (the “ISDEAA”), by failing to disperse calendar year (“CY”) 2014 funding to the Nation according to the Nation’s proposed CY 2014 annual funding agreement (the “Proposal”). Specifically, the Nation contends that DOI Secretary Sally Jewell (the “Secretary”) failed to approve or decline the Proposal within the statutorily-mandated 90-day window for doing so and that, as a result, the Proposal must be deemed approved as a matter of law.

The parties have each moved for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the parties’ motions and supporting briefs, and for the reasons set forth below, the Nation’s motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED, and DOI’s cross-motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.

Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York Cert Petition

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

Shinnecock Cert Petition

Questions presented:

Petitioner’s case is the last in a long line of Indian land claim cases arising in the State of New York in which Indian tribes have been denied access to the courts by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005); see also, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010); Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012); Stockbridge-Munsee Community v. New York, 756 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2014). Based on its Cayuga “laches” defense, the court of appeals summarily dismissed all claims of Petitioner for legal and equitable relief for the loss of their lands in violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, also known as the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177. Recently, however, this Court affirmed the general rule in equity that courts may not override Congress’ judgment and apply laches to summarily dispose of all claims filed within a statute of limitations established by Congress, thereby foreclosing the possibility of any form of relief. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1975 (2014). In Petrella, this Court recognized that only equitable remedies may be foreclosed at the outset of litigation due to delay in commencing suit in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 1977. The questions presented are:
1. Whether at the outset of litigation a court may apply “laches” to foreclose an Indian tribe from bringing its federal statutory and common-law claims, *ii including one for money damages, if brought within the statute of limitations established by Congress.
2. Whether a court violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process and Takings Clauses when it retroactively applies a new, judicially-formulated rule to dismiss an Indian tribe’s viable claims ab initio, thereby extinguishing established property rights.
Lower court materials here.