Here is the complaint in Navajo Nation v. Dept. of the Interior (D.D.C.):
Available district court materials (many filings are sealed, including the district court order):
Here is the opinion in Navajo Nation v. Dept. of Interior:
The Navajo Nation delivered a proposed funding agreement to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, an agency within the United States Department of the Interior, during a partial government shutdown. By law, the BIA had 90 days after receipt to act on the proposal or it would be deemed approved. The BIA did not consider the proposal “received” until normal government operations later resumed, and issued a partial declination 90 days after that date. The Nation filed an action to enforce the proposal, contending that the BIA’s declination was untimely. The district court granted summary judgment to the DOI, holding that because the Nation had remained silent when the BIA indicated its position on the deadline, the Nation was equitably estopped from asserting an earlier one. The Nation brought the present appeal. We reverse the judgment.
Lower court materials here.
Here are the materials in Navajo Nation v. Dept. of Interior (D.D.C.):
Plaintiff Navajo Nation (the “Nation”) alleges that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), an agency within the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”), violated the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. (the “ISDEAA”), by failing to disperse calendar year (“CY”) 2014 funding to the Nation according to the Nation’s proposed CY 2014 annual funding agreement (the “Proposal”). Specifically, the Nation contends that DOI Secretary Sally Jewell (the “Secretary”) failed to approve or decline the Proposal within the statutorily-mandated 90-day window for doing so and that, as a result, the Proposal must be deemed approved as a matter of law.
The parties have each moved for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the parties’ motions and supporting briefs, and for the reasons set forth below, the Nation’s motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED, and DOI’s cross-motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.
Here is the complaint in Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Lacounte (D. Mont.):
Here are the materials in Matt v. United States (D. Mont.):
Matt seeks documents in the possession of the Fort Belknap Community Council. (Doc. 26-1 at 2.) In order to satisfy Matt’s request, Council would be required to take affirmative action to produce tribal documents. (Doc. 37 at 3.) If the Court granted Matt’s request the judgment would “interfere with public administration” of the tribe and would “compel [the sovereign] to act.” Maxwell, 708 F.3d at 1087-90. The recovery sought in this case would operate against the tribe. Matt should not be allowed to “circumvent tribal immunity” by addressing the Subpoena Duces Tecum to Mark Azure instead of to the tribe.
The Council entered into an ISDEAA contract for the maintenance of the roads on Matt’s property. The Council and its tribal members should be deemed part of the BIA and subject to the FTCA. The Council and its tribal members should be subject to discovery related to the construction and maintenance of the roads covered by the ISDEAA contract.