sovereign immunity

Eighth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Two Shields v. Wilkinson

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here is the opinion:

Two Shields Opinion

An excerpt:

Appellants Ramona Two Shields and Mary Louise Defender Wilson are Indians with interests in land allotted to them by the United States under the Dawes Act of 1887. Such land is held in trust by the government, but may be leased by allottees. Two Shields and Defender Wilson leased oil and gas mining rights on their allotments to appellee companies and affiliated individuals who won a sealed bid auction conducted by the Board of Indian Affairs (BIA) in 2007. Subsequent to the auction, appellants agreed to terms with the winning bidders, the BIA approved the leases, and appellees sold them for a large profit. Appellants later filed this putative class action in the District of North Dakota, claiming that the United States had breached its fiduciary duty by approving the leases for the oil and gas mining rights, and that the defendant bidders aided, abetted, and induced the United States to breach that duty. The district court concluded that the United States was a required party which could not be joined, but without which the action could not proceed in equity and good conscience, and dismissed the case. Appellants challenge that dismissal. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

Briefs here.

Federal Court Dismisses ADEA Claim against Tribal Casino

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Boricchio v. Chicken Ranch Casino (E.D. Cal.):

13-1 Motion to Dismiss

18 Opposition

20 Reply

24 DCT Order

Federal Court Imposes $200K Appeal Bond on Wolfchild Appeal

Matthew L.M. Fletcher3 Comments

Here are the relevant materials in Wolfchild v. Redwood County (D. Minn.):

208 Lower Sioux Community Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions

291 DCT Order

Materials on the court’s dismissal of the claim are here.

Federal Court Holds Federal Bankruptcy Code Did Not Waive Tribal Immunity under Bay Mills Clear Statement Rule

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the materials in Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Papas (In re Greektown Holdings, LLC):

8 Sault Tribe Brief

10 Buchwald Capital Brief

12 Sault Reply

15 DCT order

This case is on appeal from the bankruptcy court. Here are those materials.

Federal Court Declines to Dismiss California v. Iipay Nation 

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the materials in State of California v. Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel (S.D. Cal.):

15-1 Iipay Nation Motion to Dismiss

18 California Response

19 Iipay Nation Reply

24 DCT Order Denying Motion to Dismiss

TRO stage materials are here.

Tribal Immunity Does Not Block Third Party Subpoena in Ongoing Grand Canyon Skywalk Development Disputes

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the materials in Grand Canyon Skywalk Development v. Cieslak (D. Nev.) & Grand Canyon Skywalk Development v. Steele (D. Ariz.):

1 Motion to Quash in 15-663 D. Ariz.

15 Reply re Motion to Quash in 15-663 D. Ariz.

125 DCT Order Denying Motion to Quash

Federal Court Dismisses Town of Browning v. Sharp, States Town Has Tribal Court Remedy

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Town of Browning v. Sharp (D. Mont.):

71 Sharp 12b1 Motion to Dismiss

73 Sharp 12b6 Motion to Dismiss

75 Sharp 12b7 Motion to Dismiss

95 Town Response to 71

96 Town Response to 73

97 Town Response to 75

115 Sharp Reply in Support of 75

156 Magistrate Recommendation

162 DCT Order

An excerpt:

No adequate alternative forum exists to address the Town of Browning’s ex Parte Young action. The Blackfeet Tribal Court appears to represent an adequate alternative forum, however, to address the ongoing dispute between the Blackfeet Tribe and the Town of Browning. Indeed, in the Blackfeet Tribal Court, the Town of Browning can litigate against the Blackfeet Tribe directly rather than through an ex Parte Young action. Further, the Town of Browning appears to have moderated its position regarding the relief that it seeks. (Doc. 159). The Town of Browning appears to seek some reasonable compensation from the Blackfeet Tribe for use of the Town of Browning’s water main to deliver water to utility customers. The Town of Browning can seek and obtain this relief as a counterclaim in the breach of contract claim currently pending in the Blackfeet Tribal Court. Although the Town of Browning has challenged the Blackfeet Tribal Court’s jurisdiction over it on the grounds of sovereign immunity, the existence of a contract between the parties appears to confer jurisdiction on the Blackfeet Tribal Court. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). An alternative forum exists for the Town of Browning to obtain the relief it seeks.

After weighing the factors listed in Rule 19(b), this Court has determined that this case should not proceed in the absence of the Blackfeet Tribe, a required party. The potential prejudice to the Blackfeet Tribe far outweighs the harm to the Town of Browning. The Blackfeet Tribal Court represents an alternative forum for the Town of Browning to address its underlying dispute with the Blackfeet Tribe.

Materials on the preliminary injunction stage of this litigation are here.

First Circuit Rejects Narragansett Interlocutory Appeal in Sovereign Immunity Matter (Waited Too Long to Appeal Denial of Motion for Reconsideration)

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe:

CA1 Opinion

An excerpt:

Surveying the foregoing, a prior duty panel of this court cleared the underbrush by  dismissing as untimely any appeal from the denial of the Motion to Dismiss. Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, No. 14-1106, Order at 1 (1st Cir. Aug. 29, 2014). That decision obviates the need to decide whether we would have had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from the Motion to Dismiss. We do need to decide, though, whether we have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the only order before us: the denial of the untimely Rule 59(e) Motion. For the reasons described below, we conclude that the denial of the Tribe’s untimely Rule 59(e) Motion does not qualify as a collateral order that we may review prior to the end of the litigation in the district court.

Briefs here.

Federal Court Dismisses Title VII Claim against Seminole Casino

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the materials in Longo v. Seminole Indian Casino–Immokalee (M.D. Fla.):

24 Motion to Dismiss

25 Response

28 Reply

29 Surreply

31 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Remarkably, Plaintiff demands that the Court ignore this clear and dispositive analysis, and hold that the Tribe is not actually a federally recognized tribe. Plaintiff acknowledges that to do so, this Court would have to find not only that its own previous opinion, Mastro v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, No. 2:12–cv–411–SPC–38UAM, 2013 WL 3350567, at *1 (M.D.Fla.2013), was incorrect, but also that the Eleventh Circuit has erred on multiple occasions too, see Mastro, 578 F.App’x 801; Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 692 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir.2012). To support this sizeable request, Plaintiff provides the Court with numerous pages of historical context and argument, explaining how the Tribe, to this date, has failed to achieve federal recognition as an Indian tribe. But this argument is completely without merit. This Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and the Florida Supreme Court “rotely” accept that the Tribe is federally recognized because it is. Unsurprisingly, this has not changed in 2015. A simple search in the Federal Register reveals as much. To be sure, the United States Bureau of Indian Affair’s most recent list of “Indian entities … acknowledged to have the immunities and privileges available to federally recognized Indian tribes” includes the Seminole Tribe of Florida. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 80 FR 1942–02 (2015) (emphasis added).

Federal Court Dismisses Title VI Claim against Chickasaw Housing

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the materials in Sanders v. Anoatubby (W.D. Okla.):

11 Motion to Dismiss

14 Response

16 Reply

19 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s Complaint, and presuming all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claims alleged in her Complaint. The Court specifically finds that jurisdiction is not vested in this Court based on plaintiff’s claim that defendants violated Title VI by not complying with the NAHASDA since the NAHASDA specifically exempts federally recognized tribes, such as the Chickasaw Nation and the tribally designated housing entities of those tribes such as the Chickasaw Nation Housing Administration, from Title VI. Further, the Court finds jurisdiction is not vested in this Court based on the Ex parte Young doctrine. Plaintiff specifically included defendants’ official titles in the caption of this lawsuit and alleges that defendants violated tribal policies. Other than conclusory statements that defendants were acting outside the scope of their official tribal capacity, plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support her claim that defendants were acting outside the scope of their tribal capacity or violating federal law. Therefore, the Court finds plaintiff’s Complaint against defendants Governor Bill Anoatubby, Wayne Scribner, Renee Sweet, Jackie Williams, and Terry Davis should be dismissed.