Here:
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
Lower court materials here.
Here:
Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation Cert Petition
Question presented:
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) defines authorized Indian gaming as Class I, Class II, or Class III. 25 U.S.C. § 2703. Unlike Class III gaming, Class II is not subject to tribal-state gaming compacts. 25 U.S.C. § 2710. Class II gaming includes card games that “are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State.” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(II). Wisconsin’s Constitution prohibits the state legislature from authorizing any form of gambling, including poker. See Wis. Const., art. IV, § 24(1).
Prior to Congress enacting IGRA, the Court held that a state cannot enforce its gambling laws on Indian land when its policy toward gambling is civil and regulatory, rather than criminal and prohibitory. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,480 U.S. 202, 210 (1987). Here, the Seventh Circuit applied Cabazon to interpret IGRA. It concluded that the electronic poker offered by the Ho-Chunk Nation is Class II, not Class III, when Wisconsin’s policy toward gambling and poker is regulatory, rather than prohibitory. Under this approach, the Nation can offer e-poker in Madison, Wisconsin despite the parties’ compact, which does not authorize Class III gaming in Madison.The question presented is:
Whether Cabazon’s “regulatory/prohibitory” test that pre-dates IGRA applies to determine whether a game is Class II or Class III gaming under IGRA?
Lower court materials here.
Given the significant weight that is to be placed on this factor, the Court finds that it tips the balance in favor of granting the Band retrospective relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Although (1) the parties voluntarily agreed to the Consent Decree, (2) the NIGC initially endorsed the Agreements, and (3) the NIGC may lack authority to punish the Band for its compliance with the Consent Decree, those factors are outweighed by (4) the strong congressional intent that tribes be the primary beneficiaries of gaming revenues, (5) the fact that the Band’s obligation to pay rent under the Agreements is now considered—by the agency tasked with making such determinations—to violate that intent, and (6) the fact that the City was aware of the NIGC’s changing viewpoint on the subject matter. Accordingly, the Band is relieved from its obligation to pay to the City the rent withheld in 2009, 2010, and 2011.
Previous coverage here.
Here (from the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians):
Request for Depublication 07 14 15
Prior request for depublication here.
Here is the request to the California Supreme Court for depublication of Cosentino v. Fuller (Cal. Ct. App.) submitted by thirteen California Indian tribes:
Cosentino Request for Depublication – File Endorsed
Here’s an excerpt:
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s suit rests entirely on the quintessentially sovereign action of the Pechanga Gaming Commission: revocation of Plaintiff’s gaming license. Opinion, pp. 6-7. That action cannot be effected by Gaming Commissioners in their personal capacity — only a properly constituted Gaming Commission can revoke a gaming license. Indeed, Congress has recognized that regulation of gaming on tribal lands is central to tribal self-governance. 25 U.S.C. § 2701.
Even though it was “the official action of the [Tribe], following [Defendants’] votes, that caused [Plaintiff]’s alleged injury” (Imperial Granite, 940 F.2d at 1271), the Opinion appears to condition an officer’s immunity on the additional showing that the sovereign’s action fell within its authority and was benignly motivated. Specifically, the Opinion evaluated whether the Tribe’s Commission acted with a retaliatory motive and whether it “revoked [Plaintiff’s] license on a ground identified in the IGRA, the Tribal-State Compact, or the Pechanga Ordinance.” Opinion, pp. 16-17. But where, as here, a plaintiff challenges official action of the tribe, the “tribe’s immunity is not defeated by an allegation that it acted beyond its powers.” Imperial Granite Co., 940 F.2d at 1271. The Opinion invites courts and litigants to disregard this firmly established protection of sovereign action under the guise of a “masked official capacity suit[].” Pistor, 2015 WL 3953448, at *5.
Here are previous TurtleTalk posts on this matter:
Here:
An excerpt:
The Pueblo and the State previously negotiated a Class III gaming compact that expired on June 30, 2015. The Pueblo formally requested that the State enter into a compact regarding the Pueblo’s Class III gaming activities on its Indian lands beyond the expiration of the current compact. More than 180 days have expired since the Pueblo made its initial request. Accordingly, the Pueblo now seeks a determination by this Court that the State has failed to conclude negotiations in good faith. With that determination, the Court has jurisdiction to invoke IGRA’s remedies that will result in a negotiated compact, or submission of last best offers to a mediator (“baseball arbitration”), and/or procedures promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior to govern the Pueblo’s Class III gaming activities.
Here are the materials in Save the Valley LLC v. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians (C.D. Cal.):
22-1 Santa Ynez Motion to Dismiss
We posted the complaint here.
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