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2014 Associate Judge Tulalip Job Announcement
Here is the opinion in Rayellen Resources Inc. v. Lyons.
An excerpt:
We accepted certification from the Court of Appeals to review the decision of the New Mexico Cultural Properties Review Committee to recognize approximately 400,000 acres of public land on Mount Taylor as a registered cultural property under the New Mexico Cultural Properties Act. We affirm in part the Committee’s decision and hold that the Mount Taylor listing was lawful under the Cultural Properties Act and that the proceedings before the Committee did not violate the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We reverse the Committee’s inclusion of 19,000 acres of Cebolleta Land Grant property and hold that land grant property is not state land as defined in the Cultural Properties Act.
We posted on this case a while back here.
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Here are the materials in Belcourt Public School District v. Davis (D. N.D.):
19 Belcourt Motion for Summary J
And here is the opinion in Fort Yates Public School District #4 v. Murphy (D. N.D.):
We posted materials in this matter here.
Thomas M. Antkowiak has posted “Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Court,” forthcoming in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights handed down Sarayaku v. Ecuador, a crucial decision on indigenous rights. This Article considers how the Sarayaku judgment impacts the Court’s case law on indigenous lands and resources, and evaluates that jurisprudence as a whole. Examining the cases, it becomes evident that the Tribunal now connects a number of key indigenous rights to the right to property, Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights. When traditional lands are involved, the right to property has become the Court’s structural basis for indigenous rights.
For significant reasons, however, the right to property cannot serve as the conceptual stronghold for indigenous peoples’ survival and development. First, the Court’s approach limits the autonomy of indigenous peoples and their capacity for change. Second, the right to property inherently has difficulty providing even basic protection for ancestral lands because domestic and international law grants states wide latitude to interfere with property. Though the Court has attempted to create special ‘safeguards’ for indigenous lands and resources, they have proven inadequate.
In response, I urge a distinct way for the Court to conceptualize indigenous rights. The right to property must be subsumed by, and anchored to, a stronger configurative principle to defend indigenous peoples’ livelihood. Other human rights regimes offer the right to self-determination or specific minority protections that can safeguard indigenous rights. The relevant Inter-American legal instruments fail to establish such principles. As a result, I propose that a broad right-to-life concept, known as vida digna in the Court’s case law, serve as the new structural basis for an array of essential indigenous norms — including cultural integrity, nondiscrimination, lands and resources, social development, and self-government.
Here.
An excerpt:
There appears to be a lot of interest in a new kind of court in Washtenaw County.
More than 80 lawyers, mediators, and probation officers packed Judge Timothy Connors’ courtroom on Friday.
They were there for a six-hour education session on the Native American philosophy that guides the new peacemaking court.
The program was led by Tribal Council member and former Tribal Judge JoAnne Gasco and Court Peacemaker Paul Raphael from the Grand Traverse Band of Ottowa and Chippewa Indians.
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