Here:

Here is the petition in Flying T Ranch Inc. v. Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians:
Question presented:
Under the immovable-property rule, may a party sue an Indian tribe, without the latter’s consent, in a State court to quiet title to real property located in that State but which is not within the boundaries of the tribe’s reservation and is not held in trust by the United States?
Lower court materials here.

Here:
Questions presented:
1. Whether the Indian Commerce Clause preempts state regulation of loans made on an Indian reservation, by an arm of a tribe, when the borrower contracts via the internet.
2. Whether a violation of the unlawful debt prohibition of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, requires scienter for civil liability.
Lower court materials here.

Here is the order list.
Case tag for Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan is here.
Case tag for Alaska v. United States is here.

Here is today’s order list, with an opinion by Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Thomas) dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Veneno v. United States:
Briefs:
Petition for Certiorari – Veneno
This is hardly a surprise given that both judges were critical of the Kagama decision. One presumes they come at this issue with a far different eye toward the outcome. Justice Thomas dissented in Brackeen because he found little constitutional text authorizing Congress’ Indian affairs powers. Thomas has seemingly sought an endgame to Indian affairs by attacking Congressional powers and tribal sovereignty. Justice Gorsuch found plenty of Congressional Indian affairs power in the text and structure of the Constitution, but not “plenary power” as described by the Kagama Court. His views are seemingly more in line with scholars like Bob Clinton, who saw no Congressional power to regulate the internal governance of tribal nations.
Certainly on a superficial level, who can really like Kagama? After all, the Court’s characterization of Indian people is unbelievably racist. It’s formalistic reading of the Constitution is also pretty . . . well, formalistic. There are important things in Kagama though, such as the notion that Congress possesses at least some powers by virtue of the duty of protection. Kagama is largely a dead letter anyway, since the Court has essentially already adopted Justice Gorsuch’s view of Congressional powers (e.g., Negonsott v. Samuels and U.S. v. Lara).
If these judges get their way and the Court eventually accepts a vehicle to review Kagama, for judges like Gorsuch, it might be merely housecleaning, but for judges like Thomas, it’s a potential revolution. There is ever-present the conflict between a formalist (Thomas) and a functionalist (Gorsuch) reading of the Constitutional text. I will continue to worry if the Court decides it needs to address Kagama if that’s the framing. It would be odd if the Court decided it needed a case to clean up its jurisprudential mess — full employment for Indian law profs!!! — where the law is settled.
More worryingly (perhaps?), the vehicle to reassess Kagama can only really be a federal criminal case. A vehicle like that will not be a good one to set the boundaries of Congressional authority over tribal nations, but instead a vehicle for revisiting Brackeen’s Congressional powers holding.
In the end, it’s just these two, so don’t hold your breath.
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