Here are the materials in Avoyelles Water Commission v. Ward 3 Avoyelles Waterworks District (W.D. La.):

Here are the materials in Avoyelles Water Commission v. Ward 3 Avoyelles Waterworks District (W.D. La.):

Here are materials from McClure v. Futrell (D. Mont.):

Here are the materials in Holguin v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (W.D. Tex.):
Here are the early pleadings in Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash.):
Here are the materials in Mendoza v. First Santa Fe Insurance Services Inc. (D.N.M.):
12 Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss
14 Response to Motion to Remand
17 Reply in Support of Motion to Remand
Related case here.
Here are the materials in Gemini Insurance Company v. Harrah’s NC Casino Company LLC (E.D. N.C.):
Here is the opinion in Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians.
From the court’s syllabus:
The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act and California law on the ground of tribal sovereign immunity.
Following the Eleventh Circuit, the panel held that a federally recognized Indian tribe does not waive its sovereign immunity from suit by exercising its right to remove to federal court a case filed against it in state court. The panel concluded that the act of removal does not express the clear and unequivocal waiver that is required for a tribe to relinquish its immunity.
The panel remanded the case, leaving it to the district court to address on remand any remaining immunity issues.
Briefs here.
Here are the materials in Feller v. Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office (D. Vt.):
Here is the opinion in Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe:
An excerpt:
Surveying the foregoing, a prior duty panel of this court cleared the underbrush by dismissing as untimely any appeal from the denial of the Motion to Dismiss. Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, No. 14-1106, Order at 1 (1st Cir. Aug. 29, 2014). That decision obviates the need to decide whether we would have had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from the Motion to Dismiss. We do need to decide, though, whether we have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the only order before us: the denial of the untimely Rule 59(e) Motion. For the reasons described below, we conclude that the denial of the Tribe’s untimely Rule 59(e) Motion does not qualify as a collateral order that we may review prior to the end of the litigation in the district court.
Briefs here.
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