Eighth Circuit Favors Indian Claimants in Voting Rights Act Case

The case is Cottier v. City of Martin, South Dakota.

Here is the opinion — cottier-v-city-of-martin-ca8-opinion2

And the briefs — city-of-martin-brief and cottier-brief

Patrice Kunesh on Indian Children in South Dakota

Patrice Kunesh (South Dakota) has posted “A Call for an Assessment of the Welfare of Indian Children in South Dakota” on SSRN. The paper is published in the South Dakota Law Review. Here is the abstract:

In the midst of faltering economies and raging poverty, American Indians in South Dakota have the nation’s lowest life expectancy, as well as some of the highest infant mortality and teen death rates. Furthermore, Indians are over-represented in significant numbers in every part of South Dakota’s welfare programs and criminal justice systems. What appears to have been missing throughout all these years is some meaningful discussion among State policymakers and tribal leaders about the correlation between the pervasive negative experience of American Indians in South Dakota, a birth to grave continuum, and restrictive and unsupportive state governmental policies. Through a close examination of demographic information about American Indian populations in the nation, with a particular focus on Indian communities in South Dakota, and of three recently issued state reports concerning the gross disproportionate over-representation of Native Americans in South Dakota’s juvenile justice, adult criminal justice, and the child welfare systems, this Article calls for a serious assessment of these critical issues in light of the State’s faltering social welfare and criminal justice systems relative to American Indians and tribal communities.

Eric Davis (Mich. Law Student) on ICWA

Eric Davis, an Indian law student at Michigan, published “In Defense of the Indian Child Welfare Act in Aggravated Circumstances” in the Michigan Journal of Race & Law (13 Mich. J. Race & L 433). From the abstract:

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) affords various protections to Indian families throughout child welfare proceedings. Among them is the duty imposed upon the state to provide rehabilitative services to families prior to the outplacement of an Indian child, or termination of parental rights. An analogous provision for non-Indians in the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) excuses rehabilitative services in “aggravated circumstances” of child abuse. The ICWA contains no such exception, and that absence has been controversial.
In 2002, the Alaska Supreme Court applied ASFA’s aggravated circumstances exception to the ICWA, thereby excusing services when a father severely abused his three Native children. In 2005, the South Dakota Supreme Court addressed the same issue, but expressly refused to engraft such an exception into the ICWA. This Note defends South Dakota’s position on policy grounds. It chiefly argues that an aggravated circumstances exception would do violence to the ICWA and its family preservation goals, and further that such an exception is unnecessary to protect Native children from dangerous parents.

What Remains of the Yankton Sioux Reservation?

After a decade of litigation, a federal court (D. S.D.) held a trial and reached a decision as to “what remains of the Yankton Sioux Reservation following the Supreme Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 358 (1998).” Slip op. at 2.

Here are the materials:

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WSJ Article on Tribal Judges

Thanks to Mike McBride and June Mamagona Fletcher, you can download the entire article here without having to register with the Journal:

Wall Street Journal Article on Tribal Judges and Federal Indian Law

Federal Tort Claims Act & Indian Self Determination Act — Necklace v. United States

Interesting case involving the federal government’s liability for a road maintenance accident in Indian Country. Here are the materials:

District Court Order (D. S.D.)

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Tales from the Cert Pool: Circuit Splits and Federal Indian Law

Most cases now reach the Supreme Court because of circuit splits or splits in authority between federal courts of appeal and state supreme courts, but federal Indian law is an exception. In my study of the digital archive of Justice Blackmun’s cert pool memos from docket years 1986-1993, perhaps a quarter of cases that attracted the Court’s attention (reaching the so-called “discuss list” at conference) did so because there was a split.

One reason for the lack of circuit splits in federal Indian law is geography — well over 80 percent of cert petitions arise out of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits (and the states located within those circuits).

Moreover, because the cert petition subject matters are based on treaties or statutes that apply only within a state or a region, there is little likelihood of there ever being a split where the federal circuit and the state supreme court agree. Two examples from my forthcoming paper, “Factbound and Splitless”:

In South Dakota v. Spotted Horse, the Justice Blackmun’s clerk wrote a supplemental memo to the cert pool memo in which she wrote, “As the poolwriter noted, there will never be a split on the question of South Dakota’s jurisdiction over these tribal highways because both CA8 and the S.D. SCt agree that the State is without jurisdiction.” In Tarbell v. United States, a criminal case involving the application of a federal statute that applied to New York Indians, the cert pool memowriter (Mark Snyderman, an O’Connor clerk) noted, “Of course, NY state is probably the only other jurisdiction that would have an opportunity to rule on the issue.”

In one famous instance, the Court granted cert in a case thinking there was a circuit split when there really wasn’t (or more accurately, the split dissolved when the Court decided the case). The cases were Anderson v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation. In Anderson, the WI Supreme Court ruled that Indians living off the rez but working on the rez have to pay state income taxes. In Sac and Fox, the CA10 ruled that Indians living on trust land and working for the tribe on trust land don’t have to pay tax. That’s the split, but the split disappeared when the Court decided that trust land is the same as “Indian Country” — making the factual predicate for the split (the residence of the tribal member: one was off, one was on) disappear.

I go into greater depth in the paper, but the story basically is this. The OTC’s petition in Sac and Fox reached the Court first, but neglected to mention the Wisconsin case. The Wisconsin case reached the cert pool next, alleging the split in authority. The cert pool writer thought the Sac and Fox case was factually messier (because of the trust land question) so recommended the Court grant cert in Anderson. Also, the cert pool memowriter argued that the OTC was a bad litigant for not noting the split in the first place, so recommended that the Court go for the Wisconsin case instead. But Anderson filed indigent, and he shouldn’t have, so the Court had to order him to comply with SCT rules before his appeal would proceed. In the meantime, the Court decided to hear Sac and Fox instead. The Anderson pool memo is here and the Sac and Fox memo is here.

And it’s good thing too. Bill Rice’s mastery of oral argument before the Supreme Court can be heard here (with a little help from Edwin Kneedler).

Had the Court decided Anderson instead, it seems clear to me that it would have ruled against Anderson, who was living off the rez and refusing to pay state income taxes. Who know what would have happened to Sac and Fox Nation?

Patrice Kunesh on ICWA: “Borders Beyond Borders”

Patrice Kunesh (South Dakota Law) has posted “Borders Beyond Borders: Protecting Essential Tribal Relations Off Reservation Under the Indian Child Welfare Act” on her BEPRESS Selected Works site.

Patrice presented her paper at the 3rd Annual Indigenous Law Conference, “Facing the Future: The Indian Child Welfare Act at 30.”

Abstract:

2008 is the thirty year anniversary of the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), one of the most dynamic pieces of legislation in federal Indian affairs that irrevocably changed the jurisdictional prerogatives of states and tribes. ICWA’s tribal wardship provision is remarkably constructive because it vests tribes with exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children who are wards of the tribal court–irrespective of the child’s domicile. This jurisdictional scheme, a rough mixture of territorial and personal criteria, defies the normative notions of state court jurisdiction over family relations. And the cross-hatching of state and tribal interests in off-reservation child welfare matters has engendered serious tension and questions about the precise contours of tribal sovereignty and the boundary line between state and tribal power.

This article investigates the transformation point between tribal and state jurisdiction over Indian child welfare matters. From an examination of the historical development of tribal wardship decisions and ICWA’s legislative history, material unexamined in this context in other scholarship, I posit that tribes, as unique political entities in our federal system of government, possess inherent attributes of sovereignty to regulate their internal social relations. ICWA is premised on the dual nature of tribal sovereignty, and allows, if not encourages, tribes to redefine their relationship to state governments by recognizing that the power to adjudicate internal matters, including child custody matters, derives from a source independent of the land. Thus, there are no real boundaries to protecting these essential tribal relations where the exercise of tribal authority is vital to the maintenance of tribal integrity and self-determination.