Florida, the Seminoles, and the Class III Procedures

From Indianz:

Florida threatens suit over Class III procedures

Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum said he will sue the Interior Department if it issues Class III procedures for the Seminole Tribe. McCollum cited a 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decision that invalidated the Class III secretarial procedures. He said Interior can’t force a state to accept Class III gaming over the state’s objections. “They can put all they want in a letter to the governor, but I don’t think they can act on it,” McCollum told The Miami Herald. Interior says it will authorize the tribe to offer slot machines unless the state can reach a compact by November 15. The tribe and the state say they are near an agreement.

Get the Story:
State to sue feds if Seminole Tribe is given slots (The Miami Herald 11/8)

Tales from the Cert Pool: Montana Taxes at Crow

The Supreme Court denied cert in a case captioned Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. 1039 (1988) (No. 87-343). The case involved the State’s attempt to impose severance and gross proceeds on a non-Indian mining company.

The cert pool memo (from a Rehnquist clerk no less) ripped the State’s argument:

[Montana]’s contention that its taxes should not be preempted because they fall on Westmoreland, rather than on the Crow Tribe itself, is ludicrous. The state severance and gross proceeds taxes have restricted the amount of taxation [Crow] can levy on its lessees. The CA9 found that the marketability of [Crow]’s coal was significantly diminished by [Montana]’s taxes, resulting in a corresponding decrease in the amount of money accruing to[Crow]’s coffers.

Cert Pool Memo at 7.

How times have changed. After Cotton Petroleum and Wagnon, states can strategically tax for the specific purpose of limiting on-reservation activities and all but eliminate tribal tax base.

Village of Pender v. Parker — tribal court exhaustion case

Recently, a federal judge in Nebraska stayed a federal claim that the Omaha tribe has no authority to require on-reservation, non-Indian liquor vendors to obtain a tribal license to sell liquor.

The judge noted that this appears to be a question of first impression (“While the briefing has been excellent, neither side has given me a case that is squarely on point regarding whether exhaustion is required in these circumstances. As a result, I must read the ‘tea leaves.'”), but correctly stayed the case until the tribal court had a chance to opine on the jurisdiction questions.

The 2nd amended complaint is here: Complaint

The tribal motion to dismiss is here: Motion to Dismiss

The opposition is here: Opposition to Motion to Dismiss

The reply is here: Reply Brief

The court’s stay order and opinion is here: DCT Order Denying Motion to Dismiss

Wash. Court of Appeals — Dram Shop Actions and Tribal Sovereign Immunity

The Washington Court of Appeals recently decided Foxworthy v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians, a dram shop tort claim against a tribal business enterprise. The Court held that the Puyallup tribe hadn’t waived its immunity in state court.

The opinion was out, but is missing online at the moment. When I get a nice, clean pdf I’ll put it up. It is on Westlaw, etc.

The plaintiff’s brief is here: Foxworthy Opening Brief

The tribe’s response is here: Puyallup Response Brief

The plaintiff’s reply is here: Foxworthy Reply Brief

Tales from the Cert Pool: Circuit Splits and Federal Indian Law

Most cases now reach the Supreme Court because of circuit splits or splits in authority between federal courts of appeal and state supreme courts, but federal Indian law is an exception. In my study of the digital archive of Justice Blackmun’s cert pool memos from docket years 1986-1993, perhaps a quarter of cases that attracted the Court’s attention (reaching the so-called “discuss list” at conference) did so because there was a split.

One reason for the lack of circuit splits in federal Indian law is geography — well over 80 percent of cert petitions arise out of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits (and the states located within those circuits).

Moreover, because the cert petition subject matters are based on treaties or statutes that apply only within a state or a region, there is little likelihood of there ever being a split where the federal circuit and the state supreme court agree. Two examples from my forthcoming paper, “Factbound and Splitless”:

In South Dakota v. Spotted Horse, the Justice Blackmun’s clerk wrote a supplemental memo to the cert pool memo in which she wrote, “As the poolwriter noted, there will never be a split on the question of South Dakota’s jurisdiction over these tribal highways because both CA8 and the S.D. SCt agree that the State is without jurisdiction.” In Tarbell v. United States, a criminal case involving the application of a federal statute that applied to New York Indians, the cert pool memowriter (Mark Snyderman, an O’Connor clerk) noted, “Of course, NY state is probably the only other jurisdiction that would have an opportunity to rule on the issue.”

In one famous instance, the Court granted cert in a case thinking there was a circuit split when there really wasn’t (or more accurately, the split dissolved when the Court decided the case). The cases were Anderson v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation. In Anderson, the WI Supreme Court ruled that Indians living off the rez but working on the rez have to pay state income taxes. In Sac and Fox, the CA10 ruled that Indians living on trust land and working for the tribe on trust land don’t have to pay tax. That’s the split, but the split disappeared when the Court decided that trust land is the same as “Indian Country” — making the factual predicate for the split (the residence of the tribal member: one was off, one was on) disappear.

I go into greater depth in the paper, but the story basically is this. The OTC’s petition in Sac and Fox reached the Court first, but neglected to mention the Wisconsin case. The Wisconsin case reached the cert pool next, alleging the split in authority. The cert pool writer thought the Sac and Fox case was factually messier (because of the trust land question) so recommended the Court grant cert in Anderson. Also, the cert pool memowriter argued that the OTC was a bad litigant for not noting the split in the first place, so recommended that the Court go for the Wisconsin case instead. But Anderson filed indigent, and he shouldn’t have, so the Court had to order him to comply with SCT rules before his appeal would proceed. In the meantime, the Court decided to hear Sac and Fox instead. The Anderson pool memo is here and the Sac and Fox memo is here.

And it’s good thing too. Bill Rice’s mastery of oral argument before the Supreme Court can be heard here (with a little help from Edwin Kneedler).

Had the Court decided Anderson instead, it seems clear to me that it would have ruled against Anderson, who was living off the rez and refusing to pay state income taxes. Who know what would have happened to Sac and Fox Nation?

Native Heritage Month at MSU

You can download the calendar here: MSU Native Heritage Month Calendar

Highlights include Pat LeBeau’s talk on mascots on the 7th and NALSA’s panel, Tribal Extinction, featuring Marilyn Vann of the Cherokee Freedmen, on the 9th.

Angelique Eaglewoman: Tribal Values of Taxation within the Tribalist Economic Theory (SSRN)

Angelique Eaglewoman/Wambdi A. Wastewin of Hamline law has posted “Tribal Values of Taxation within the Tribalist Economic Theory” on SSRN. The paper is forthcoming from the Indigenous Nations Journal (KU).

From the Abstract:

Tribal governments in mid-North America exercise inherent sovereignty by imposing taxes within tribal territories. The recent history of commerce and commercial relationships is explored in this article along with the underlying cultural values that have guided economic relations. Taxation as a natural embodiment of tribal values of sharing and generosity fit within this tribalist economic theory. As Tribal Nations interacted with the newly formed settler government in this area, the United States, this new government sought to colonize tribal peoples, tribal resources, lands, and institutions. This colonial mentality continues to operate against Tribal Nations impeding and interfering with tribal resource management, resource utilization, taxation and the realization of prosperity. Recent developments in international indigenous human rights law support the assertion of full tribal sovereignty in the tribal territorial to the exclusion of the United States, including in the area of taxation. With this support in international law, Tribal Nations are able to continue to exercise economic development in harmony with the tribal values exemplified in the tribalist economic theory.

Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine & KBIC Tribal Court

Judge Quist in the Western District of Michigan recently remanded a tort claim back to tribal court in accordance with the tribal court exhaustion doctrine, as articulated in National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual.

The case is called Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Association v. Foucault-Funke American Legion Post 444.

The motion to dismiss is here: Memorandum in Support of Motion

The response brief is here: Response Brief

Judge Quist’s opinion remanding the case to tribal court is here: Opinion

Tales from the Cert Pool: Justice Blackmun’s Papers on Cotton Petroleum

Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico is one of the harshest outcomes in the modern era of Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court. In this case, the Court held that states may tax non-Indian-owned businesses doing business in Indian Country, even where the tribe has imposed its own tax. In short, the states may double-tax non-Indians, effectively preempting tribal taxes on the tribe’s own land.

The recent uploading of Justice Blackmun’s papers on the internet offers a glimpse into the background of the case.

In Cotton Petroleum, two documents are available: The cert pool memo and Justice Blackmun’s docket sheet recording the votes of the Justices.

The Court decided to grant certiorari in this case over the recommendation of the cert pool memo to deny cert. Justices White, Stevens, O’Connor, and Blackmun voted to grant cert (in accordance with the Rule of Four, only four votes are required to grant cert), while Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, Scalia, and Kennedy voted to deny.

One interesting (and awful) tidbit from the cert pool memo is that the memowriter noted that the tribal interests weren’t represented in the litigation and that, importantly, Cotton Petroleum hadn’t introduced evidence about the impact of New Mexico’s tax on tribal sovereignty:

“As [New Mexico] and [state] amici explain, this Court’s precedents require a showing of actual impact on tribal interests in self-government before pre-emption will be found, and [Cotton Petroleum] failed to introduce evidence of such impact in this case.” Cert Pool Memo at 7.

As noted above, the impact of New Mexico’s tax on tribal sovereignty was devastating, but since Cotton Petroleum was never in a position to make the argument, it was never developed.

Moreover, in a case denied cert that same Term, Rodney, Dickason v. Revenue Division of New Mexico, the cert pool memowriter (Deborah Malamud of NYU) argued that “the Indian preemption framework serves a substitute for the now-repudiated doctrine that state law has no effect on Indian reservations…. As that doctrine was geographical in nature, perhaps it makes sense that those same limits should apply to its modern substitute.” Cert Pool Memo in Rodney, Dickason at 8-9. But, alas, the Court decided not to adopt such a workable bright-line rule.

More tales from the cert pool memos will follow over the next several weeks.

Eagle Repository Case: United States v. Friday (CA10)

In December, the Tenth Circuit will hear oral argument in the United States’ appeal of the dismissal of the prosecution of Winslow Friday for the taking of eagle parts. The district court found that the difficulty for American Indians in obtaining eagle parts using the national eagle repository permit system violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Specifically, the court held that the eagle repository permit system was not the least restrictive means to protect eagles and therefore infringed on the religious freedom of Winslow Friday.

One element of the case that might make it difficult for Winslow Friday is the apparent fact that he never applied for a permit. The lower court found that the application of a permit was futile. However, some American Indians did seek and receive permits to fatally take eagles, perhaps only 1 but perhaps as many as 5.

The lower court order is here: District Court’s Order of Dismissal

The Government’s opening brief is here: US Opening Brief

Friday’s response brief is here: Friday’s Response Brief

The Government’s reply brief is here: US Reply Brief