Frank Pommersheim to Speak at UND on United States v. Sioux Nation
Author: Matthew L.M. Fletcher
Seventh Circuit Rejects Arbitration of Tribal Sovereign Lending Dispute for Lack of Tribal Law at Time of Contract Formation
Ninth Circuit Briefs in Holl v. Avery & Native Village of Eklutna
SCOTUS Denies Cert in Flying T v. Stillaguamish
Here is today’s order list.
Cert stage materials in Flying T Ranch Inc. v. Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians here.
Washington State Bar Association Indian Law Section’s 38th Annual CLE, May 7-8, 2026
MSU ILPC Conference — Treaty Waters at Risk: Tribal Sovereignty and the Line 5 Challenge in the Great Lakes — April 17, 2026
Join us at MSU Law for Treaty Waters at Risk: Tribal Sovereignty and the Line 5 Challenge in the Great Lakes, a one-day conference on Friday, April 17, 2026, examining the legal and environmental stakes of energy infrastructure in treaty-protected waters.
Featuring a keynote by Whitney Gravelle, MSU Law and ILPC alumna and President of the Bay Mills Indian Community, the program brings together leading voices to discuss treaty rights, co-management, and the ongoing Line 5 conflicts at Bad River and the Straits of Mackinac.
Red Dress Project @ UMich
Land Acknowledgement Event at The Henry Ford
Marcia Zug on Custom
Marcia Ann Zug has posted “‘In My Defense, I Have None:’ Taylor Swift, Indian Law, And A Re-Examination Of Custom’s Inapplicability In The United States,” forthcoming in the Harvard Journal of Environmental Law, on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Traditions matter. They connect people with their past and provide a sense of identity and community in the present. When they disappear, the opposite occurs; individuals are left isolated and detached. The common law doctrine of custom was crafted to protect community customs and traditions, yet for centuries, American courts have repeatedly declared this doctrine inapplicable and irrelevant. This Article demonstrates that the inapplicability of customary law in the United States has been greatly exaggerated. More specifically, this Article shows it was a deliberate fabrication created to justify both the seizure of native lands and the commencement of the American Revolution. Acknowledging this shameful history, which includes the centuries-long erasure of native nations and the modern-day denial of tribal rights, demands the reexamination of the doctrine of custom, and its alleged inapplicability. This Article explores how and why custom was declared dead in America while also advocating for its revival. Custom defines who we are, and the doctrine of custom provides an essential framework for protecting the cultural practices that shape our collective identity. Safeguarding our customs-from what we eat, to where we play-is vitally important. Unfortunately, current methods of protection are limited and largely ineffective. Reviving customary law offers a potential solution that will benefit all Americans while also addressing the particular injustice of declaring native customs, and by extension, native people, irrelevant.
Grant Christensen on Indian Affairs Agency Deference Post-Chevron
Grand Christensen has posted “Indian Deference” forthcoming in the University of Chicago Law Review, on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The Supreme Court’s decision in Loper-Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024), formally retired Chevron deference. By rejecting the long-standing presumption that courts should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutes, Loper-Bright reshapes the relationship between the judiciary and the executive branch. Yet this shift poses unique challenges in the field of federal Indian law, where agency decisions have long been essential to the implementation of the federal government’s trust responsibility to Indian tribes. This Article argues that despite Loper-Bright’s general rejection of Chevron, federal courts are obligated to defer to federal agency decisions involving Indian tribes. This deference is a distinct, sui generis doctrine grounded in constitutional structure, history, and the unique status of tribal nations.
Federal Indian law has always occupied a special place in the constitutional order, one shaped by the trust relationship between the United States and tribal nations. When federal agencies act pursuant to statutes and treaties embodying that trust, their decisions do not merely interpret general administrative policy, they execute sovereign obligations owed to another Nation. Judicial deference in this context therefore protects not just agency expertise but also the political accountability of the elected branches, which are constitutionally charged with managing relations between the United States and tribes. The elimination of Chevron’s framework should not be read to eliminate this constitutionally anchored respect for the federal government’s political and moral commitments to tribal self-determination.
The implications are profound for federalism and for Indian law. Judicial deference to agency decisions in Indian affairs aligns with both Article III’s limits on judicial power and the federal government’s trust obligations. Judicial modesty in this arena reinforces the proper constitutional balance among the branches, ensuring that the courts do not displace the executive’s policy judgments or the legislature’s political commitments toward tribal nations. Recognizing the Indian deference doctrine honors the jurisprudential history of tribal-federal relations, safeguards tribal sovereignty, and preserves the integrity of federal Indian law.
Turtle Talk 
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