Here.
Briefs here.
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss in Rosebud and Oglala National Voter Registration Act Lawsuit
Here is the Order Denying South Dakota’s Motion to Dismiss Rosebud and Oglala’s Complaint that South Dakota is failing to comply with the National Voter Registration Act.
doc.-115-memorandom-and-order-denying-defs-motion-to-dismiss-rst-v-barnett0-2022.05.17-00234861x105fe6Download
Here is the Amended Complaint.
Previous post on this issue here.
Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Lyman County Board of Commissioners
Here is the complaint in Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, et al., v. Lyman County.
And here is the release on the litigation.
“Through this lawsuit we’re insisting Lyman County hold elections with a fairly drawn map in 2022,” said plaintiff, voter, and Lower Brule Sioux Tribe Vice Chairman Neil Russell.
The Lower Brule Sioux Tribe and three enrolled members filed the lawsuit to prevent Lyman County from continuing to violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act until 2026. “Like every other county already using new election district maps adopted after the 2020 Census in 2022, Lyman County must comply with the Voting Rights Act and implement the revised district map immediately,” said Native American Rights Fund (NARF) Staff Attorney Samantha Kelty. “Lyman County cannot continue to disenfranchise voters who live on the Lower Brule Sioux Reservation until 2026.”
Federal Claims Court Dismisses Takings Claim Brought by Neighbor to Cherokee Casino
Here are the materials in Berry v. United States (Fed. Cl.):
Wisconsin Federal Court Dismisses False Claims Act Suit brought by Former LCO Employee
Here are the materials in Mestek v. Lac Courte Oreilles Community Health Center (W.D. Wis.):
Duwamish Sues for Federal Recognition
Amnesty Report on Continued Failure to Protect Indigenous Women from Violence in the USA
Here is “The Never-Ending Maze: Continued Failure to Protect Indigenous Women from Sexual Violence in the USA.” Full report.
Original report here.
Minnesota Court of Appeals on Reason to Know: How to Write an Opinion On This [ICWA]
All the Courts of Appeals facing the question of reason to know should just go read this one (I’m looking at you, Colorado).
In this case the court ordered another investigation to ensure the children were not Indian children, and this bothered the state So Much that it asked for a writ of prohibition to avoid the order. The Court is pretty clear that the lower court has the power to order an investigation and dismisses the state’s argument that the lower court didn’t have “reason to know” in one succinct paragraph.
Finally, we reject the county’s assertion that the district court erroneously replaced the reason–to–know standard with a lower standard: that the children “might” be Indian children. “[R]eason to know” is “[i]nformation from which a person of ordinary intelligence . . . would infer that the fact in question exists or that there is a substantial enough chance of its existence that, if the person exercises reasonable care, the person can assume the fact exists.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1520 (11th ed. 2019). The word “might” means “to express possibility.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 1219 (2d ed. 1987). There is significant overlap between when a court “has reason to know” that a child is an Indian child and when there is a “possibility” that a child is an Indian child. On this record, we cannot say that the district court applied an incorrect standard. Moreover, as noted, even if a court has something less than a reason to know that a child is an Indian child, the court may nevertheless “choose to require additional investigation into whether there is a “reason to know” the child is an Indian child.” ICWA Guidelines, supra, at 11
Iowa Supreme Court Decision on Notice and Indian Child [ICWA]
Opinion here:
Court page with oral arguments here.
I have delayed in posting this one mostly because I found this one particularly difficult, but I’ve referenced it in multiple presentations, so here it is. In essence, the child is a Lakota child, but due to COVID and tribal citizenship requirements and enrollment delays, ICWA did not apply to their case.
Red Cloud [Oglala Sioux ICWA Director] testified that he first met Mother the day before the hearing. He testified that he had consulted with his supervisor and that it was absolutely the intention of the tribe to intervene in the proceeding. When the State pointed out that the motion to intervene contained a reference to a stranger who was not a party to the proceedings, Red Cloud apologized for the error.
Red Cloud testified that because of staff difficulties and COVID-19, there were two years’ worth of cases that were not followed up on by the Oglala Sioux Tribe. He testified that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which ordinarily signed off on tribal enrollments, had not done enrollments since March of 2020. When asked, however, whether Z.K. was “eligible for enrollment” in the Oglala Sioux Tribe, Red Cloud responded “Yes.”
On cross-examination, Red Cloud stated that it was hard to get enrollment certified because of the health issues of a BIA employee responsible for certification. Yet, Red Cloud testified that the tribe could determine whether somebody is a member or eligible for membership without certification by the BIA.
***
Red Cloud further stated that the Mother is at least half Native American regardless of whether she is a member of the Standing Rock Sioux or Oglala Sioux Tribe, and as a result, “there was no way that [the Court] can determine that [Z.K.] is not an Indian.” Red Cloud added, “[W]e need the time to figure this out.”
Obviously, that time didn’t happen and the Court found ICWA did not apply because the mother was not a citizen of Oglala. This is especially frustrating coming out of Iowa, which has an ICWA statute that attempted to define an “Indian child” as one that was recognized as such by her community. However, in 2007, the Iowa Supreme Court found that portion of the statute unconstitutional.
Adams v. Dodge Cert Petition
Here:
Questions presented:
1. Whether federal plaintiffs seeking to challenge their non-federal prosecution on the basis of bad faith face a heightened pleading standard.
2. Whether actions taken by the clerk of a non-federal court to impede review of a habeas petition obviate the petitioner’s need to further exhaust remedies in that court.
Lower court materials here.
Turtle Talk 
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