Here are the briefs in Columbe v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe:
Lower court materials here.
Here are the briefs in Columbe v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe:
Lower court materials here.
Here.
This is an action by plaintiff State of Wisconsin (“the State”) pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d), to enjoin certain Class III gaming activities being conducted by defendant Ho-Chunk Nation (“the Nation”) at its DeJope facility in violation of the tribal-state Class III gaming compact between the parties.
Here are the materials:
Wyandotte Motion for Summary J
An excerpt:
Plaintiff Wyandotte Nation, a federally recognized Indian tribe (“the Nation”), filed this lawsuit against Kenneth Salazar, Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior (“the Secretary”), seeking an order from this Court compelling the Secretary to accept title to certain land and hold it in trust for the Nation’s benefit, as specifically required by Public Law 98-602, 98 Stat. 3149 (1984) (“P.L. 98-602”), under both the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(a) and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The State of Kansas (“the State”) was permitted to intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).1 This matter is before the Court on the Nation’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 60) and the Secretary and State’s cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. 66, 69). The Court heard oral arguments on March 14, 2013, at which time the Secretary was directed to supplement the Administrative Record and the matter was taken under advisement. For the reasons explained in detail below, the Court denies the Nation’s motion and grants in part and denies in part the Secretary and the State’s cross- motions, retaining jurisdiction over the case until the agency issues a final decision on the Nation’s pending land-into-trust application.
Prior posts on this case here, here, and here.
Here are the updated materials in State of Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority (M.D. Ala.):
PBCI Notice of Removal + Exhibits
Prior post here.
News coverage here.
Here is the complaint in Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Stevens (D. D.C.):
An excerpt:
This is a civil action against the United States National Indian Gaming Commission and its officials (collectively, the “Chairwoman,” the “Commission,” the “NIGC,” or “Defendants”) under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, et seq. and 701, et seq., seeking mandamus and related relief compelling the Commission to comply with its statutory duty to approve and publish gaming ordinance amendments submitted by the Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians (“Tribe”).
Here is the order and related materials in Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon v. Salazar (D. D.C.):
Clark County et al Motion for Summary J
Interior Opposition to Summary J Motion
Interior Revised Cowlitz Initial Reservation Opinion
Clark County et al Opposition to Remand Motion
Clark County et al Motion to Strike
Interior Opposition to Motion to Strike
Clark County et al Reply in Support of Motion to Strike
Excerpt from Judge Rothstein’s opinion:
Nor can the Federal Defendants supplement the administrative record with the 2012 Revised Initial Reservation Decision. It is black letter law that the record to be considered by this Court “consists of the administrative record compiled by the agency in advance of litigation, not any record thereafter constructed in the reviewing court.” AT&T Info. Sys. Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 810 F.2d 1233, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (rejecting agency’s attempt to submit a litigation affidavit as a post hoc rationalization of the agency’s action); see also, Center for Auto Safety v. Federal Highway Admin., 956 F.2d 309, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting agency’s rationale as post hoc rationalization not included in administrative record); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539-40 (1981) (“[P]ost hoc rationalization of the agency or the parties to this litigation cannot serve as a sufficient predicate for agency action”). Accordingly, the Federal Defendants cannot “incorporate” a 2012 explanation into a 2010 ROD by characterizing it as a “Supplemental Record of Decision.”
However, the Court is now in a conundrum. The Court notes that Plaintiffs opposed the Federal Defendants’ motion to remand, yet remand is the relief that they sought on the initial reservation determination because the agency had failed to provide a “reasoned explanation for his decision.” The Secretary has now provided such a reasoned explanation. Plaintiffs again oppose remand and ask the Court to strike the Supplemental ROD. If the Court were to grant Plaintiffs’ request, the parties would be litigating the 2010 Initial Reservation Determination, a determination that has been withdrawn and superceded. The Court will not waste its or the parties’ resources on such a fruitless endeavor. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998) (“[Federal courts] are not in the business of pronouncing that past actions which have no demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong”). The Court is also cognizant of the fact that the parties have been locked in this battle for nearly eleven years. (TR at 13.). However, the APA requires that the Federal Defendants conform to its dictates, disallowing amendments to a final decision once a case has been filed in district court. Accordingly, the Court will remand this action to the agency with instructions to rescind the 2010 ROD. Since this is a case where the agency has already reconsidered and revised its final decision and since the parties represent to the Court that the agency is not required to provide public notice under IGRA (which is the only portion of the 2010 ROD being supplemented), the Court will require the agency to issue a new decision of record within sixty (60) days of the date of this order, unless good cause is shown why it cannot do so. See Fulton v. FPC, 512 F.2d 947, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
News coverage here.
Here is a study of the effects of gaming per capita payments on tribal members of three Michigan tribes (Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe, and Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians). In line with the 1491s’ hilarious video in which a candidate for tribal office runs on the platform of “progression, procreation, per cap,” the study suggests that tribal members receiving per caps leads to “decreased work efforts,” while “weak” evidence exists that per cap payments increase fertility. Enjoy.
Here is the study:
The abstract:
The purpose of this research is to provide a preliminary examination of the effects of per capita tribal payments on the decision making of tribal members. Standard microeconomic theory suggests that unearned income changes the labor-leisure tradeoff in utility maximization models. While the results of per capita payments on hours of work can be easily anticipated, the effects of these payments on human capital accumulation and family size are more ambiguous. Using Census data from 1990 and 2000 we shed some light on the impact of these per capita tribal payments on the lives of the recipients. We concentrate on three tribes in the state of Michigan: the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe, the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, and the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians of Michigan. The results lend support to the basic labor theory conclusion that an increase in nonlabor income causes individuals to decrease their work efforts. There is also weak evidence that the payment of per capita payments from casino profits is increasing the fertility rate of Saginaw Chippewa tribal families.
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