Here are the materials in Union Pacific Railroad v. Runyon (D. Or.):
Rule 19
Split Washington SCT Decides Rule 19/Tribal Immunity in In Rem Jurisdiction Matter
Here is the 5-4 opinion in Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe.
Briefs:
Federal Court Dismisses Pipeline Condemnation Action under Rule 19, Tribal Immunity
Here are the materials in Enable Oklahoma Intrastate Transmission LLC v. 25 Foot Wide Easement (W.D. Okla.):
Federal Court Orders Tribal Exhaustion in Challenge to Lummi Seizure
Here are the materials in Wilson v. Doe (W.D. Wash.):
57 Horton’s Towing Motion for Summary J
64 Horton’s Towing Response to 60 & 61
An excerpt:
On October 22, 2014, Plaintiff Curtiss Wilson was stopped by a Lummi Tribe police officer while driving on the Lummi Reservation after drinking at the Lummi Casino. (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 2.) Lummi Tribal Police Officer Grant Austick stopped Plaintiff, searched his 1999 Dodge Ram Pickup, and developed probable cause that Plaintiff was committing a DUI. (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 2.) Officer Austick then called the Washington State Patrol and Plaintiff was arrested. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff’s truck was towed by Defendant Horton’s Towing and impounded at the direction of the Washington State Trooper. (Id.)
The following day, Lummi Tribal Police Officer Brandon Gates presented a “Notice of Seizure and Intent to Institute Forfeiture” (“Notice of Seizure”) from the Lummi Tribal Court of the Lummi Tribe to Horton’s Towing. (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 3-4, 9.) The seizure and intent to institute forfeiture of Plaintiff’s vehicle was based on violations of the Lummi Nation Code [3] of Laws (“LNCL”) 5.09A.110(d)(2) (National Indian Law Library 2016) (Possession of Marijuana over 1 ounce), and authorized by LNCL 5.09B.040(5)(A) (National Indian Law Library 2016) (Civil forfeiture section addressing Property Subject to Forfeiture, specifically motor vehicles used, or intended for use, to facilitate the possession of illegal substances.) (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 9.) Horton’s Towing released the truck to the Lummi Tribe. (Id. at 3-4).
Plaintiff brought suit in Whatcom County Superior Court and the case was removed. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff originally brought claims for outrage, conversion, and relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 7-8.) All of Plaintiff’s claims, save conversion, have been previously dismissed either voluntarily or by Court order. (See Dkt. Nos. 25, 35, and 53.) Plaintiff’s conversion claim against both Horton’s and the United States is based on Horton’s release of the vehicle to the Lummi Tribe pursuant to the order served by Gates. (Dkt. No. 4-1 at 6.)
Defendant Horton’s moves for summary judgment, claiming the release of the vehicle was pursuant to the Notice of Seizure, and [4] therefore with lawful justification. (Dkt. No. 57.) Plaintiff argues in response that the Notice of Seizure is invalid or not enforceable off the reservation. (Dkt. No. 61.) The United States moves for summary judgment based on, inter alia, Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Dkt. No. 65.) In response, Plaintiff regurgitates failed arguments from previous briefing, relying on an overturned, out-of-Circuit case and “maintaining” a line of reasoning with respect to Brandon Gates and the scope of employment that this Court has already ruled against. (Dkt. No. 66.)
Ninth Circuit Rejects Alaska’s Effort to Condemn Alaska Native Allotments
Here are the materials in State of Alaska v. United States:
An excerpt:
The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of quiet title and declaratory judgment claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and vacated the dismissal of a condemnation claim in a case involving a land dispute between the State of Alaska and two Alaska Natives, Agnes and Anne Purdy, concerning ownership of rights-of-way for four public trails that cross the Purdys’ land.
The Purdys acquired ownership of the parcels in question under the Alaska Native Allotment Act through allotments by the federal government. The State of Alaska contended that the allotments were subject to rights-of-way for four trails. Federal statute R.S. 2477, repealed in 1976, granted rights of way over public lands; it was self-executing; acceptance of a grant was determined by state law; and under Alaska law an R.S. 2477 grant could be accepted through public use.
Addressing the State of Alaska’s Quiet Title Act claim, the panel held that the State of Alaska’s quiet title claim was barred. The panel held that the United States was a necessary party to the claim because it held an interest in the Purdys’ allotments (by virtue of the restraint on alienation), and recognition of the R.S. 2477 rights-of-way would impair the United States’ interest. The panel further held that the United States had not waived its immunity from suit pursuant to the Quiet Title Act’s Indian lands exception, which preserves the United States’ immunity from suit when the United States claims an interest based on that property’s status as trust or restricted Indian lands.
The panel concluded that the district court properly dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The panel held that the district court correctly dismissed the State of Alaska’s claim for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which sought essentially the same relief as the quiet title claim.
Addressing the State of Alaska’s condemnation claim against the Purdys and the United States under 25 U.S.C. § 357, the panel held that although the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the State’s condemnation claim, the claim could not proceed as pleaded. The panel held that the United States was an indispensable party to the claim. The panel further held that the district court erred in dismissing the claim on the ground that the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity because Congress waived the government’s immunity with respect to such claims. The panel also held that the United States’ express consent to the condemnation claim was not required. The panel concluded that the State improperly pleaded its condemnation claim, and remanded so that the State may be given an opportunity to amend the claim if it so chooses.
Tanana Chiefs Conference Brief
Federal Court Denies Reconsideration in N.M. Condemnation Action against Navajo; Certifies for Interlocutory Appeal
Here are the new materials in Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. Approximately 15.49 Acres of Land in McKinley County (D. N.M.):
107 Motion for Reconsideration
27 DCT Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration
Prior post here.
Selected Materials in Commonwealth of Penn. v. Think Finance LLC
Here:
67-1 Think Finance Motion to Dismiss Rule 19
68-1 Think Motion to Dismiss Rule 12 and 17
Excerpts:
In both Hotleva and Chehalis, the actions of the non-party would preclude the relief sought. In contrast, here the relief sought by the Plaintiffs does not require the non-party tribes to do or refrain from doing anything. For example, the Plaintiff seeks disgorgement of the money earned by the Defendants only, not the money the tribes have earned, through the alleged scheme. FAC p. 40. The Plaintiff is not seeking a declaration that the contracts themselves are illegal, but rather a declaration that the Defendants’ conduct violates a number of state and federal laws.FAC p. 39. The Chippewa Cree were engaged in consumer lending prior to their partnership with Think Finance and, since the tribes are not bound by the outcome of this case, they would be permitted to continue that business. The tribes continuing their business (without the services of the Defendants) would in no way limit the relief the Plaintiffs seek. See Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 16 F.Supp.3d 605, 615 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (“[J]udgment…will not prohibit the lenders from lending money or from relying on other mechanisms to collect on their loans.”). The relief the OAG seeks is thus not “hollow.” The tribes are not required underRule 19(a)(1)(a).
Supreme Court Cert Petition in Two Shields v. Wilkinson
Here:
ILTF Amicus Brief in Support of Petition
Law Profs Amicus Brief in Support of Petition
Questions presented:
In Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5 (1990) (per curiam), this Court unanimously held that joint tortfeasors are not required parties under Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because “[i]t has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit.” Id. at 7. Six circuits have recognized the rule that joint wrongdoers are not required parties under Rule 19(a). Three circuits now have followed the opposite rule in holding that, in some circumstances, a joint tortfeasor is a required party, while case law in the Seventh Circuit is conflicted. The Eighth Circuit below followed the minority line of the circuit split to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the action under Rule 19 for failure to join the United States.
The question presented is: Does Rule 19 incorporate the common law rule that joint tortfeasors are not required parties?
Lower court materials here.
Supreme Court Petition Involving NAGPRA, Rule 19, and Tribal Immunity
Here is the petition in White v. Regents of the University of California:
Questions presented:
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), which governs repatriation of human remains to Native American tribes, contains an enforcement provision that states, “The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over any action brought by any person alleging a violation of this chapter and shall have the authority to issue such orders as may be necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter.” 25 U.S.C. § 3013. Over a strong dissent, a divided Ninth Circuit panel held that a party can prevent judicial review of controversial repatriation decisions by claiming a tribe is a “required party” under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if the tribe invokes tribal immunity. The questions presented are:
1. Whether Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a district court dismiss any case in which a Native American tribe with immunity is deemed to be a “required party.”
2. Whether tribal immunity extends to cases where Rule 19 is the only basis for adding a tribe, no relief against the tribe is sought, and no other forum can issue a binding order on the dispute; and if so, whether Congress abrogated tribal immunity as a defense to claims arising under NAGPRA.
Lower court materials here.
UPDATE (1/4/16): Anthropologists Amicus Brief
Update in Western Sky-Related Proceedings
Here are materials in Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank NA (M.D. N.C.):
162 Dillion Motion to Compel re Generations
165 Bay Cities Bank Opposition
166 Generations Community FCU Opposition
An excerpt:
Using the Heldt analysis, however, Plaintiffs’ logic can be used to assert a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction, because some of Defendants’ actions involved alleged tribal entities and/or tribal members.”). Operating against that backdrop, these courts mandated tribal exhaustion where the record did not establish (i) the nature of the payday lenders’ relationship to each other and/or the tribe; (ii) the unavailability of the specified tribal arbitral forum; and (iii) for purposes of the Western Sky agreement, (A) who constitutes an “authorized representative of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation” and (B) whether any such authorized representative “is a JAMS or AAA arbitrator,” Heldt, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 1193 (internal quotation marks omitted).See id. at 1184-87, 1190-93; see also Brown, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 480-81 (following Heldt).
As discussed below, Dillon bases his Requests and Motions to Compel in significant part on a need to develop a factual record sufficient to overcome the concerns in the Heldt line of cases. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 162 at 1-2; Docket Entry 162-2 at 4-6.).
We posted on this Rule 19 portion of this case here.
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