Here are the Ninth Circuit briefs in Cahto Tribe of the Laytonville Rancheria v. Dutschke:
lower court materials here.
Here are the Ninth Circuit briefs in Cahto Tribe of the Laytonville Rancheria v. Dutschke:
lower court materials here.
Here are the materials (so far) in City of Yreka v. Salazar:
Lower court materials here.
Here are the materials in Rincon Mushroom Corp. v. Mazzetti:
Rincon Band Motion to Take Judicial Notice
Rincon Mushroom Motion to Take Judicial Notice
Lower court materials here.
An excerpt from the Ninth Circuit opinion:
The Tribe argues that the non-member fee land at issue could potentially contaminate the Tribe’s water supply, or exacerbate a future fire that might damage the Rincon Casino. However, these possibilities do not fall within Montana’s second exception, which requires actual actions that have significantly impacted the tribe. Compare id. at 341 (“The sale of formerly Indian-owned fee land to a third party . . . cannot fairly be called ‘catastrophic’ for tribal self-government. . . .”) (citation omitted); and Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 458-59 (1997) (ruling that tribal court jurisdiction over tort suits is not “needed to preserve the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), with Elliott, 566 F.3d at 844, 849-50 (holding that the tribal court had colorable jurisdiction where a non-Indian started a forest fire on reservation land).
To hold that the potential threats of harm presented on this record give rise to tribal jurisdiction under Montana’s second exception would allow the exception to swallow the rule; any property within the Rincon Reservation faces similar potential threats. See Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 330. Because the potential threats did not create a plausible basis for tribal court jurisdiction, the district court erred when it dismissed RMCA’s Complaint for failure to exhaust tribal remedies. See Elliott, 566 F.3d at 848.
Compare that language to the lower court’s description of the same allegation:
Defendants have submitted evidence indicating that conduct on Plaintiff’s property “pose direct threats to the Tribe’s groundwater resources.” (Minjares Decl. ¶ 29, Doc. # 52). Defendants also have submitted evidence that “[c]onditions on the Subject Property during the [2007] Poomacha Fire contributed to the spread of wildfire from that property to Tribal lands across the street on which the Casino is located.” (Mazzetti Decl. ¶ 15, Doc. # 17-2). Although Plaintiff disputes this evidence, Defendants have shown that conduct on Plaintiff’s property plausibly could threaten the Tribe’s groundwater resources and could contribute to the spread of wildfires on the reservation. This showing is sufficient to require exhaustion, given the relief requested by the first two counts of the Complaint.
Here.
The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes are attempting to list a sacred site on the National Register of Historic Places in hopes of stopping plans to mine Chicago Peak. Stories are here and here.
Case material (unsuccessful efforts to stop the mining project) referenced in the articles:
Here are the materials in today’s opinion in Oklevueha Native American Church v. Holder:
Lower court materials here.
Here are the materials in United States v. Wilbur:
CA9 Opinion (per Judge W. Fletcher, with partial dissent by Judge Rawlinson)
An excerpt:
For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Wilburs that during the period from 2003 to 2005, when they were licensed to sell tobacco by the Swinomish Tribe, there were no “applicable State or local cigarette taxes” under the CCTA. We also agree with the Wilburs that the five-year statute of limitations for CCTA violations bars any charges based on activity from 1999 to 2003. We conclude, however, that after their tribal tobacco license expired in 2005, the Wilburs’ activities ceased to be covered by the Swinomish cigarette tax contract (“CTC”), and that the state’s retrocession therefore ceased to apply. The unstamped cigarettes the Wilburs transported and sold during this period were thus “contraband” under the CCTA. We reject the Wilburs’ due process and treaty arguments.
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