The Eastern Band tribal court disbarred Robert Saunooke, an Eastern Band member and a Florida-licensed attorney, for noncompliance with the tribal court licensure rule that requires a North Carolina bar license.
Here is that order:
The Eastern Band tribal court disbarred Robert Saunooke, an Eastern Band member and a Florida-licensed attorney, for noncompliance with the tribal court licensure rule that requires a North Carolina bar license.
Here is that order:
From ICT:
People slander each other everywhere—without regard for territorial boundaries. But the legal treatment of such speech differs drastically depending on whether tribal or non-tribal laws apply. Tribal courts sometimes treat reputational torts like slander and libel, structurally, like their non-tribal counterparts, generally requiring proof of fault, falsity and harm. For instance, in many ways the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians defamation statute mirrors the standards of proof and structure of non-tribal defamation. (“Protection Against Defamation Act of 2006,” PDF) On the other hand, at least one tribal court has recognized a traditional cause of action for defamation under tribal law, complete with novel privileges and standards. As media interests increasingly collide with tribal governmental and commercial interests, tribal laws on expression will be tested. The results, as shown in a recent case from the Ho-Chunk Nation courts, will test the ongoing viability of defamation law in Indian country.
Libel and slander are curious species of lawsuits since they involve a person writing or speaking his mind. In non-tribal courts, plaintiffs who are public figures face a high burden of proof. But because U.S. Constitutional standards are not imported into tribal defamation law, speech laws take on very different shapes in Indian country. In 2008, an ordinance passed and quickly rescinded by the Tribal Business Counsel of the Chippewa Cree of Rocky Boy’s Reservation in Montana made it a crime to defame a tribal official. And last month, a Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court applied a tribal military veteran’s privilege that, as it is recognized, existed nowhere besides Ho-Chunk.
In a careful treatment of tribal-specific defamation law, the Ho-Chunk Trial Court recently held inGardner v. Littlejohn that a “veteran privilege” existed, protecting certain defamation defendants from liability (see the opinion at the invaluable Turtle Talk—“Ho-Chunk Trial Court Decides Defamation Claim under Tribal Customs and Traditions”—edited by the Indigenous Law and Policy Center at Michigan State University College of Law). The court noted that although it “does not exist in any other jurisdiction,” the Ho-Chunk veteran privilege resembles that possessed by legislators, which shields certain legislative speech.
The suit stemmed from an Indian military veteran’s criticism of a tribal health department employee and an incorrect statement that the plaintiff had been terminated from employment. Typically, public officials suing their defamers must prove knowing or reckless falsehood. InGardner, had such a rule been applied and had defendants simply negligently defamed the plaintiff, no liability would exist.
Here is the State’s response to the Sault Tribe’s motion to enjoin the state prosecution of its members for treaty fishing violations:
And an amicus brief supporting the state prosecution:
Here are the materials in Fife v. Moore (E.D. Okla.):
The court concluded that the Muscogee District Court had no jurisdiction to prosecute tribal members for theft against the tribal government because the crime did not occur in Indian country (which until recently would have been considered preposterous).
This case implicates two important issues (one at Muscogee and one involving many Oklahoma tribes). The first is the continuing dispute over the tribal district court at Muscogee (see our posts here and here). The other involves Indian Country in Oklahoma, the subject of a cert petition involving the Supreme Court (most recent post here).
Here is the unpublished opinion in In re Child of C.L.
The court’s syllabus:
Appellants Traverse County and the guardian ad litem of O.L. challenge the district court‟s transfer of jurisdiction over this termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) proceeding to the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate Tribal Court, pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Appellants argue that res judicata barred the tribe‟s motion to transfer jurisdiction. Alternatively, appellants contend that the “advanced stage” of the proceeding constitutes “good cause” to deny the transfer. Because res judicata did not apply and because the proceeding was not at an “advanced stage,” we affirm.
Here are the materials in Houle v. Central Power Elec. Coop. (D. N.D.), so far:
Central Power Motion to Dismiss
As usual, Friday is the most exciting time of the week for Indian law events.
Here are the materials in the most recent proceedings in United States v. Michigan, an effort to enjoin State v. Jensen in Delta County court (John Petoskey doing the heavy lifting in state court for Jensen and Bruce Greene in federal court for the Sault Tribe):
Doc. No. 1819 (Motion for Relief)
Doc. No. 1820 Memo in Support of Motion for Relief
Doc. No. 1820-3 (Certif of Compliance with 2000 Consent Decree
Here are the materials:
There are two active cases out there involving Florida tribes that raise interesting questions relating to tribal courts and tribal immunity in federal and state courts. The two cases, Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. (which is currently pending before the Supreme Court — an invitation brief from the OSG may be forthcoming soon), and last week’s district court decision in Contour Spa at Hard Rock v. Seminole Tribe (see today’s post here).
It is our understanding that both tribes have unusual government structures (unusual by federal and state standards, and to most but not all tribes) in which the tribal legislature serves as the appellate court of final resort for the tribal judiciary. This is less common, we think, than it once was in Indian country, but a goodly number of tribes retain this structure. Many tribes in Michigan, by contrast, have very clear constitutional boundaries between the tribal political branches and the tribal courts, and the Harvard Project strongly recommends an independent judiciary as part of its prescription for solid economic growth in Indian country.
Tribes can and should establish whatever governmental structure they believe fits best for their communities, but there may be consequences to the tribal council-as-appellate court structure for tribes that have large commercial operations. Miccosukee, for example, is trying to enforce a tribal court judgment in federal court, and their tribal court judgment creditor is vehemently arguing that tribal jurisdiction is not viable because the tribal appellate court — the tribal council — is an interested party in the underlying suit. [That case likely will turn on whether the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claim, however.] But if the Miccosukee Tribe or other tribes try to enforce tribal court judgments in state or federal courts, it could be very difficult to persuade a foreign court to enforce a judgment ultimately controlled by the tribal council.
Such bad government structure “facts” almost made terrible law in the Contour Spa case, where the district court gave a great deal of credence to the Tenth Circuit’s maligned Dry Creek Lodge exception (this exception allows federal courts to review tribal government action under the Indian Civil Rights Act under certain circumstances, such as the lack of a tribal court forum). Other than the actual Dry Creek Lodge case (which was “bad facts make bad law” exemplified), no other court has adopted it. And outside of the Tenth Circuit, few (if any) courts have even invoked it to see if it was worth adopting. But last week, in large part because the tribal legislature sits as the tribal court at Seminole (according to the opinion), the district court invoked Dry Creek Lodge and applied the facts of the Contour Spa contract breach claim to it. While the court did not, in the end, apply the “exception,” likely because the non-tribal party didn’t attempt to resolve the dispute in “tribal court,” the mere fact that it was willing to take the Dry Creek Lodge exception seriously is worth contemplating.
Two commercially successful tribes with no independent tribal judiciary. While nothing disastrous has occurred yet, there are commercial costs associated with this government structure. Maybe for these tribes, those costs are worth paying. But they should be taken seriously.
Here are the materials in Contour Spa at Hard Rock v. Seminole Tribe (S.D. Fla.):
DCT Order Remanding Case to Fla. Cir. Ct.
Seminole Tribe Motion to Dismiss
Contour Spa Response to Cypress Motion
Contour Spa Response to Tribe Motion
Of note, the court here appeared to assume that the so-called “Dry Creek lodge exception” could apply here, but found that the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements (one of which was essentially exhaustion of tribal forums). This is a potentially troubling development (that is, the spread of Dry Creek Lodge to areas outside of the Tenth Circuit).
You must be logged in to post a comment.