Here is the opinion in Tsosie v. Deschene:
We posted on this issue here.
Here is the opinion in Tsosie v. Deschene:
We posted on this issue here.
Here is the opinion in EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co.:
The syllabus:
The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with respect to its claim that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited the tribal hiring preference contained in Peabody Western Coal Co. leases with the Navajo Nation.
The panel held that the Navajo hiring preference in the leases was a political classification, rather than a classification based on national origin, and therefore did not violate Title VII. The panel concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to defendants Peabody Western Coal Company and Navajo Nation, and third-party defendant Secretary of the Interior. The panel also held that the EEOC waived on appeal its record-keeping claim. Finally, the panel held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the EEOC’s eleventh-hour motion to supplement the record with a declaration and documents about Peabody’s hiring practices in 1999.
Elizabeth Kronk Warner has posted “Justice Brandeis and Indian Country: Lessons from the Tribal Environmental Laboratory” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Justice Brandeis first famously wrote of a system of federalism where states would serve as laboratories of regulatory experimentation, allowing other states and the federal government to benefit from successful regulatory experiments. Although likely beyond the contemplation of Brandeis, tribes, as separate sovereigns existing within the United States, are well-placed to experiment in new and interesting ways. In particular, given their unique connection to the land and the intensified threat of some modern environmental challenges, many tribes are already engaged in regulatory innovation related to environmental law. This is the first scholarly work to fully develop the idea of tribes as “laboratories” for examining environmental law, demonstrating that tribal experimentation can generate the same benefits typically ascribed to the system of federalism. This is also the first article to examine how tribes are already innovating in areas of environmental law outside of tribal codes. The article begins with an examination of federalism and the benefits, such as states as laboratories, typically attributed to the system of federalism. Having provided an introduction, the article then explains how federalism itself is not required to achieve the benefits associated with it, arguing that tribal regulatory experimentation can yield similar results. Next, the article establishes the modern-day need for environmental regulatory experimentation given the lack of innovation occurring at the federal level. And, finally, the article takes a deep look into forms of tribal environmental law related to the regulation of environmental pollution and climate change other than code provisions. Such an examination is particularly helpful given the potential for governments to use such legal tools to fill existing regulatory gaps and the ease with which innovations in this field can be diffused amongst other governments. Having considered these other forms of tribal environmental laws, the article then develops some initial thoughts of how tribes, the states and the federal government may benefit from innovations occurring within the tribal environmental laboratory. Tribal environmental law is particularly exciting given its ability to transcend federal and state environmental law. This section of the article then ends with a call for additional tribal environmental innovation within this area. Ultimately, the article concludes that, by enacting environmental laws to meet their unique tribal needs, many tribes are creating and innovating in the field under their unique powers as separate sovereigns within the United States.
Here is the opinion in Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham. An excerpt:
The Thlopthlocco Tribal Town is a federally recognized Indian tribe in Oklahoma. An election dispute arose about which individuals were properly elected or appointed to govern the Thlopthlocco people. Seeking to resolve that dispute, the Tribal Town filed suit in the tribal court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and, accordingly, voluntarily submitted to that court’s jurisdiction.
The Tribal Town subsequently concluded it did not want to maintain its suit in tribal court and dismissed its claims. But the defendant in that suit had, by that time, filed cross-claims. Arguing that the Tribal Town’s sovereign immunity waiver did not cover proceedings on the cross-claims, the Tribal Town attempted to escape Muscogee court jurisdiction, but, in various decisions, several judges and justices of the Muscogee courts held that they may exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Town without its consent.
The Tribal Town then filed a federal action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against those Muscogee judicial officers, seeking to enjoin the Muscogee courts’ exercise of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, the Tribal Town had failed to join indispensable parties, and the Tribal Town had failed to exhaust its remedies in tribal court. We conclude, however, that the Tribal Town has presented a federal question and that the other claims do not require dismissal. But we agree the Tribal Town should exhaust its remedies in tribal court while its federal court action is abated.
Here are the briefs:
Lower court materials here.
I’m beginning research on tribal gun laws. If you would like to help, please email any information you have on tribal laws regulating guns or protecting gun rights, such as a copy of the law or information on legislative history, to me at tribalgunrights@comcast.net. I’m particularly interested in efforts to curb gun violence through regulation, especially laws enacted in response to mass shootings, and also in whether any tribes have stand-your-ground laws. But all tribal laws pertaining to guns are of interest to me. You can find my earlier work on tribes and the Second Amendment here.
Here is the opinion:
Based on these findings, we now conclude that the Plaintiffs’ action should not have been dismissed because the arbitral mechanism specified in the agreement is illusory. We also cannot accept the Loan Entities’ alternative argument for upholding the district court’s dismissal: that the loan documents require that any litigation be conducted by a tribal court on the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation. As the Supreme Court has explained, most recently in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008), tribal courts have a unique, limited jurisdiction that does not extend generally to the regulation of nontribal members whose actions do not implicate the sovereignty of the tribe or the regulation of tribal lands. The Loan Entities have not established a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction, and, therefore, exhaustion in tribal courts is not required. Accordingly, we cannot uphold the district court’s dismissal on this alternative basis.
Primary briefs here. Supplemental briefs here.
As should be expected by this time, payday lending in Indian country is creating bad law for tribal interests. This case involved a privately owned payday lending operation. Tribally-owned operations will be scrambling to distinguish themselves from this case. Particularly troublesome is the holding and (hopefully) dicta from the opinion that suggests tribal courts have no jurisdiction involving off-reservation lending operations, even though the operation is based in Indian country and even though the lending instrument includes a forum selection clause naming a tribal forum.
My initial recommendations to tribal leaders and counsel — shut down on-reservation-based payday lending operations operated privately immediately. My second recommendation is to ensure that tribal regulations of tribally owned payday lending operations are independent and robust. In other words, tribes must be able to withstand the kind of searching inquiry into their regulatory scheme that the federal court did in this case. Can tribal sovereign lenders say that?
Here is the opinion in Chavez v. Morongo Casino Resort & Spa:
Here is the news article, “KBIC moves tribal court.”
Here is the new report, “Judges suspended by Tribal Council following KBIC civil lawsuit hearing.”
Note that the tribal judicial code treats the judiciary as a branch of government on par with the legislative and executive branches.
You must be logged in to post a comment.