This is a case on tribal court jurisdiction out of the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians. The tribe owns the Tribal Community Center in fee, where the criminal act between two tribal members occurred. The petitioner claims the tribal court has no jurisdiction over him to charge or convict him with the crime. The petitioner filed a habeas petition in federal court.
Habeas brief
Respondent’s brief
There is a hearing scheduled on the matter for May 24th.
Here is the opinion in Hasgood v. Cedar Unified School District.
The court’s syllabus:
The Court grants the parties’ stipulated dismissal but strongly questions the basis of a federal court’s decision in a local school board personnel matter, which lends itself to be read as excluding all state-run schools on the reservation from tribal regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction.
Here is the order in Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprises v. Lin (N.Y. Sup. Ct.):
The Eastern Band tribal court disbarred Robert Saunooke, an Eastern Band member and a Florida-licensed attorney, for noncompliance with the tribal court licensure rule that requires a North Carolina bar license.
Here is that order:
From ICT:
People slander each other everywhere—without regard for territorial boundaries. But the legal treatment of such speech differs drastically depending on whether tribal or non-tribal laws apply. Tribal courts sometimes treat reputational torts like slander and libel, structurally, like their non-tribal counterparts, generally requiring proof of fault, falsity and harm. For instance, in many ways the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians defamation statute mirrors the standards of proof and structure of non-tribal defamation. (“Protection Against Defamation Act of 2006,” PDF) On the other hand, at least one tribal court has recognized a traditional cause of action for defamation under tribal law, complete with novel privileges and standards. As media interests increasingly collide with tribal governmental and commercial interests, tribal laws on expression will be tested. The results, as shown in a recent case from the Ho-Chunk Nation courts, will test the ongoing viability of defamation law in Indian country.
Libel and slander are curious species of lawsuits since they involve a person writing or speaking his mind. In non-tribal courts, plaintiffs who are public figures face a high burden of proof. But because U.S. Constitutional standards are not imported into tribal defamation law, speech laws take on very different shapes in Indian country. In 2008, an ordinance passed and quickly rescinded by the Tribal Business Counsel of the Chippewa Cree of Rocky Boy’s Reservation in Montana made it a crime to defame a tribal official. And last month, a Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court applied a tribal military veteran’s privilege that, as it is recognized, existed nowhere besides Ho-Chunk.
In a careful treatment of tribal-specific defamation law, the Ho-Chunk Trial Court recently held inGardner v. Littlejohn that a “veteran privilege” existed, protecting certain defamation defendants from liability (see the opinion at the invaluable Turtle Talk—“Ho-Chunk Trial Court Decides Defamation Claim under Tribal Customs and Traditions”—edited by the Indigenous Law and Policy Center at Michigan State University College of Law). The court noted that although it “does not exist in any other jurisdiction,” the Ho-Chunk veteran privilege resembles that possessed by legislators, which shields certain legislative speech.
The suit stemmed from an Indian military veteran’s criticism of a tribal health department employee and an incorrect statement that the plaintiff had been terminated from employment. Typically, public officials suing their defamers must prove knowing or reckless falsehood. InGardner, had such a rule been applied and had defendants simply negligently defamed the plaintiff, no liability would exist.
Here is the State’s response to the Sault Tribe’s motion to enjoin the state prosecution of its members for treaty fishing violations:
And an amicus brief supporting the state prosecution:
Here are the materials in Fife v. Moore (E.D. Okla.):
The court concluded that the Muscogee District Court had no jurisdiction to prosecute tribal members for theft against the tribal government because the crime did not occur in Indian country (which until recently would have been considered preposterous).
This case implicates two important issues (one at Muscogee and one involving many Oklahoma tribes). The first is the continuing dispute over the tribal district court at Muscogee (see our posts here and here). The other involves Indian Country in Oklahoma, the subject of a cert petition involving the Supreme Court (most recent post here).
Here is the unpublished opinion in In re Child of C.L.
The court’s syllabus:
Appellants Traverse County and the guardian ad litem of O.L. challenge the district court‟s transfer of jurisdiction over this termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) proceeding to the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate Tribal Court, pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Appellants argue that res judicata barred the tribe‟s motion to transfer jurisdiction. Alternatively, appellants contend that the “advanced stage” of the proceeding constitutes “good cause” to deny the transfer. Because res judicata did not apply and because the proceeding was not at an “advanced stage,” we affirm.
Here are the materials in Houle v. Central Power Elec. Coop. (D. N.D.), so far:
Central Power Motion to Dismiss
As usual, Friday is the most exciting time of the week for Indian law events.
Here are the materials in the most recent proceedings in United States v. Michigan, an effort to enjoin State v. Jensen in Delta County court (John Petoskey doing the heavy lifting in state court for Jensen and Bruce Greene in federal court for the Sault Tribe):
Doc. No. 1819 (Motion for Relief)
Doc. No. 1820 Memo in Support of Motion for Relief
Doc. No. 1820-3 (Certif of Compliance with 2000 Consent Decree
Turtle Talk 
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