Here are the materials in State of Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (W.D. Mich.):
55 State Response to Motion to Dismiss
58 Soo Tribe Response to Motion for Relief
63 DCT Order to Adjourn and Reschedule Oral Argument
Sixth Circuit materials are here.
Here are the materials in Lujen Brands LLC v. Seminole Tribe of Florida Inc. (S.D. Fla.):
DCT paperless order:
ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc., Mike Ulizio, and Chris Osceola’s (STOFI Defendants) 14 Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction; DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE the STOFI Defendants’ 31 Motion for Scheduling Conference; and GRANTING Plaintiff’s 32 Motion to Compel Initial Disclosures. On May 2, 2014, the STOFI Defendants filed a 14 Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that they are immune from suit by virtue of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. In its 15 Response, Plaintiff requested jurisdictional discovery. It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff shall have forty-five (45) days to conduct jurisdictional discovery narrowly tailored to the subject-matter jurisdiction issue implicated by the STOFI Defendants’ 14 Motion to Dismiss. Discovery may not stray to merits issues. The Parties are directed to confer and cooperate in good faith in determining the logistics of the discovery. After the forty-five (45) day jurisdictional discovery period, the STOFI Defendants may, if they choose, refile their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that all parties shall proceed to merits discovery at the conclusion of the forty-five (45) day jurisdictional discovery period. This entry constitutes the ENDORSED ORDER in its entirety. Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 8/22/2014. (jn) (Entered: 08/22/2014)
38 STOFI Motion for Reconsideration
DCT Order:
ORDER GRANTING Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc. (STOFI), Mike Ulizio, and Chris Osceola’s (STOFI Defendants) 38 Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s August 22, 2014 Paperless Order. In their Motion, the STOFI Defendants argue that the Court’s August 22, 2014 Order (D.E. 33) implies that if they were to re-file their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity grounds at the close of jurisdictional discovery, they would nevertheless have to participate in merits discovery before the Court issued a ruling on the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. (See D.E. 38 at 2). The STOFI Defendants further argue that if the Court were to order them to engage in merits discovery prior to resolution of the issue of sovereign immunity, the Court would be infringing on their tribal sovereign immunity and that such an order would constitute error. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts no argument on this issue in its Response. (See D.E. 46). The Court is permitted to resolve the issue of sovereign immunity before allowing discovery. See Caraballo-Sandoval v. Honsted, 35 F.3d 521, 524 (11th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, at the close of jurisdictional discovery, should the STOFI Defendants re-file their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity grounds, the Court will stay this action as to the STOFI Defendants pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.
The STOFI Defendants also argue in their Motion that the Court should more precisely define the boundaries of jurisdictional discovery. In its August 22, 2014 Order, the Court stated that “jurisdictional discovery [shall be] narrowly tailored to the subject-matter jurisdiction issue implicated by the STOFI Defendants’ [May 2, 2014] Motion to Dismiss. Discovery may not stray to merits issues.” (D.E. 33). STOFI argues that, because it has sovereign immunity unless it waives such immunity in its Charter or by contract, the only proper jurisdictional discovery against it concerning sovereign immunity goes to waiver, not to whether it is a subordinate economic entity of the Seminole Tribe of Florida. (See D.E. 38 at 8). The Court agrees. In accordance with binding precedent, STOFI is entitled to sovereign immunity unless and until it waives such immunity. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank of W. Hollywood, 361 F.2d 517, 520-22 (5th Cir. 1966); see also Inglish Interests, LLC v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc., No. 2:10cv367FtM29DNF, 2011 WL 208289, at *5-6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2011). Accordingly, it is ORDERED that jurisdictional discovery regarding STOFI is limited to the issue of whether STOFI waived sovereign immunity. Jurisdictional discovery shall not be permitted on the issue of whether STOFI is a subordinate economic entity of the Seminole Tribe of Florida, because, in the Eleventh Circuit, that issue is irrelevant with respect to whether STOFI has sovereign immunity. See Maryland Cas. Co., 361 F.2d at 520-22. Jurisdictional discovery shall be permitted on the issue of whether Ulizio and Osceola are also entitled to sovereign immunity.
It is further ORDERED that the forty-five day jurisdictional discovery period is to begin from the date of this order, as requested by the parties. Accordingly, the parties shall have until and including November 3, 2014, to complete jurisdictional discovery. This entry constitutes the ENDORSED ORDER in its entirety.
Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 9/18/2014. (jn) (Entered: 09/18/2014)
Here are the materials in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Cypress (S.D. Fla.):
408 Miccosukee Motion to Disqualify Judge
410 Lewis & Tein Opposition to 408
411 Lehtinen Opposition to 408
416 Miccosukee Reply in Support of 408
417 Order Denying Motion to Disqualify
A large part of the case is pending before the CA11. We posted on the lower court materials here (denial of tribe motion to reconsider), here (tribe motion to reconsider), and here (granting motion to dismiss).
Here is the opening brief in Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians:
Here are some excerpts:
Because Indian tribes are sovereigns preexisting the United States and its Constitution, they may be sued only where the tribe or Congress unequivocally expresses consent to suit. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 58-59 (1978). Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has admonished that the federal courts may not “carv[e] out exceptions” to the broad protections sovereign immunity provides federally recognized tribal governments. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014). In this case, the district court did precisely that. . . . [T]he court reasoned that, because the Tribe could have chosen to raise its tribal sovereign immunity defense in state court, the Tribe’s choice to raise the defense in federal court waived it. Specifically, the court concluded the Tribe had “no principled reason” to remove the federal claims filed against it to federal court, and that, by virtue of the removal, the Tribe lost its right to assert its sovereign immunity to the lawsuit, at all. . . . No law authorized the district court to imply a waiver on this basis, and in fact, the very notion that a Tribe can waive its immunity by implication contradicts well established principles of federal Indian law governing sovereign immunity. It also contradicts the only federal appellate court decision to address the issue of whether an Indian tribe’s removal of a case to federal court waives the Tribe’s immunity to suit. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal specifically held it does not. Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 692 F.3d 1200, 1208 (11th Cir. 2012).
***
Apart from the dissonance between a rule that finds waiver of immunity from a tribe’s removal of a suit in which it is an involuntary participant, while preserving immunity where the tribe itself voluntarily files suit, the district court’s rule would incentivize litigation, unduly burdening both Indian tribes and federal courts alike. Under the district court’s rule, an Indian tribe with any reason (even remotely) to anticipate suit on a federal claim would be incentivized to file preemptive suit in federal court, hoping to beat the prospective state court plaintiff to the courthouse. This would result in a groundswell of preemptive federal court litigation by Indian tribes, requiring federal courts, in many instances, to expend their limited judicial resources issuing declarations on matters that would not have otherwise coalesced into litigation. There is certainly no “principled reason” to impose this burden on Indian tribes and federal courts by manufacturing an arbitrary distinction between cases Indian tribes file in federal court seeking a declaration as to their sovereign rights, on one hand, and cases Indian tribes remove to federal court to assert a sovereign immunity defense, on the other.
Lower court materials here.
Here are the materials in State of New Mexico v. Dept. of Interior (D. N.M.):
37 Interior Motion for Summary J
39 New Mexico Motion for Summary J
An excerpt:
Plaintiff State of New Mexico challenges the Department of the Interior and the Secretary of the Interior’s legal authority to implement regulations found in 25 C.F.R. § 291 (“Secretarial Procedures” or “Part 291 regulations”). The Secretarial Procedures, if adopted, would allow the Pueblo of Pojoaque to conduct Class III gaming on its reservation. New Mexico asks this Court to declare the Secretarial Procedures invalid because they conflict with the unambiguous terms of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. and violate New Mexico’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Here:
Question presented:
This Court has an established jurisprudence recognizing Indian sovereign immunity, and defining its scope. The Court also has an established jurisprudence on what actions will work a waiver of immunity.
This Court, however, has never decided the issue of what needs to be shown to establish authority for waiver of Indian sovereign immunity, nor whether apparent authority can be sufficient to do so. Lower courts have done so, and are split on the question of the availability of apparent authority. E.g. Rush Creek Solutions, Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402 (Colo. App. 2004) (apparent authority appropriately invoked); Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Industries, Inc., 585 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2009) (prohibiting use of apparent authority).
The question presented is whether the authority of a tribal official who signs a waiver of sovereign immunity may be established under the doctrine of apparent authority.
Lower court materials here.
Here are the materials in Johnson v. Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma (D. Kan.):
An excerpt:
Plaintiff brings this personal injury action against the Wyandotte Nation for injuries she sustained when she fell down a flight of stairs at the 7th Street Casino, which is located on land held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Wyandotte Nation. This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6). Defendant argues that the Court must dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit because defendant, a federally recognized Indian tribe, is immune from unconsented suit and, therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).1 After considering the arguments made by both parties, the Court grants defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
Here are the new materials in State of Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (W.D. Tex.):
431 Pueblo Response to Motion for Contempt
468 Pueblo Motion for Summary J
469 Texas Opposition to Motion for Summary J
470 Pueblo Reply in Support of Motion for Summary J
473 Texas Opposition to Motion to Exclude
477 Pueblo Reply in Support of motion to Exclude
News coverage on the show cause hearing here.
Here are the materials in Estate of Gonzales ex rel. Gonzales v. Brown (N.D. Okla.):
Turtle Talk 
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