Here are the materials in Apache Stronghold v. United States (D. Ariz.):
Trevor Reed on Indigenous Dignity and the Right to be Forgotten
Trevor Reed has posted “Indigenous Dignity and the Right to be Forgotten,” forthcoming in the BYU Law Review, on SSRN.
Here is the abstract:
Indigenous cultural documentation amassed over more than two centuries currently occupies the shelves and databases of American museums, universities, archives and other institutions. Field notes, photographs, sound recordings, maps, kinship charts, and all manner of other cultural materials collected from Tribal members constitutes what is perhaps America’s first instance of “big data.” While often touted by collectors and institutions as rich historical and cultural resources, I argue that some of these collections have become toxic in their preserved forms, separated from their communities’ modes of care. These materials are among those that Indigenous groups should have the right to remove from settler archives, museums, digital repositories, and other institutions and if necessary, erase, delete, or destroy. The kind of Indigenous right to erase sensitive cultural material held by settler institutions, the contours of which I begin to etch out in this symposium essay, is not unlike the right to be forgotten and other data privacy rights already adopted by the European Union, and to some extent, the State of California. While much of the debate surrounding the right to be forgotten in the United States has focused on tensions between personal autonomy and the right of the public to be informed, the collective rights of Indigenous peoples to maintain cultural dignity and sovereignty in the wake of colonization, I argue, provides a compelling case for recognizing an Indigenous right to be forgotten.
Hon. Claudette White Walks On
Here.
Words I’ve seen describing Claudette this week: a leader, a good good person, a force, a problem solver, a giant for tribal courts, a kind judge, a fighter, a singer, a dancer, a dear friend, a sister, a mom. She was all that and more, and we are heartbroken to lose her.
Here (starting at 1:21) she is kicking off the Inauguration.
Here is the documentary Tribal Justice with her and Judge Abinanti.
Here is the announcement from the National American Indian Court Judges Association: Claudette White Announcement
Tribal Law Journal Volume 20
Here:
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez in the Evolution of Federal Law
Richard B. Collins
Tribal Justice: Honoring Indigenous Dispute Resolution (Symposium Keynote Address)
Deb Haaland
Native American Oral Evidence: Finding a New Hearsay Exception
Max Virupaksha Katner
Tribal Opposition to Enbridge Line 5: Rights and Interests
John Minode’e Petoskey
Stephanie Hall Barclay & Michalyn Steele on Protections for Indigenous Sacred Sites
Stephanie Hall Barclay & Michalyn Steele have published “Rethinking Protections for Indigenous Sacred Sites” in the Harvard Law Review. Here is the abstract:
Meaningful access to sacred sites is among the most important principles to the religious exercise of Indigenous peoples, yet tribes have been repeatedly thwarted by the federal government in their efforts to vindicate this practice of their religion. The colonial, state, and federal governments of this Nation have been desecrating and destroying Native American sacred sites since before the Republic was formed. Unfortunately, the callous destruction of Indigenous sacred sites is not just a troubling relic of the past. Rather, the threat to sacred sites and cultural resources continues today in the form of spoliation from development, as well as in the significant barriers to meaningful access Indigenous peoples face.
Scholars concerned about government failure to protect Indigenous sacred sites on government property have generally agreed that the problem stems from the unique nature of Indigenous spiritual traditions as being too distinct from non-Indigenous religious traditions familiar to courts and legislators, and therefore eluding protection afforded to other traditions. By contrast, this Article approaches the problem from an entirely different angle: we focus instead on the similarities between government coercion with respect to Indigenous religious exercise and other non-Indigenous religious practices. We illustrate how the debate about sacred sites unwittingly partakes in longstanding philosophical debates about the nature of coercion itself — a phenomenon that has previously gone unnoticed by scholars. This Article argues that whether or not one formally labels the government’s actions as “coercive,” the important question is whether the government is bringing to bear its sovereign power in a way that inhibits the important ideal of religious voluntarism — the ability of individuals to voluntarily practice their religious exercise consistent with their own free self-development. Indeed, this is precisely the sort of question courts ask when evaluating government burdens on non-Indigenous religious exercise. The failure to ask this same question about voluntarism for Indigenous religious practices has created a double standard, wherein the law recognizes a much more expansive notion of coercion for contexts impacting non-Indigenous religious practices, and a much narrower conception of coercion when it comes to Indigenous sacred sites.
This egregious double standard in the law ought to be revisited. Doing so would have two important implications. First, when government interference with religious voluntarism is viewed clearly, tribal members and Indigenous practitioners should be able to prove a prima facie case under statutes like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act much more easily. Second, this Article makes the novel claim that clearer understanding of the coercive control government exercises over sacred sites should animate a strong obligation under the government’s trust responsibility and plenary power doctrine to provide more — rather than less — robust protection of Indigenous sacred sites.
Judge Bradley Letts on the Cherokee Court System
Judge Bradley Letts has published “The Cherokee Tribal Court: Its Origins and Its Place in the
American Judicial System” in the Campbell Law Review.
Highly recommended.
Stacy Leeds and Lonnie Beard on the Tax Implications of McGirt v. Oklahoma
Stacy Leeds and Lonnie Beard have posted “A Wealth of Sovereign Choices: Tax Implications of McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Promise of Tribal Economic Development,” forthcoming in the Tulsa Law Review, on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s now famous opening line in McGirt v. Oklahoma will long be remembered by Indigenous nations as one of the most powerful judicial statements in the history of federal Indian law. “On the far end of the Trail of Tears was a promise.”
For that promise to be fully realized, the McGirt decision must lead to more than just increased criminal justice system responsibilities for the federal government and the impacted Indigenous nations, collectively known as the “Five Tribes.” The promise at the end of the wholesale removal and relocation of Five Tribes was not simply an empty promise of geographic boundaries, it also included a permanent homeland with fully functioning tribal governments, including powers of taxation. With the re-affirmation of reservation boundaries and the re-assumption of many governmental responsibilities, the Five Tribes necessarily have the power to raise meaningful revenue to govern.
The promise must also include diverse economic development strategies conceived of and implemented by the Five Tribes in order to take advantage of and fully realize McGirt’s newly reaffirmed reservation status. If this challenge is accepted, the Five Tribes have an opportunity to reconfirm and expand government powers that have been denied them for over a century, including the power to make the same sovereign tax choices afforded other sovereigns worldwide.
This article explores the tax implications of the McGirt decision with detailed analysis of what has changed, and what remains the same, for purposes of federal, tribal and state taxing authority. The article suggests several law and policy choices available to the Five Tribes, including how to maximize tax incentives to grow the reservation population base and support a diverse economy through small business and enterprise scale development. The article includes a call to action for tribal governments to formulate a long-term economic strategy that will take advantage of tax attributes that attach to the various reservations. In conclusion, the article suggests possible compact arrangements with other Indigenous nations and with Oklahoma’s state and local governments.
McGirt has been heralded as ushering in substantial changes for the eastern half of Oklahoma. If tribes and Oklahoma play their collective economic cards right, big change could come in the form of positive economic outcomes. Economists predict, or at least hope for, a post-COVID economic revival for rural communities in America’s heartland. To assist in this economic revival, the Five Tribes’ reservations could serve as laboratories for the formulation of economic development strategies that could serve as blueprints for other parts of rural America. For that to happen in eastern Oklahoma, McGirt will need to live up to its full potential, becoming much more than an overturned criminal conviction from inside Indian country.
Govind Persad on Allocating Medicine Fairly in an Unfair Pandemic
Govind Persad has posted “Allocating Medicine Fairly in an Unfair Pandemic,” forthcoming in the University of Illinois Law Review, on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
America’s COVID-19 pandemic has both devastated and disparately harmed minority communities. In this Article, I focus on the pressing question of how the allocation of scarce treatments for COVID-19 and similar public health threats should respond to these racial disparities. Many policymakers and popular commentators have recognized that the inevitable initial scarcity of vaccines presents questions about racial disparity. Therapeutics like monoclonal antibodies raise similar questions, as do emergency interventions such as ventilators and ICU beds. Some have proposed that members of racial groups who have been especially hard-hit by the pandemic should receive priority for scarce treatments. Others have worried that this prioritization misidentifies racial disparities as reflecting biological differences rather than structural racism, or that it will generate mistrust among groups who have previously been harmed by medical research. Still others complain that such prioritization would be fundamentally unjust.
In Part II, I provide a brief overview of current and proposed COVID-19 treatments and identify documented or likely scarcities and disparities in access. In Part III, I argue that randomly allocating scarce medical interventions, as some propose, will not effectively address disparities: it both permits unnecessary deaths and concentrates those deaths among people who are more exposed to infection. In Part IV, I explain why using individual-level racial classifications in allocation is precluded by current Supreme Court precedent. Addressing disparities will require focusing on factors other than race, or potentially considering race at an aggregate rather than individual level. I also argue that policies prioritizing members of Native American tribes can succeed legally even where policies based on race would not. In Part V, I examine two complementary strategies to narrow racial disparities. One would prioritize individuals who live in disadvantaged geographic areas or work in hard-hit occupations, potentially alongside race-sensitive aggregate metrics like neighborhood segregation. These approaches, like the policies school districts adopted after the Supreme Court rejected individualized racial classifications in education, would narrow disparities without classifying individuals by race. The other strategy would address the starkly disparate racial impact of deaths early in life by limiting the use of policies that explicitly deprioritize the prevention of early deaths, and by considering policies that prioritize their prevention.
Second Circuit Rejects Six Nations GRE Challenge to Connecticut’s Tobacco Statute
Here are the materials in Grand River Six Nations Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton:
Turtle Talk 
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