Federal Court Dismisses Skokomish Treaty Rights Claims against State under 11th Amendment and Rule 19

Here are the materials in Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Goldmark (W.D. Wash.):

59 State Defendants Motion to Dismiss

60 Prosecuting Attys Motion to Dismiss

67 Tribal Amici Motion to Dismiss

71 Skokomish Reponse

116 DCT Order Dismissing Complaint

An excerpt:

Being fully advised, the court GRANTS both motions on grounds that Skokomish Indian Tribe failed to join certain other Indian tribes in this action. These other tribes are required parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, but cannot be joined due to their sovereign immunity. Because the court concludes that the action cannot proceed “in equity and good conscience” without these other tribes, see id., the court dismisses Skokomish Indian Tribe’s action without prejudice. With respect to Defendants Goldmark and Young only, the court also grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss on grounds of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and because Skokomish Indian Tribe has failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Nevertheless, despite granting Defendants’ motions, the court also grants Skokomish Indian Tribe leave to amend its Amended Complaint.

We posted the complaint here.

Federal Court Seeks Briefing on Whether Tribe Waived Immunity by Removing FMLA Claim against Tribe to Federal Court

Here are the materials in Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians (E.D. Cal.):

19 Shingle Springs Motion to Dismiss

31 Bodi Opposition

37 Shingle Springs Reply

40 DCT Order

From the order:

The court is concerned by a predicate question: whether the Tribe waived sovereign immunity by removing the action to federal court.

The issue is an open one in the Ninth Circuit. District courts to have considered it focus their analysis on whether tribal immunity is more analogous to states’ immunity to suit under the Eleventh Amendment, or to foreign nations’ immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 27 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. Courts taking the former position have found removal to constitute waiver, see, e.g., State Eng’r v. S. Fork Band of the Te–Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians, 66 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (D. Nev. 1999), while  courts taking the latter position have not, see, e.g., Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo and  Casino, 676 F. Supp. 2d 953 (E.D. Cal. 2009).

Federal Court Rejects Narragansett Effort to Dismiss Attorney Fees Suit on Immunity Grounds

Here are the updated materials in Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe (D. R.I.):

18-1 Narragansett Motion for Reconsideration

19-1 Luckerman Response

20 Narragansett Reply

22 DCT Order Denying Reconsideration

An excerpt:

On August 29, 2013, this Court denied Defendant Narragansett Indian Tribe’s (“Tribe”) motion to dismiss, but stayed adjudication of the case pending tribal exhaustion.1 Now, the Tribe has filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision (ECF No. 18), re-emphasizing the Tribe’s position that its tribal sovereign immunity bars the instant lawsuit, and asking again that the Court dismiss the claims brought by Plaintiff Douglas J. Luckerman. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

Earlier, the federal court remanded the case to tribal court for exhaustion purposes, post here. Other lower court materials here and here.

Nooksack COA Briefing in Roberts v. Kelly Complete

Here:

Roberts v Kelly COA Opening Brief of Appellants

Roberts v Kelly COA Response Brief of Appellees

Roberts v Kelly COA Reply Brief of Appellants

Lower court materials here.

Year-End News Coverage of Nooksack Disenrollments Controversy

Here.

An excerpt:

The 306 people fighting to stay on the Nooksack Indian Tribe’s membership rolls won a rare legal victory recently when Tribal Court Chief Judge Raquel Montoya-Lewis ruled that tribal leaders had violated their rights by denying them $250-per-person Christmas checks that were mailed to everyone else in the 2,000-member tribe.

But the ruling didn’t put any extra presents under anyone’s tree. While Montoya-Lewis ruled that it was illegal to deny the 306 the same treatment as other tribe members before their legal status is determined, she also decided that she had no legal authority to order Chairman Bob Kelly and his supporters on the tribal council to issue checks to anyone.

The episode was one more example of the difficulties that the 306 have faced during the past year, as they try to get courts to block the move to strip them of tribal membership under a process known as disenrollment.

Colorado COA Dismisses Colorado AG’s Appeal of Cash Advance Matter

Here:

Colorado v Cash Advance Colo. COA Opinion

Lower court opinion here.

Sixth Circuit Reverses in Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe

Here is the opinion:

Michigan v SSM CA6 Opinion

An excerpt:

Because the State is not suing to enjoin a class III gaming activity, but instead a trust submission under MILCSA, § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) of IGRA does not abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The issue of whether class III gaming on the casino property will violate IGRA if the Tribe’s MILCSA trust submission is successful is not ripe for adjudication because it depends on contingent future events that may never occur. The injunction was therefore not properly entered.

Briefs are here.

Lower court materials here.

Federal Court Remands Cal. Valley Miwok Membership Issues to BIA

Here are the materials in California Valley Miwok Tribe v. Jewell (D. D.C.):

56 Federal Motion for Summary J

83 Intervenor CVMT Response to US Motion

86 Plaintiff CVMT Reply

87 DCT Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration

88 DCT Order on Cross-Motions for Summary J

An excerpt:

For the reasons discussed below, this Court concludes that the Assistant Secretary erred when he assumed that the Tribe’s membership is limited to five individuals and further assumed that the Tribe is governed by a duly constituted tribal council, thereby ignoring multiple administrative and court decisions that express concern about the nature of the Tribe’s governance. Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in so far as it seeks remand of the August 2011 Decision and deny the Federal Defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment.

Prior posts are here, here, and here.

Update in Wells Fargo v. Chukchansi

News coverage here.

The order referenced in the article is here:

353 SCT Order Dismissing Counterclaim against Wells Fargo

And materials:

166 Ayala Opposition

270 Wells Fargo Motion

342 Ayala Reply

Fletcher Commentary on the Michigan v. Bay Mills Argument

My read of the transcript is below. Same disclaimers as always — I wasn’t there; cold transcripts are treacherous; and, especially, none of this means anything if it isn’t in the majority opinion.

State’s Main Argument

As has become the norm in Indian law arguments, Justice Sotomayor opened with an initial flurry of questions to State’s counsel, a discussion that went on for some time (page 3 line 25 through page 6 line 20). She wondered why the State was the petitioner here when the district court expressly did not include the State in the denial for an injunction against the Vanderbilt casino (it was a motion by the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians instead), a point made by the National Congress of American Indians. The State’s response was fairly weak — the parties (and it turns out, perhaps, the CA6) merely “assum[ed]” the State and LTBB’s claims were consolidated. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor’s questions delayed the State’s wish to proceed directly to a discussion of tribal immunity by several minutes.

Justice Ginsburg further delayed the State (page 5 line 5 through page 8 line 18) by wanting to know why the State did not choose to invoke the dispute resolution mechanism in the 1993 gaming compact with Bay Mills, especially as Justice Kagan later noted the Court had previously held in C&L Enterprises that an arbitration provision can effectuate a waiver of tribal immunity. From page 8 line 19 to page 9 line 7, the Chief Justice wanted to know why the State raised its own immunity when BMIC sued for a declaratory judgment on the merits of the Vanderbilt casino theory. The State’s blithe(?) response was “all roads lead to tribal immunity.”

Justice Sotomayor finally got the argument into important ground by asking about Ex parte Young, which prompted the State to explain why federalism principles justified the procedural posture of this case (page 9 line 8 through page 12 line 15). First, this initial colloquy:

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All roads lead to one issue, I think. If you had gotten a declaratory judgment, they would have had to stop their gaming activity.

MR. BURSCH: No.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But you wouldn’t have gotten their property; isn’t that what this suit is about, you trying to take over the –the casino?

MR. BURSCH: No, we don’t want to take over the casino. We want to stop illegal gaming on lands subject to Michigan’s exclusive jurisdiction.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why not Ex Parte Young?

The State’s answer is quite silly — and what is getting picked up in the newspapers and perhaps some Justices gaoing all the way back to Kiowa itself — if France or Haiti opened a casino in Michigan then the State would be able to sue those foreign nations to get relief, but for some unexplained reason not Indian tribes (page 10 line 17 through page 17 line 21). I don’t believe the State ever explained why Ex parte Young is insufficient to shut down off-reservation gaming under the tribe’s MILSCA theory. The State wants to win by limiting or modifying Kiowa Tribe, rather than win with Ex parte Young (page 17 lines 15-23):

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But once the Congress didn’t respond, the majority opinion in Kiowa –I don’t know whether it’s “Kiowas” or “Kiowa” –said, you know, this is an unfortunate result, but Congress can do something about it. Well, now Congress hasn’t done anything about it, and you are asking this Court essentially to modify the –that precedent.

MR. BURSCH: I am. I mean, I don’t think you need to modify it.

Justice Alito kicked off another almost morbid series of colloquies that bled into the Tribe’s argument time about whether the State could arrest tribal officials, employees, and casino patrons, and prosecute them on page 18 line 9.

A largely irrelevant point to this case, but perhaps more important to the six tribes (including BMIC) now negotiating with the State over class III gaming, the State made a concession:

JUSTICE ALITO: It seems to me if a tribe wants to open a casino and the State has to –it has to have a compact with the State. Isn’t all the bargaining power on the –on the side of the State? So the State says, fine, if you want to do that, you have to waive sovereign immunity.

MR. BURSCH: Well, we had a compact in place in 1993 that limited their casinos so that this wouldn’t happen.

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I –but I mean, when will –when will this compact expire?

MR. BURSCH: Right. Let me give you a very practical answer to that question. This compact in 1993 had a 20-year term on it. And so it essentially expired at the end of –of November, just a few days ago, although it has an evergreen clause that allows it to continue while the parties try to negotiate a new compact. And As you would imagine, the very first thing Michigan asked for in its proposed amended compact was to waive tribal sovereign immunity to deal with issues like this. And, unsurprisingly, the tribe said: We’re really not interested in that; we kind of like the way the sovereignty issue is preserved in  the existing compact.

***

JUSTICE ALITO: So the compact has expired and there’s –so then how can they operate the casino?

MR. BURSCH: Well, it hasn’t expired. Until the parties –

JUSTICE ALITO: Until they reach a new compact, it continues.

MR. BURSCH: Until they reach a new compact, it continues in effect.

Near the end of the State’s time, Justice Sotomayor redirected the argument at least obliquely to an important issue raised by the National Congress of American Indians — why is the NIGC is sitting this one out? (page 22 line 20 to page 24 line 16). Specifically:

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. The issue of what constitutes Indian lands is between the Federal government and the Indians pursuant to the land trust settlement, correct?

MR. BURSCH: I disagree with that because –

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, I know you do and I know why you do. But –but what defines the lands is the settlement trust, correct?

MR. BURSCH: Federal court interpretation of the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, yes, would determine the status of these lands. The reason why it’s not just between the tribe and the Federal government is because Michigan has a huge interest in having lands that aren’t currently under its exclusive sovereign jurisdiction be determined to be  Indian lands –

One wishes Justice Sotomayor had been more direct in her questioning on this point, but the point was made.

Tribe’s Argument Continue reading