Here is the petition:
Question presented:
Whether an insurance company doing business with a federally recognized American Indian Tribe is entitled to sovereign immunity for the acts and omission it takes in furtherance of the business of insurance.
Here is the petition:
Question presented:
Whether an insurance company doing business with a federally recognized American Indian Tribe is entitled to sovereign immunity for the acts and omission it takes in furtherance of the business of insurance.
Here are the updated materials in State of Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe (D. Idaho):
35 DCT Order Staying Proceedings
An excerpt:
The Court has before it Defendant Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 15) and Plaintiff the State of Idaho’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and for a Preliminary Injunction (Dkts. 3, 4). The Court previously stayed this lawsuit based on the Tribe’s argument that the parties had agreed to arbitrate this dispute. See June 23, 2014 Order, Dkt. 35. Afterward, the Tribe changed its mind and decided it would prefer to litigate. The Court will therefore address the pending motions. For the reasons expressed below, the Court will deny the Tribe’s motion to dismiss and grant the State’s motion for injunctive relief.
Here are the materials in Chamblin v. Greene (W.D. Wash.):
Here is the opinion in Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham. An excerpt:
The Thlopthlocco Tribal Town is a federally recognized Indian tribe in Oklahoma. An election dispute arose about which individuals were properly elected or appointed to govern the Thlopthlocco people. Seeking to resolve that dispute, the Tribal Town filed suit in the tribal court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and, accordingly, voluntarily submitted to that court’s jurisdiction.
The Tribal Town subsequently concluded it did not want to maintain its suit in tribal court and dismissed its claims. But the defendant in that suit had, by that time, filed cross-claims. Arguing that the Tribal Town’s sovereign immunity waiver did not cover proceedings on the cross-claims, the Tribal Town attempted to escape Muscogee court jurisdiction, but, in various decisions, several judges and justices of the Muscogee courts held that they may exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Town without its consent.
The Tribal Town then filed a federal action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against those Muscogee judicial officers, seeking to enjoin the Muscogee courts’ exercise of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, the Tribal Town had failed to join indispensable parties, and the Tribal Town had failed to exhaust its remedies in tribal court. We conclude, however, that the Tribal Town has presented a federal question and that the other claims do not require dismissal. But we agree the Tribal Town should exhaust its remedies in tribal court while its federal court action is abated.
Here are the briefs:
Lower court materials here.
Here are the new materials in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) (D. Mass.):
37 Aquinnah Community Association Motion to Intervene + Proposed Complaint
39 Town of Aquinnah Motion to Intervene
41 Wampanoag Opposition to Town Motion
42 Wampanoag Opposition to Community Association Motion
Here are the new materials in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) (D. Mass.):
37 Aquinnah Community Association Motion to Intervene + Proposed Complaint
39 Town of Aquinnah Motion to Intervene
41 Wampanoag Opposition to Town Motion
42 Wampanoag Opposition to Community Association Motion
Here are the materials in Burley v. OneWest Bank (E.D. Cal.):
14 Onewest Bank Response to Order to Show Cause
15 Burley Response to Order to Show Cause
Prior post with materials here.
Here is the opinion in White v. University of California.
From the court’s syllabus:
The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an action under the Native Graves Protection and Repatriation Act on the basis that the affected tribes and their representatives were indispensable parties and could not be joined in the action.
The action concerned the “La Jolla remains,” two human skeletons discovered during an archaeological excavation on the property of the Chancellor’s official residence at the University of California-San Diego. The tribes claimed the right to compel repatriation of the La Jolla remains to one of the Kumeyaay Nation’s member tribes. Repatriation was opposed by the plaintiffs, University of California professors who wished to study the remains. The professors sought a declaration that the remains were not “Native American” within the meaning of NAGPRA, which provides a framework for establishing ownership and control of newly discovered Native American remains and funerary objects, as well as cultural items already held by certain federally funded museums and educational institutions.
The panel held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring suit because if the La Jolla remains were repatriated,
the plaintiffs would suffer a concrete injury that was fairly traceable to the challenged action. In addition, this injury was likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.The panel held that NAGPRA does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity because Congress did not unequivocally express that purpose. The panel held that the “Repatriation Committee,” a tribal organization, was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity as an “arm of the tribe.” In addition, the Repatriation Committee did not waive its sovereign immunity by filing a separate lawsuit against the University or by incorporating under California law.
The panel held that the tribes and the Repatriation Committee were necessary parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1) and were indispensable under Rule 19(b). In addition, the “public rights” exception to Rule 19 did not apply. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the action.
Dissenting, Judge Murguia agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, that NAGPRA did not abrogate the sovereign immunity of the tribes, and that the Repatriation Committee was entitled to sovereign immunity. She would hold, however, that the Committee was not a necessary and indispensable party because it was neither necessary nor indispensable to resolution of the question whether the University properly determined that the La Jolla remains were Native American within the meaning of NAGPRA.
Briefs are here.
Here are the materials in In re Greektown Holdings LLC (E.D. Mich. Bkrcy.):
453 SSM Renewed Motion to Dismiss
An excerpt:
In sum, although Indian tribes have a “thumb on the interpretive scale” tending to tip the balance in their favor in the event of an ambiguity or lack of clarity, that does not come into play because, in this Court’s view, Congress sufficiently, clearly, and unequivocally intended to abrogate their sovereign immunity in the subject statute.
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