tribal courts

Eighth Circuit Decides Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr]

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here.

Excerpt:

A dispute over the practice of flaring natural gas from oil wells fuels the legal controversy in this case: the scope of Native American tribal court authority over  nonmembers. Several members of the MHA Nation sued numerous non-tribal oil and gas companies in MHA tribal court. Those companies operate oil wells on lands within the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation that have been allotted to individual tribe members but are held in trust by the federal government. The tribe members alleged the companies owed royalties from wastefully-flared gas. Some of these companies unsuccessfully contested the tribal court’s jurisdiction over them in tribal court. Then they initiated this action in federal court to enjoin the tribal court plaintiffs and tribal court judicial officials. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, and the tribal court plaintiffs and officials separately appealed. We affirm the injunction because we conclude suits over oil and gas leases on allotted trust lands are governed by federal law, not tribal law, and the tribal court lacks jurisdiction over the nonmember oil and gas companies.

Briefs here.

Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria Cert Petition

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

cert-petition.pdf

Questions presented:

“[T]he inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). The Montana Court recognized two limited narrow exceptions to that rule. But the Court has never resolved the question of whether tribal courts may ever exercise civil tort jurisdiction over nonmembers. In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) and in Dollar General Corporation and Dolgencorp, LLC v. The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, et. al. 136 S.Ct. 2159 (2016) the issue was brought before this Court, but unanswered. This case presents the issue of: Whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort claims against nonmembers?

Further this case presents the issue of: If the Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort claims over nonmembers, what is the prerequisite notice of any such authority, what is the prerequisite consent thereto by a nonmember, and what is the viable scope of such jurisdiction so as to satisfy the Due Process rights of a nonmember?

Lower court materials here.

UPDATE:

Brief in Opposition–PDFA

H.R.3977 – To amend the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 to extend the jurisdiction of tribal courts to cover crimes involving sexual violence, and for other purposes.

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Introduced by Rep. Haaland.

BILLS-116hr3977ih

Tribal Courts and Child Welfare Podcast Series from ACF

Kate Fort

Here.

Tribal Courts and Child Welfare Series

Eighth Circuit Decision Upholding Tribal Jurisdiction in Watso v. Piper [ICWA, PL 280]]

Kate Fort

Decision here.

This settles a long running string of cases out of the Minnesota federal courts in which the non-Indian parents of tribal member children argued there was no tribal jurisdiction over their children when they lived on the tribal reservation due to ICWA and PL 280.

ICWA holding:

Watso and Dietrich believe this provision means that “the tribe does not have jurisdiction over a child held by the state until the state court transfers jurisdiction to the tribe, which can only occur after a state court ICWA hearing.” To the contrary, § 1911(b) does not require a state court hearing. Section 1911(b) addresses the transfer of proceedings from state court to tribal court. Here, there were no state court proceedings. There was no transfer from state court to tribal court. Section 1911(b) does not apply.

PL 280 holding:

Public Law 280 does not require a state court hearing or any state court proceedings. See Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Nothing in the wording of Public Law 280 or its legislative history precludes concurrent tribal authority.”); Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1063 n. 32 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Public Law 280 states have only concurrent jurisdiction with the tribes over child custody proceedings involving Indian children.”), citing Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. State of Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 562, 559–62 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting argument that Public Law 280 vested enumerated states with exclusive jurisdiction). The SMSC Court’s jurisdiction over C.P. and C.H.’s child custody proceedings is consistent with Public Law 280.

And a succinct due process holding:

Lastly, Watso and Dietrich allege that the absence of a state court proceeding violated their due process rights, based on parents’ fundamental right “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (invalidating state law that allowed any third party to petition state courts for child visitation rights over parental objections). They allege due process rights “to object and to stop the transfer, a right to notice and a right to a meaningful court hearing.” Watso and Dietrich had sufficient notice of the tribal court proceedings. They were heard in tribal court. They have presented no evidence of a due process violation.

“Doing Justice: An Interview With Abby Abinanti, Chief Judge of the Yurok Tribe (Part 1)”

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here.

In Re: The Protest of Huber to Disqualify Walkingstick as Candidate for Principal Chief (Cherokee Nation Supreme Court, May 29, 2019)

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

SC-19-07 25-Order 5-29-19

Pokagon Peacemaking Discussion

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

SG Recommends GVR in Poarch Band v. Wilkes

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the brief:

sg-invitation-brief-1.pdf

An excerpt:

This brief is submitted in response to the Court’s order inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. After the petition for a writ of certiorari was filed, amendments to tribal law were proposed that could substantially affect the basis for the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama in this case. In the view of the United States, if those changes are enacted, the petition should be granted, the judgment vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Cert stage materials are here.

UPDATE:

17-1175SupplementalBriefForRespondents

Petitioners Supplemental Brief

Muscogee (Creek) Nation SCT Issues Opinion in Judicial Recusal Matter

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the order in Bruner v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation.