Grant Christensen on ICRA and Banishment

Grant Christensen has posted “Civil Rights Notes: American Indians and Banishment, Jury Trials, and the Doctrine of Lenity,” forthcoming in the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal.

The syllabus:

Indian defendants appearing before tribal courts are not protected by the Bill of Rights. Instead, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968 to extend some, but not all, constitutional protections unto Indian reservations. Fifty years later and there continues to be extensive litigation surrounding ICRA.

This paper looks at all of the ICRA cases decided in 2017 to attempt to evaluate the merits of ICRA’s protections of tribal rights. The picture is decidedly mixed. From these cases the paper calls for three changes that directly respond to trends in civil rights litigation. 1) The paper suggests that courts expand the understanding of habeas jurisdiction to extend when an individual has been banished. It argues that banishment is a form of confinement and a restriction of liberty – albeit one where the jail cell is large, essentially the world minus the reservation. 2) Tribes must adopt codes that provide for a trial by jury and rules for determining who constitutes the jury and how it may be empaneled. While ICRA provides for a trial by jury, tribal courts have an affirmative duty to inform defendants of their right to request a jury trial. It is a violation of ICRA if the tribe does not make provisions for a jury when requested. 3) Finally tribal court judgments, when used in other forums, may be ambiguous because tribal law and tribal procedures are distinct from those followed by states or the federal system. Accordingly, any ambiguity that arises in response to a tribal court judgment should be resolved with a reference to the doctrine of lenity.

Washington Supreme Court Visits Tribal Land For Public Outreach, To Hear Cases

Here.

GTB Tribal Court RFP

Here:

Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa

Tenth Circuit Rejects ICRA Claims against Ute Tribe

Here is the unpublished opinion in Oviatt v. Reynolds.

Briefs:

opening brief

response brief

reply

Washington State Attorney General Opinion Requested on Enforcing Out of State & Tribal Protective Orders

Comments are open. Here’s the info.

Federal Court Holds Utah State Court Has Jurisdiction over Contract Dispute with Former Ute Tribe Contractor

Here are the materials in Ute Indian Tribe v. Lawrence (D. Utah):

52 motion for partial sj

53 motion for partial sj

54 emergency motion

95 becker opposition to emergency motion

101 reply

136 dct order

Tenth Circuit materials here.

Federal Magistrate Recommends Granting ICRA Habeas Petition of Kewa Pueblo Prisoner [Van Pelt III]

Here are the materials in Van Pelt III v. Geisen (D.N.M.):

1 Habeas Petition

2 Amended Petition

18 Answer

19 Motion to Release

25 Tribe Brief

33 Magistrate Report

Federal Magistrate Recommends Granting ICRA Habeas Petition of Kewa Pueblo Prisoner [Tortalita]

Here are the materials in Tortalita v. Geisen (D.N.M.):

1 Habeas Petition

7 Motion to Release

24 Tribe Brief

33 Magistrate Report

Federal Magistrate Recommends Granting ICRA Habeas Petition of Kewa Pueblo Prisoner [Garcia]

Here are the materials in Garcia v. Geisen (D.N.M.):

1 Habeas Petition

15 Motion for Release

27 Tribe Brief

36 Magistrate Report

ILADA Blog [McGill Law]: Seasonal Thematic Contributions by Indigenous Legal Scholars

Here:

Season 1:  Law Through Language (2018)

Our first season focuses on language as law: within the context of language revitalization, how do Indigenous laws pronounce themselves through language? How can Indigenous laws be strengthened, given the impact of colonialism on Indigenous languages? And can the changes required to revitalize—funds, experts, and the privileging of resources—create additional inequities? This season seeks to answer these questions among others.

This season aims first and foremost to address the crucial relationship between language and law: in particular, the role Indigenous languages play in articulating Indigenous laws. Writing about the Navajo people, Anishinaabe scholar Matthew Fletcher emphasizes, “for many tribal communities, the law is encoded right into the language – and the stories generated from the language.”1 Because most Indigenous communities historically expressed (and continually express) their customs and laws orally, this statement applies to Indigenous groups broadly.2 This season features contributors who explore expressions of law and answer questions about how language deepens and complicates protocols, interpretations and worldviews.

We recognize inherent challenges in this exercise: communities experience “law” in different forms and may not identify practices and behaviours as law in the same way that they are identified in Western legal normativity. What one group claims as “law” may be something entirely different to another; and not everything is translatable into English or French—nor should it be. As John Borrows stated, “context should not be stripped from the practice of Indigenous law.”3 Often, that context is language. Our contributors this season help to tease out how Indigenous languages limit and liberate, stymie and enable, and generally complicate the articulation of Indigenous law.

 

The State of Canada’s Indigenous Languages by Katsi’tsakwas Ellen Gabriel

Indonaakonigewininaan – Toward an Anishinaabe Common Law by Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Language and Anishinaabe Consultation Law by John Borrows


1 Matthew Fletcher, “Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence” (2007) 13 Mich J Race & L 57 at 21.

2 Ibid at 41, “Indian cultures (often) were and are oral cultures.”

3 Borrows, John, “Foreword: Indigenous Law, Lands, and Literature,” (2016) 33 Windsor YB Access to Just v at ix.