gaming

Latest District Court Memorandum and Order in Duluth v. Fond Du Lac

Kate Fort

07 28 15 Nelson Decision

Given the significant weight that is to be placed on this factor, the Court finds that it tips the balance in favor of granting the Band retrospective relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Although (1) the parties voluntarily agreed to the Consent Decree, (2) the NIGC initially endorsed the Agreements, and (3) the NIGC may lack authority to punish the Band for its compliance with the Consent Decree, those factors are outweighed by (4) the strong congressional intent that tribes be the primary beneficiaries of gaming revenues, (5) the fact that the Band’s obligation to pay rent under the Agreements is now considered—by the agency tasked with making such determinations—to violate that intent, and (6) the fact that the City was aware of the NIGC’s changing viewpoint on the subject matter. Accordingly, the Band is relieved from its obligation to pay to the City the rent withheld in 2009, 2010, and 2011.

Previous coverage here.

Ninth Circuit Rules in Favor of Idaho in Texas Hold ‘Em Dispute with Coeur d’Alene Tribe

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

here is the opinion. 

Briefs here. 

Additional Request to Depublish Cosentino v. Fuller

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here (from the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians):

Request for Depublication 07 14 15

Prior request for depublication here.

California Tribes Seeking Depublication of Cosentino v. Fuller

Matthew L.M. Fletcher4 Comments

Here is the request to the California Supreme Court for depublication of Cosentino v. Fuller (Cal. Ct. App.) submitted by thirteen California Indian tribes:

Cosentino Request for Depublication – File Endorsed

Here’s an excerpt:

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s suit rests entirely on the quintessentially sovereign action of the Pechanga Gaming Commission: revocation of Plaintiff’s gaming license.  Opinion, pp. 6-7.  That action cannot be effected by Gaming Commissioners in their personal capacity — only a properly constituted Gaming Commission can revoke a gaming license.  Indeed, Congress has recognized that regulation of gaming on tribal lands is central to tribal self-governance.  25 U.S.C. § 2701. 

Even though it was “the official action of the [Tribe], following [Defendants’] votes, that caused [Plaintiff]’s alleged injury” (Imperial Granite, 940 F.2d at 1271), the Opinion appears to condition an officer’s immunity on the additional showing that the sovereign’s action fell within its authority and was benignly motivated.  Specifically, the Opinion evaluated whether the Tribe’s Commission acted with a retaliatory motive and whether it “revoked [Plaintiff’s] license on a ground identified in the IGRA, the Tribal-State Compact, or the Pechanga Ordinance.”  Opinion, pp. 16-17.  But where, as here, a plaintiff challenges official action of the tribe, the “tribe’s immunity is not defeated by an allegation that it acted beyond its powers.”  Imperial Granite Co., 940 F.2d at 1271.  The Opinion invites courts and litigants to disregard this firmly established protection of sovereign action under the guise of a “masked official capacity suit[].”  Pistor, 2015 WL 3953448, at *5.

 

Here are previous TurtleTalk posts on this matter:

 https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2015/06/23/california-appellate-court-issues-slightly-modified-opinion-in-cosentino-v-fuller/

 https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2015/06/18/california-tribes-seek-rehearing-or-depublication-of-official-immunity-ruling/

 https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2015/05/29/california-appeals-court-holds-pechanga-casino-officials-may-be-sued-in-employment-action/

Pueblo of Pojoaque v. State of New Mexico Good Faith Negotiations Complaint

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

1 Complaint

An excerpt:

The Pueblo and the State previously negotiated a Class III gaming compact that expired on June 30, 2015. The Pueblo formally requested that the State enter into a compact regarding the Pueblo’s Class III gaming activities on its Indian lands beyond the expiration of the current compact. More than 180 days have expired since the Pueblo made its initial  request. Accordingly, the Pueblo now seeks a determination by this Court that the State has failed to conclude negotiations in good faith. With that determination, the Court has jurisdiction to invoke IGRA’s remedies that will result in a negotiated compact, or submission of last best offers to a mediator (“baseball arbitration”), and/or procedures promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior to govern the Pueblo’s Class III gaming activities.

Hobia Cert Opposition Brief

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

Hobia Cert Opp

Cert petition here.

Ninth Circuit Briefs in Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission v. State of California

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

California Opening Brief

Pauma Answer Brief

California Reply Brief

Pauma Band Reply

Oral argument audio and video.

Lower court materials here.

Federal Court Dismisses Challenge to Santa Ynez Chumash Casino

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Save the Valley LLC v. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians (C.D. Cal.):

22-1 Santa Ynez Motion to Dismiss

26 Opposition

29 Reply

31 DCT Minute Order

We posted the complaint here.

Split Sixth Circuit Panel Affirms NLRB Jurisdiction over Saginaw Chippewa’s Soaring Eagle Casino

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here is the opinion:

2015-07-01 Soaring Eagle Decision

Briefs here.

Ninth Circuit Allows Suit by “Advantage Gamblers” against Tribal Casino Officials under Maxwell Precedent

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in Pistor v. Garcia:

12-17095

From the court’s syllabus:

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an action brought against tribal officers who were sued in their individual capacities for an assertedly unconstitutional detention and seizure of property that took place at a casino owned and operated by a tribe on tribal land. The district court held that even if the tribal defendants were entitled to tribal immunity, it was inappropriate to dismiss the claims against the defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court went on to hold, however, that if the tribal defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss was construed as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court would conclude that plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the tribal defendants in their individual capacities. The district court therefore denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the action.

The panel held that sovereign immunity is a quasi-jurisdictional issue that, if invoked at the Rule 12(b)(1) stage, must be addressed and decided. Accordingly, the panel held that the district court erred in concluding that it would be inappropriate to dismiss the claims against the defendants at the 12(b)(1) stage. The panel nevertheless affirmed the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss the action. The panel held that the tribal defendants were not entitled to tribal sovereign immunity because they were sued in their individual rather than their official capacities, as any recovery will run against the individual tribal defendants, rather than the tribe.

The panel held that it did not have jurisdiction to decide whether plaintiffs successfully stated a claim against the defendants under § 1983. The panel held that whether the tribal defendants were acting under state or tribal law did not matter for purposes of the tribal sovereign immunity analysis, although it will matter for purposes of deciding whether plaintiffs can succeed in their § 1983 claim.

Briefs and lower court materials here.