Ninth Circuit – Page 58

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment charging the defendant, an Indian, with two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).

Applying United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989), the panel held that, subject to the narrow exception recognized in case law for statutes that serve merely as enforcement mechanisms for civil disabilities, tribal court convictions may be used in subsequent prosecutions only if the tribal court guarantees a right to counsel that is, at minimum, coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right. Because the defendant’s tribal court domestic abuse convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment had they been obtained in federal or state court, the panel concluded that it is constitutionally impermissible to use them to establish an element of the offense in a subsequent prosecution under § 117(a), which is an ordinary recidivist statute and not a criminal enforcement scheme for a civil disability.

Concurring, Judge Watford wrote separately to highlight
why Ant warrants reexamination.

Judge Watford correctly notes that a circuit split on this issue has arisen with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits:

It’s perhaps unsurprising that our decision in this case conflicts with decisions from two of our sister circuits. Faced with almost identical scenarios—prior, uncounseled tribal court convictions that would have violated the Sixth Amendment in state or federal court and that were used as predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 117—the Eighth and Tenth Circuits pointedly disagreed with us. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 595, 604 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 995–98 (10th Cir. 2011). As our colleagues on the Eighth Circuit noted, “Supreme Court authority in this area is unclear; reasonable decisionmakers may differ in their conclusions as to whether the Sixth Amendment precludes a federal court’s subsequent use of convictions that are valid because and only because they arose in a court where the Sixth Amendment did not apply.” Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605. Given this circuit split and the lack of clarity in this area of Sixth Amendment law, the Supreme Court’s intervention seems warranted.

If nothing else, the case at least may generate support for en banc review. We posted materials on these two cases here (the Supreme Court denied cert). I wrote about this issue a few years ago in a paper titled “Sovereign Comity.“

Here are the briefs:

Bryant Opening Brief

US Brief

Bryant Reply Brief

Bryant Supplemental Brief

US Supplemental Brief

Ninth Circuit Rejects Treaty Argument in King Mountain Tobacco v. McKenna

September 26, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here is the opinion.

The court’s syllabus:

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment, the panel held that the Yakama Treaty of 1855 did not preclude enforcement of the State of Washington’s escrow statute, which requires tobacco companies to place money from cigarette sales into escrow to reimburse the State for health care costs related to the use of tobacco products.

The panel held that Washington’s escrow statute was a nondiscriminatory law and that the activities of King Mountain Tobacco Co., a company owned and operated by an enrolled member of the Yakama Indian Nation, were largely off-reservation. Accordingly, absent express federal law to the contrary, King Mountain was subject to the escrow statute. The panel held that the plain text of the Yakama Treaty did not create a federal exemption from the escrow statute. Specifically, Article II of the Treaty, which established the boundaries of the Yakama reservation and reserved it for Yakama use and benefit, was not an express federal law that exempted King Mountain from the escrow statute. Nor was Article III, which reserved to the tribe the right to travel on public highways and the right to hunt and fish. The panel held that the district court did not err by declining to make findings regarding the Treaty’s meaning to the Yakama people at the time of its signing because the meaning to the Yakama people could not overcome the clear words of the Treaty.

Briefs here.

Ninth Circuit Affirms Title VII Exemption for Tribal Preference in Employment`

September 26, 2014September 26, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the opinion in EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co.:

EEOC Opinion – 09-26-2014

The syllabus:

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with respect to its claim that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited the tribal hiring preference contained in Peabody Western Coal Co. leases with the Navajo Nation.

The panel held that the Navajo hiring preference in the leases was a political classification, rather than a classification based on national origin, and therefore did not violate Title VII. The panel concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to defendants Peabody Western Coal Company and Navajo Nation, and third-party defendant Secretary of the Interior. The panel also held that the EEOC waived on appeal its record-keeping claim. Finally, the panel held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the EEOC’s eleventh-hour motion to supplement the record with a declaration and documents about Peabody’s hiring practices in 1999.

Briefs here. Oral argument audio here.

Friends of Amador County v. Jewell Cert Petition

September 26, 2014September 30, 2014Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

FAC Cert Petition FILED

Question presented:

Whether, in an action by a third party against the Secretary of the Interior under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., a putative Indian tribe may invoke its sovereign immunity to prevent a court from reviewing the lawfulness of the Secretary’s decision to recognize it as a tribe.

Lower court materials here.