Here are the materials in United States v. Washington subproceeding 17-1 (Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Squaxin Island Tribe of the Squaxin Island Reservation) (W.D. Wash.):
1-1 Skokomish Request for Determination
21 S’Klallam Tribes Motion to Dismiss
Here are the materials in United States v. Washington subproceeding 17-1 (Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Squaxin Island Tribe of the Squaxin Island Reservation) (W.D. Wash.):
1-1 Skokomish Request for Determination
21 S’Klallam Tribes Motion to Dismiss
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Here is the article noting the resignation.
Here is the opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Nash (D.D.C.).
More details tomorrow.
An excerpt:
The Court finds it confounding that the Cherokee Nation historically had no qualms about regarding freedmen as Cherokee “property” yet continues, even after 150 years, to balk when confronted with the legal imperative to treat them as Cherokee people. While the Cherokee Nation might persist in its design to perpetuate a moral injustice, this Court will not be complicit in the perpetuation of a legal injustice.
Here are the materials in Kialegee Tribal Town v. Dellinger (N.D. Okla.):
an excerpt:
The Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case because plaintiffs have not shown in their complaint that the Court would be required to resolve a substantial and disputed question of federal law. Plaintiffs’ complaint identifies an issue of federal law concerning the enforcement of IGRA by an Indian tribe, but plaintiffs have not adequately alleged facts supporting even an inference that the MCN was seeking to enforce IGRA. Dellinger’s letter strongly supports the conclusion that the MCN was seeking to enforce its own laws when it took possession of the Bruner allotment. The law is clearly established that federal courts lack the authority to resolve disputes over tribal law, and such disputes fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of tribal courts. Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Mississippi in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 943 (8th Cir. 2010); Wheeler v. United States Dep’t of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 811 F.2d 549, 551-52 (10th Cir. 1987). The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear matters solely concerning the interpretation of tribal law, and plaintiffs must litigate their case in tribal court to the extent that plaintiffs’ contest the enforcement of tribal gaming laws. As the parties seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this court, plaintiffs bear the burden to establish that “federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. of State of California, 463 U.S. at 27-28. Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden, and this case should be dismissed.
Here:
Questions presented:
1. Whether a tribe that opted out of the Indian Reorganization Act can have its status under the Act revived under the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2202, even though the United States did not hold land in trust for that tribe at the time the tribe sought a land-in-trust acquisition.
2. Whether the land-in-trust provision of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 5108, exceeds Congress’ authority under the Indian Commerce Clause, Art. I, § S, cl. 3.
3. Whether § 5108’s standardless delegation of authority to acquire land “for Indians” is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
4. Whether the federal government’s control over state land must be categorically exclusive for the Enclave Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, to prohibit the removal of that land from state jurisdiction.
Here is the order in Crist v. Nix (D.N.M.):
An excerpt:
Last, Crist also names the Sandia Pueblo Police Department as a Defendant. The Sandia Pueblo Police Department is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is no remedy against the Sandia Pueblo Police Department under § 1983 and the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief against the Sandia Pueblo Police Department Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63–64 (1989). In addition, although the Court does not reach the question, an issue exists as to whether Sandia Pueblo Tribal police officers act under color of state law and are subject to liability under § 1983. Compare Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1174 (10th Cir. 2006) (tribal officers act under color of tribal law, not state law) and Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1348–49 (9th Cir. 1989) (tribal officials acting in concert with state officials act under color of state law).
Here (PDF):

Here are the materials in Quinault Indian Nation v. Pearson.
The court’s syllabus:
In an action brought by the Quinault Indian Nation alleging a scheme to defraud the Nation of cigarette taxes, the panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of counterclaims as barred by the Nation’s sovereign immunity.
The panel held that if brought in a separate suit against the Nation, the counterclaims would be barred by sovereign immunity. Asserting the claims as counterclaims did not change the sovereign-immunity analysis. The panel concluded that the Nation did not waive its sovereign immunity because it filed the underlying suit but took no further action that unequivocally waived its immunity to the counterclaims, and the counterclaims did not qualify as claims for recoupment.
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