Ninth Circuit Vacates Major Crimes Act Conviction on Sixth Amendment Grounds

Here is the unpublished opinion in United States v. War Club.

An excerpt:

We conclude that bylimiting cross-examination of Green’s brother, the district court precluded War Club from developing evidence that Green’s brother had a motive to commit the murder. The court thereby deprived War Club of the “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense” guaranteed by the Constitution. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690(1986)). Because we cannot say that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v. Boulware, 384 F.3d 794, 808 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)), we vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial.

Eighth Circuit Rejects Indian Prisoner’s Claim Feds Had No Jurisdiction Over Him under Treaty of Fort Laramie

Here are the materials in United States v. White Mountain (unpublished opinion here):

White Mountain Opening Brief

USA Appellee Brief

White Mountain Reply Brief

 

Raeder on Orenstein on Character Evidence in Indian Country Rape Cases

Interesting discussion from Jotwell on this paper (we posted it a while back here), discussed by Myrna Raeder:

Aviva Orenstein, Propensity or Stereotype?: A Misguided Evidence Experiment in Indian Country, 19 Cornell J. Law & Pub. Pol. 173 (2009), available at SSRN.

An excerpt (or two):

Changing evidentiary policy to make it easier to convict rapists and child abusers has been high on the agenda of many feminists who have decried the difficulty of holding such perpetrators accountable, even when they commit serial crimes. In 1994, in a well documented trade, Congress adopted Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 as the quid pro quo for securing the deciding vote necessary to pass the then pending Violent Crime Control Act. Rules 413-414 specifically permit propensity evidence in sexual assault and child molestation cases. Professor Aviva Orenstein investigates how these rules have been (mis)applied in federal court. Her thought-provoking essay decries the disproportionate use of the rules against Indian defendants, and suggests the repeated presence of negatively stereotyped Indian defendants may actually help perpetuate the myth that rapists are easily identified “others,” an attitude that makes acquaintance rapes incredibly difficult to prove. She also suggests that stereotyping reinforces the propensity evidence and may lead judges to more willingly accept character evidence beyond sex crimes.

***

What I particularly appreciated about the article was that Orenstein did not downplay that the victims in these cases are Indian women and children who are more likely to be raped or sexually assaulted than other females in the United States. She explains that Indian women also face stereotyping that can lead to discounting their testimony, and discusses their no-win dilemma that can result in their complaints further stereotyping their entire culture. Importantly, Orenstein suggests why propensity may harm victims. She cites reports implying prosecutors appear reluctant to bring charges in sexual assault cases arising on reservations, and argues that the propensity rules may furnish a convenient reason for prosecutors to refuse cases without evidence of prior sexual crimes.

Prisoner Response Brief in Miranda v. Nielson (Ninth Circuit)

Here: Responsive Brief in Miranda 111010

Parties Agree that Bustamante v. Valenzuela Ninth Circuit Appeal is Moot

Here are the materials:

Pascua Motion to Dismiss

Bustamante Consent

Opening brief is here, and lower court materials here.

Details here, from the Bustamante filing:

Respondents argue that because Mr. Bustamante has completed his sentence and been released from custody, and because Mr. Bustamante’s habeas petition challenges only the length of his sentence, his appeal should be dismissed on grounds of mootness. Upon review of Respondents’ motion and pertinent authorities, including North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971), Mr. Bustamante, by and through undersigned counsel, agrees with Respondents’ contention and does not oppose Respondents’ motion.

Utah Appellate Court Affirms Conviction of Man Claiming Indian Status (with No Blood Quantum)

Oh, and Rule 11 sanctions for failing to raise adverse authority regarding this unusual claim.

Here is the unpublished decision in State v. Clark.

Tenth Circuit Affirms Sentence in Major Crimes Act Conviction

The case is United States v. Warrior, and here is the unpublished opinion.

The case apparently involves the Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma.

 

Former AIM member pleads guilty to accessory in Anna Mae Aquash (Mi’kmaq) 1975 murder – given suspended sentence

Rapid City Journal – November 8, 2010

Thelma Rios pleaded guilty Monday to being an accessory to the 1975 kidnapping of American Indian Movement activist Annie Mae Aquash, three weeks before she was scheduled to go on trial on charges related to Aquash’s murder.

Continue reading

Federal Court Grants ICRA Habeas Petition of Kewa Pueblo Prisoner

Here are the materials in Pacheco v. Massengill (D. N.M.):

Pacheco Habeas Petition

Pacheco Motion to Expedite

Order Granting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Ninth Circuit Panel Issues Amended Order in Colville Death Penalty Case

Well, it’s complicated. Colville has not reinstated the death penalty in accordance with the Federal Death Penalty Act, which removes capital murder from the Major Crimes Act unless the tribe “reinstates” it. But apparently a split panel of the Ninth Circuit held (and holds) that federal prosecutors can still pursue the crime of capital murder under the Major Crimes Act, they just can’t impose the death penalty. And the CA9 panel majority says that therefore the 5-year statute of limitations for capital crimes is therefore waived. Interesting. Here is the opinion (and the earlier opinion).

The majority panel writes:

If we were to limit the federal statute of limitations for murder to five years when a tribe has not opted to permit imposition of the death penalty against its members under the Federal Death Penalty Act, we would in fact be limiting sovereignty by burdening the choice created by the Act. “[T]here is typically no statute of limitations for first-degree murder — for the obvious reason that it would be intolerable to let a cold-blooded murderer escape justice through the mere passage of time . . . .” United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on other  grounds, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1026-27 (Wyo. 1986) (stating that no state has adopted a limitations period for murder). If the statute of limitations for murder were to shorten so dramatically as a consequence of a tribe’s decision not to reinstate the death penalty, tribal governments would be forced to choose between capital punishment — to which they may have religious or political objections — and justice for the most heinous of crimes.

Judge Tashima disagreed:

Continue reading