Update in TON Suit against Arizona Officials re: Glendale Casino

Here are the new materials in Tohono O’Odham Nation v. Ducey (D. Ariz.):

82 DCT Order Denying TON Motion for PI

108 TON Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims

111 Bergin Response

115 TON Reply

127 DCT Order

Previous materials are here.

Navajo Loses 2014 Self-Determination Contract Funding Challenge

Here are the materials in Navajo Nation v. Dept. of Interior (D.D.C.):

15-3 Navajo Motion for Summary J

18 US Response

21 Navajo Reply

23 US Reply

30 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Plaintiff Navajo Nation (the “Nation”) alleges that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), an agency within the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”), violated the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. (the “ISDEAA”), by failing to disperse calendar year (“CY”) 2014 funding to the Nation according to the Nation’s proposed CY 2014 annual funding agreement (the “Proposal”). Specifically, the Nation contends that DOI Secretary Sally Jewell (the “Secretary”) failed to approve or decline the Proposal within the statutorily-mandated 90-day window for doing so and that, as a result, the Proposal must be deemed approved as a matter of law.

The parties have each moved for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the parties’ motions and supporting briefs, and for the reasons set forth below, the Nation’s motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED, and DOI’s cross-motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.

Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York Cert Petition

Here:

Shinnecock Cert Petition

Questions presented:

Petitioner’s case is the last in a long line of Indian land claim cases arising in the State of New York in which Indian tribes have been denied access to the courts by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005); see also, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010); Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012); Stockbridge-Munsee Community v. New York, 756 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2014). Based on its Cayuga “laches” defense, the court of appeals summarily dismissed all claims of Petitioner for legal and equitable relief for the loss of their lands in violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, also known as the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177. Recently, however, this Court affirmed the general rule in equity that courts may not override Congress’ judgment and apply laches to summarily dispose of all claims filed within a statute of limitations established by Congress, thereby foreclosing the possibility of any form of relief. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1975 (2014). In Petrella, this Court recognized that only equitable remedies may be foreclosed at the outset of litigation due to delay in commencing suit in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 1977. The questions presented are:
1. Whether at the outset of litigation a court may apply “laches” to foreclose an Indian tribe from bringing its federal statutory and common-law claims, *ii including one for money damages, if brought within the statute of limitations established by Congress.
2. Whether a court violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process and Takings Clauses when it retroactively applies a new, judicially-formulated rule to dismiss an Indian tribe’s viable claims ab initio, thereby extinguishing established property rights.
Lower court materials here.

 

White Plume Family Prevails in Industrial Hemp Claim

Here are the materials in United States v. White Plume (D.S.D.):

125 Motion to Vacate

136 US Opposition

137 Reply

140 Oglala Sioux Tribe Amicus Brief

143 DCT Order Granting Motion

An excerpt:

What is material to the court’s analysis is the shifting national focus on industrial hemp as a viable agricultural crop and the decision of the Attorney General of the United States to engage in a dialogue with the various tribes on the relationship between the CSA and the Agricultural Act of 2014. The government did not challenge Mr. White Plume’s assertion that “[w]ith the Agricultural Act of 2014, the Federal government joined the twenty-two states that have enacted legislation on industrial hemp.” (Docket 125 at p. 7) (reference omitted). Nor did the government challenge the representation that seven states have ventured into the area of agricultural or academic research of industrial hemp.

Federal Court Rejects Nonmember Challenge to Tribal Member Probated Estate

Here are the materials in Estate of Raymond P. Sauser v. United States (D. S.D.):

18 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

19 US Response

20 Reply

22 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Because James Raymond Sauser’s Renunciation of interest in the Trust Land was untimely filed, the IBIA was correct to not consider it when rendering its decision. In order to be valid, the Renunciation needed to be filed with the ALJ prior to the issuance of his final order. In addition, the ALJ and IBIA reasonably interpreted the Decedent’s will and gave effect to its provisions. This Court finds that neither the ALJ nor the IBIA acted arbitrarily and capriciously as defined in the Administrative Procedure Act.

Federal Court Orders Tribal Exhaustion in Challenge to Lummi Seizure

Here are the materials in Wilson v. Doe (W.D. Wash.):

57 Horton’s Towing Motion for Summary J

61 Wilson Opposition to 57

62 Horton’s Towing Reply

64 Horton’s Towing Response to 60 & 61

65 US Brief

66 Wilson Reply

67 DCT Order

An excerpt:

On October 22, 2014, Plaintiff Curtiss Wilson was stopped by a Lummi Tribe police officer while driving on the Lummi Reservation after drinking at the Lummi Casino. (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 2.) Lummi Tribal Police Officer Grant Austick stopped Plaintiff, searched his 1999 Dodge Ram Pickup, and developed probable cause that Plaintiff was committing a DUI. (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 2.) Officer Austick then called the Washington State Patrol and Plaintiff was arrested. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff’s truck was towed by Defendant Horton’s Towing and impounded at the direction of the Washington State Trooper. (Id.)

The following day, Lummi Tribal Police Officer Brandon Gates presented a “Notice of Seizure and Intent to Institute Forfeiture” (“Notice of Seizure”) from the Lummi Tribal Court of the Lummi Tribe to Horton’s Towing. (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 3-4, 9.) The seizure and intent to institute forfeiture of Plaintiff’s vehicle was based on violations of the Lummi Nation Code [3]  of Laws (“LNCL”) 5.09A.110(d)(2) (National Indian Law Library 2016) (Possession of Marijuana over 1 ounce), and authorized by LNCL 5.09B.040(5)(A) (National Indian Law Library 2016) (Civil forfeiture section addressing Property Subject to Forfeiture, specifically motor vehicles used, or intended for use, to facilitate the possession of illegal substances.) (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 9.) Horton’s Towing released the truck to the Lummi Tribe. (Id. at 3-4).

Plaintiff brought suit in Whatcom County Superior Court and the case was removed. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff originally brought claims for outrage, conversion, and relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 7-8.) All of Plaintiff’s claims, save conversion, have been previously dismissed either voluntarily or by Court order. (See Dkt. Nos. 25, 35, and 53.) Plaintiff’s conversion claim against both Horton’s and the United States is based on Horton’s release of the vehicle to the Lummi Tribe pursuant to the order served by Gates. (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 6.)

Defendant Horton’s moves for summary judgment, claiming the release of the vehicle was pursuant to the Notice of Seizure, and [4]  therefore with lawful justification. (Dkt. No. 57.) Plaintiff argues in response that the Notice of Seizure is invalid or not enforceable off the reservation. (Dkt. No. 61.) The United States moves for summary judgment based on, inter alia, Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Dkt. No. 65.) In response, Plaintiff regurgitates failed arguments from previous briefing, relying on an overturned, out-of-Circuit case and “maintaining” a line of reasoning with respect to Brandon Gates and the scope of employment that this Court has already ruled against. (Dkt. No. 66.)

Student Note on U.S. v. Bryant

University of Nebraska law student Sara Rips has posted “Mind the Gap: The Unique Disadvantage Faced by Indigent Indians” on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

In 2014, the Ninth Circuit created a federal circuit split over the use of tribal court convictions in federal prosecutions that the Supreme Court will soon resolve. In United States v. Bryant, the Ninth Circuit held that tribal court convictions cannot be used as predicate offenses in subsequent federal prosecutions unless the tribal court guarantees a right to counsel commensurate with the Sixth Amendment right. The Court accordingly dismissed a federal domestic assault charge under 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) because the predicate offense upon which the prosecution relied would have violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had the case arisen in federal or state court. The Court rooted its decision in the principle commonly espoused in criminal procedure jurisprudence that uncounseled convictions are unreliable. Extending this reliability principle to tribal proceedings is, perhaps predictably, problematic since indigent defendants are rarely guaranteed the right to appointed counsel, and the Constitution itself is without force in tribal courts. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have thus upheld the use of uncounseled tribal court convictions on comity grounds. This Note analyzes the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit cases to highlight the unique disadvantage indigent Indian defendants with prior uncounseled tribal court convictions confront when prosecuted under § 117(a). With an eye toward the Supreme Court, this Note proposes an alternative interpretation of the statute that avoids the constitutional quandary created by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ holdings. This Note concludes by urging the Court seize the opportunity United States v. Bryant presents to reassess Congress’ immense plenary power under the Indian Commerce Clause.

Nooksack ICW Presenting Officer/Prosecutor Posting

RFP – Request for Proposals for Prosecution and ICWA Case Services

The Nooksack Indian Tribe is soliciting proposals from individuals and/or firms interested in serving as Prosecutor for the Nooksack Indian Tribe.  The Prosecutor is responsible for all prosecutor duties related to adult criminal and juvenile delinquency matters, also for ICWA hearings in state court and child dependency matters in Tribal Court.  Criminal dockets at Tribal Court are held the 1st and 3rd Wednesday of each month.  For the complete updated RFP including caseload statistics and further details, please visit our website at NooksackTribe.org, click on the Careers tab.  Proposals (4 hard copies) may be hand delivered to the Nooksack Tribe at:  Attn Office of Tribal Attorney, 5016 Deming Rd, Deming, WA 98244, or mailed to:  Office of Tribal Attorney, PO Box 63, Deming, WA 98244.  Questions may be directed to Sue Gearhart at sgearhart@nooksack-nsn.gov

Yakama Nation Prosecutor Posting

The Yakama Nation has an opening in the Yakama Nation Prosecutor’s Office, the position closes on April 8, 2016 and the announcement is available at:

http://www.yakamanation-nsn.gov/showlistings.php

Tohono O’Odham Prevails in Gaming Compact Dispute before Ninth Circuit

Here is the opinion in State of Arizona v. Tohono O’Odham Nation

Briefs and other materials here