Here:
Mississippi Choctaw Cert Opposition
Cert petition here.
Here:
SB-104 CA Tribal Court Civil Money Judgement Act 08-22-2014
From the digest:
The existing Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act provides that foreign judgments that grant or deny recovery of a sum of money and that are final and conclusive are enforceable in California, with specified exceptions. The act includes within the definition of “foreign-country judgment” a judgment by any Indian tribe recognized by the government of the United States.
This bill would, until January 1, 2018, exempt Indian tribal judgments from the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, and would instead enact the Tribal Court Civil Money Judgment Act. The new act would likewise provide for the enforceability of tribal court money judgments in California, except as specified. The act would prescribe the procedure for applying for recognition and entry of a judgment based on a tribal court money judgment, the procedure and grounds for objecting to the entry of judgment, and the bases upon which the court may refuse to enter the judgment or grant a stay of enforcement. The bill would require the Judicial Council to prescribe a form for the notice of filing the application for recognition of the tribal court money judgment, as specified. The bill would require that this application be executed under penalty of perjury, which would expand the scope of the crime of perjury and thus impose a state-mandated local program. The bill would require the California Law Revision Commission to conduct a study of the standards for recognition of a tribal court or a foreign court judgment under the Tribal Court Civil Money Judgment Act and the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, and submit a report of its findings and recommendations to the Legislature and the Governor no later than January 1, 2017.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for
a specified reason.
Here are the materials in Maniilaq Association v. Burwell (D. D.C.):
17 Maniilaq Motion for Summary J
An excerpt:
Plaintiff Maniilaq Association (“Maniilaq” or “plaintiff”) administers healthcare systems through a self-determination compact and annual funding agreements under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDEAA”), 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa, et seq. Plaintiff is seeking a declaration that a lease with the Indian Health Service (“IHS” or “defendant”) for one of the clinics Maniilaq operates under its self-determination contract is incorporated into Maniilaq’s 2013 funding agreement as a matter of law. Pending before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment.1 For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. An appropriate Order accompanies this opinion.
Here is the opinion:
Based on these findings, we now conclude that the Plaintiffs’ action should not have been dismissed because the arbitral mechanism specified in the agreement is illusory. We also cannot accept the Loan Entities’ alternative argument for upholding the district court’s dismissal: that the loan documents require that any litigation be conducted by a tribal court on the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation. As the Supreme Court has explained, most recently in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008), tribal courts have a unique, limited jurisdiction that does not extend generally to the regulation of nontribal members whose actions do not implicate the sovereignty of the tribe or the regulation of tribal lands. The Loan Entities have not established a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction, and, therefore, exhaustion in tribal courts is not required. Accordingly, we cannot uphold the district court’s dismissal on this alternative basis.
Primary briefs here. Supplemental briefs here.
As should be expected by this time, payday lending in Indian country is creating bad law for tribal interests. This case involved a privately owned payday lending operation. Tribally-owned operations will be scrambling to distinguish themselves from this case. Particularly troublesome is the holding and (hopefully) dicta from the opinion that suggests tribal courts have no jurisdiction involving off-reservation lending operations, even though the operation is based in Indian country and even though the lending instrument includes a forum selection clause naming a tribal forum.
My initial recommendations to tribal leaders and counsel — shut down on-reservation-based payday lending operations operated privately immediately. My second recommendation is to ensure that tribal regulations of tribally owned payday lending operations are independent and robust. In other words, tribes must be able to withstand the kind of searching inquiry into their regulatory scheme that the federal court did in this case. Can tribal sovereign lenders say that?
According to Slate, anyway, in its article, “Don’t Believe the Anti-Government Tale Spun by This New Dinosaur Documentary.”
The doc is from the POV of a losing party in a famed Indian property case, Black Hills Institute v. South Dakota School of Mines and Technology.
An excerpt from the third and final opinion:
Black Hills Institute of Geological Research and Black Hills Museum of Natural History Foundation (collectively, “Black Hills”) appeal the district court’s1 judgment in favor of the United States. The district court found that the United States holds title to a valuable Tyrannosaurus rex skeleton (“the fossil” or “Sue”) in trust for Maurice Williams (“Williams”), an individual Indian who is the beneficial owner of trust land on which Black Hills discovered the fossil. Joseph M. Butler appeals separately from the district court’s order imposing Rule 11 sanctions on Butler for naming an improper party as a defendant. We affirm the district court’s judgment that the United States holds trust title to the fossil and reverse its Rule 11 order.
Here is the complaint in Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the Enterprise Rancheria v. California (E.D. Cal.):
An excerpt:
This is an action brought under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i), to compel Defendant the State of California (the “State” or “California”) to comply with IGRA’s requirement that it negotiate in good faith with Plaintiff Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the Enterprise Rancheria (“the Tribe”) for the purpose of entering into a tribal-state gaming compact pursuant to IGRA.
Here are the materials in In re Greektown Holdings LLC (E.D. Mich. Bkrcy.):
453 SSM Renewed Motion to Dismiss
An excerpt:
In sum, although Indian tribes have a “thumb on the interpretive scale” tending to tip the balance in their favor in the event of an ambiguity or lack of clarity, that does not come into play because, in this Court’s view, Congress sufficiently, clearly, and unequivocally intended to abrogate their sovereign immunity in the subject statute.
Here are the materials so far in Haeker v. United States Government (D. Mont.):
An excerpt:
Plaintiff Kurt Haeker (“Haeker”) seeks to partition his undivided fee interest in land within Indian Allotment 3316 on the Crow Indian Reservation. See Second Amend. Cmplt (ECF 19). The United States holds the legal title to the remaining undivided legal interest in trust for the benefit of several individual Indian allottees.
Pending is the United States’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF 20. Having considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, the Court makes the following findings and recommends that the motion be granted.
Here is the opinion.
An excerpt:
Washington State courts have jurisdiction over civil cases arising on Indian reservations as long as it does not infringe on the sovereignty of the tribe. At issue in this case is whether Washington State courts have jurisdiction over a civil case arising out of a contract in which the tribal corporation waived its sovereign immunity and consented to jurisdiction in Washington State courts. We hold that it does not infringe on the sovereignty of the tribe to honor its own corporation’s decision to enter into a contract providing for jurisdiction in Washington State courts.
Briefs and other materials here.
I urge readers to check out two papers by Kati Kovacs at Rutgers Law School. She formerly worked in DOJ ENRD. She just published Eagles, Indian Tribes, and the Free Exercise of Religion is available online, http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2863&context=llr, and has a forthcoming piece on Hobby Lobby and the Eagle Act, entitled Hobby Lobby and the Zero-Sum Game, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2484613.
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