Here are those materials:
2012-09-07_(40)_Memo in Support of Motion to Intervene and Exhibits
Here:
Questions Presented:
1. Does Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613 (2003), provide a basis for finding a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity where an Indian Tribe has expressly waived sovereign immunity, is sued in state court, removes to federal court, and then asserts sovereign immunity based on the Tribe’s concealment of the fact that the Tribe did not comply with the Secretary of the Interior’s lease approval requests?
2. Does Justice Brandeis’ opinion in Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919). support the concept of tribal sovereign immunity or should that accidental doctrine, questioned in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998), be revisited and discarded.
3. Does the Indian Civil Rights Act, Title 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(5) and (a)(8) create an implicit cause of action permitting the Tribe to be sued for the taking of property without due process of law?
Here are the materials in Rivera v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians (W.D. Wash.):
You read that right. A troubling case for tribal governments. Here the tribal workers were operating under a public safety cooperative agreement authorized under California statute in which the tribal government expressly reserved immunity.The facts truly are tragic — and bad facts make bad law. I’d say the fact that there’s a dissent is helpful, except our dissenter doesn’t object to the immunity holding.
The opinion in Maxwell v. County of San Diego is here. An excerpt:
In short, our tribal sovereign immunity cases do not question the general rule that individual officers are liable when sued in their individual capacities. We see no reason to give tribal officers broader sovereign immunity protections than state or federal officers given that tribal sovereign immunity is coextensive with other common law immunity principles. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58. We therefore hold that sovereign immunity does not bar the suit against the Viejas Fire paramedics as individuals. The Viejas Band is not the real party in interest. The Maxwells have sued the Viejas Fire paramedics in their individual capacities for money damages. Any damages will come from their own pockets, not the tribal treasury. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 757.
This is incredibly glib discarding of Ex parte Young should worry tribal governments everywhere.
Briefs are here:
Here are the appellate briefs in MM&A Productions v. Yavapai-Apache Nation:
Here are the materials in Gilbertson v. Quinault Indian Nation:
The Cherokee Nation has voluntarily dismissed their claims against the feds in Cherokee Nation v. Nash:
Cherokee nation vs nash order 8 21 2012 feds
The feds have an outstanding counterclaim against the Nation and so they remain parties.
In the D.C. Circuit appeal, Vann v. Interior, here is Vann’s reply brief:
2012-08-30 Reply Brief of Appellants Marilyn Vann et al
Prior briefs are here.
Here is the majority:
And the dissent:
And links to all the briefs:
85661-3 – Automotive United Trades Organization v. State of Washington et al.
Hearing Date – 01/12/2012
Here.
An excerpt:
Bay Mills has a reservation located on tribal land in the Upper Peninsula’s Chippewa County on the eastern end of Lake Superior.
In 2010, the tribe used earnings from a land settlement trust to purchase 40 acres of land in Vanderbilt, a tiny town just north of Gaylord that’s located more than 100 miles south of the tribe’s main reservation.
The Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act says that land acquired with funds from a land trust “shall be held as Indian lands are held.” So Bay Mills used that language as legal authority to open a small casino in November 2010 in Vanderbilt. Continue reading
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