Here is “Tribal judge is named MiLW’s ‘Woman of the Year.’
This is outstanding news! Izhaadaa giizhigowaande!
Here is “Tribal judge is named MiLW’s ‘Woman of the Year.’
This is outstanding news! Izhaadaa giizhigowaande!
Here.
I wondered when I learned that Tom Goldstein is co-counsel for the petitioners when this petition would end up as a SCOTUSblog “Petition of the Day.” As might be well known to TT readers, SCOTUSblog is the best daily source of news on the Supreme Court. But it is also (or was) a tool for Mr. Goldstein to drum up business. The blog recently make some headlines in its effort to acquire/obtain/earn a Supreme Court press credential, and was denied. Mr. Goldstein’s passionate and sophisticated response is well worth the read. As a question of journalism, I strongly support SCOTUSBlog’s efforts. It doesn’t bother me that SCOTUSblog-as-client development tool might somehow affect SCOTUSblog-as-journalist.
For what appears to be the first time, Mr. Goldstein is representing a Supreme Court petitioner against tribal interests, and so to the extent that it means anything at all, the tribal interests here are adversely affected by the SCOTUSblog-as-journalism outlet and SCOTUSBlog-as-Supreme Court advocate dynamic. There’s not enough information before me to make a conclusion as to whether that dynamic will affect the Court’s certiorari decision at the long conference here in a few weeks.
Here is a list of TT posts recognizing an Indian law “Petition to Watch” as identified by SCOTUSblog (grants are in red): Continue reading
Here are the materials in Chamblin v. Greene (W.D. Wash.):
Here is the opinion in Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham. An excerpt:
The Thlopthlocco Tribal Town is a federally recognized Indian tribe in Oklahoma. An election dispute arose about which individuals were properly elected or appointed to govern the Thlopthlocco people. Seeking to resolve that dispute, the Tribal Town filed suit in the tribal court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and, accordingly, voluntarily submitted to that court’s jurisdiction.
The Tribal Town subsequently concluded it did not want to maintain its suit in tribal court and dismissed its claims. But the defendant in that suit had, by that time, filed cross-claims. Arguing that the Tribal Town’s sovereign immunity waiver did not cover proceedings on the cross-claims, the Tribal Town attempted to escape Muscogee court jurisdiction, but, in various decisions, several judges and justices of the Muscogee courts held that they may exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Town without its consent.
The Tribal Town then filed a federal action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against those Muscogee judicial officers, seeking to enjoin the Muscogee courts’ exercise of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, the Tribal Town had failed to join indispensable parties, and the Tribal Town had failed to exhaust its remedies in tribal court. We conclude, however, that the Tribal Town has presented a federal question and that the other claims do not require dismissal. But we agree the Tribal Town should exhaust its remedies in tribal court while its federal court action is abated.
Here are the briefs:
Lower court materials here.
Here.
Abstract:
Despite a treaty in 1866 between the Cherokee Nation and the federal government granting them full tribal citizenship, Cherokee Freedmen—the descendants of African American slaves to the Cherokee, as well as of children born from unions between African Americans and Cherokee tribal members—continue to be one of the most marginalized communities within Indian Country. Any time Freedmen have sought the full rights and benefits given other Cherokee citizens, they have encountered intense opposition, including a 2007 vote that effectively ousted them from the tribe. The debates surrounding this recent decision provide an excellent case study for exploring the intersections of race and sovereignty. In this article, I use the most recent Cherokee Freedmen controversy to examine how racial discourse both empowers and diminishes tribal sovereignty, and what happens in settler-colonial contexts when the exercise of tribal rights comes into conflict with civil rights. I also explore how settler colonialism as an analytic can obscure the racialized power dynamics that undermine Freedmen claims to an indigenous identity and tribal citizenship.
Here (District Court Judge).
The District Court Judge presides over the District Court of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians and exercises judicial authority over cases in law and equity for the specific purposes of promoting the general welfare, preserving and maintaining justice, and protecting the rights of all persons under the jurisdiction of the Non-removable Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe. This is a six-year term.
Here are the materials in the Fort Berthold Tribal Court action, TJMD LLP v. Dakota Petroleum Transport Solutions LLC:
DOCS-#390943-v1-defendants__motion_to_dismiss
DOCS-#390944-v1-defendants__brief_-_motion_to_dismiss
DOCS-#390945-v1-defendants__appendix_-_motion_to_dismiss
Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Non-Trail Member Jur
DOCS-#407079-v1-PDF_2013_02_06_2nd_Aff_Claypool
DOCS-#407080-v1-PDF_2013_02_06_Def_Reply_Brief_Support_Motion_Dismiss
DOCS-#440826-v1-PDF_interim_order_on_jurisdiction
Prior post here.
In the most recent Bench & Bar (Minnesota State Bar Journal) article “Boomtown: Risks and Rewards in the Peace Garden State,” Kristin Rowell writes about her experiences in litigating contract claims in both Fort Berthold Tribal Court and North Dakota’s Montrail County District Court where the courts reach opposition conclusions on the same legal question. An excerpt:
In October 2012, I commenced litigation on behalf of my client against four defendants companies. Two of the companies were organized under the laws of the state of Minnesota, one of the companies was organized under the laws of Nevada, and the other company was organized under the laws of Florida. All of these out-of-state residents were conducting business with my client on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in New Town, North Dakota, as a part of the booming oil industry. (Another fascinating aspect of North Dakota’s judicial landscape is that there are several independent tribal courts separate from the state and federal court systems. An in-depth look at North Dakota tribal courts will have to be saved for another article.) My client is a member of the federally recognized Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Native American Nations, also known collectively as the “MHA Nation” or the “Three Affiliated Tribes.” For a variety of reasons, my client chose to commence its case in Fort Berthold District (Tribal) Court.
In response to the complaint, the four defendants moved to dismiss my client’s case for “lack of nonmember tribal court jurisdiction.” We opposed the motion and explained to the tribal court judge that it could and should retain jurisdiction under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the Supreme Court case that gave tribal courts the authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers on reservation land owned in fee by non-Indians. Under Montana, tribal courts can regulate the activities of nonmembers (and in turn, assert jurisdiction over nonmembers in tribal court) where: (1) the nonmembers “enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” or (2) the nonmembers’ “conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”15 If the circumstances of a case fit either exception, then the tribal court has jurisdiction over the dispute.16
We argued that the court had jurisdiction over the key non-Indian defendant because we met both Montana exceptions with respect to that defendant. The focus of our analysis was that the defendant contracted with my client so the first Montana exception was easily met. Defendants argued that because my client is a company and not a human, it could not be a “member” of the tribe for jurisdictional purposes. We argued that my client, a limited liability partnership, was owned by an Indian, which meant that it was a “member” of the tribe for jurisdictional purposes.
The Fort Berthold Tribal Court agreed with us. The court’s decision turned on the novel and narrow legal issue of whether a limited liability partnership was more akin to a limited liability company or a corporation for jurisdictional purposes. We argued that the United States Supreme Court has held that the citizenship of a limited partnership for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is determined according to the citizenship of its limited and general partners, citing Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 195-96 (1990). Several courts have held that this holds true for limited liability partnerships too.17 Defendants argued that the limited liability partnership was more analogous to a corporation, should be treated as a separate legal “person,” and cited cases in which the courts held that a corporate person could not be a “member” of an Indian tribe.
We have been proceeding in the tribal court ever since and we will eventually have a trial. But there is a conundrum. While the other side’s motion to dismiss was under advisement in tribal court, the contracting party defendant in the tribal court action started an action against my client in North Dakota state court related to alleged oil spills at the exact property they are fighting about in tribal court. My client moved to dismiss or transfer the state court case, and the same issues were argued to the state court judge that had just been decided in tribal court. The short story is that the state court judge disagreed with the tribal court judge and retained jurisdiction over the second case. In other words, we now have two cases pending in two courts involving the same two parties and the same contract. Suffice it to say that we are working hard to resolve both.
The materials in the Montrail County matter (Dakota Petroleum Transport Solutions LLC v. TJMD LLP are here:
DOCS-#424808-v1-PDF_notice_of_motion_&_motion_to_dismiss_or_transfer
DOCS-#424809-v1-PDF_Mem_Supp_Motion_Transfer_Venue_and_Dismiss
DOCS-#424810-v1-pdf_KBR_Affidavit_motion_to_dismiss_or_transfer
DOCS-#424811-v1-PDF_proposed_order_motion_to_dismiss_or_transfer
DOCS-#430259-v1-pdf_Dak_Pet_response_brief_to_motion_to_dismiss
DOCS-#430260-v1-PDF_exs_to_Dak_Pet_response_brief
DOCS-#430276-v1-PDF_authorities_cited_DP_response_motion_to_dismiss
DOCS-#431865-v1-PDF_Reply_Mem_Supp_Motion_to_Dismiss_or_Transfer
DOCS-#431866-v1-PDF_Supp_Aff_KBR_motion_to_dismiss_or_transfer
DOCS-#449184-v1-Order_denying_motion_to_dismiss_transfer_(mountrail)
Materials in the parallel tribal court litigation TJMD LLP v. Dakota Petroleum Transport Solutions LLC are included as exhibits to these pleadings. We will post those materials in a separate post.
Here are the materials in United States v. Nichols (D. S.D.):
49 DCT Order Denying Motion to Dismiss
An excerpt:
Steven Nichols, a non-Indian, was excluded from the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation. While his exclusion was in effect, he was seen driving on a public road within the reservation. Tribal officers stopped and detained him until an FBI agent arrived. The agent then arrested him for criminal trespass. Nichols claims that the tribe did not have the authority to ban him from using the road and that his federal trespass charge — built upon a tribal writ and order of exclusion — should be dismissed. Because (1) there exists latent factual issues that require an evidentiary foundation, (2)there has been no exhaustion of tribal remedies or any showing that some exception to the exhaustion prescription applies, and (3) there is no ambiguity in the language of the revocation petition as amended, Nichols’s dismissal motion must be denied, but without prejudice.
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